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Abstract
Abstract
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are a network of autonomous devices. A MANET
has a distributed, multi-hop network architecture that does not depend on any pre-existing
network infrastructure for its deployment, and for this reason, MANETs have gained a high
significance in modern wireless networking technologies. However, data and routing services in
these networks are highly vulnerable to a variety of attacks such as sleep deprivation, black hole,
grey hole and rushing attacks. Although research efforts have previously been made to secure
MANETs, most of the work in the literature has focused on detecting and preventing MANETs
from specific kind of attacks. Therefore, the motivation of this thesis emanates from realizing the
need to secure MANETs from a wide variety of attacks.
This thesis proposes a novel generalized intrusion detection & prevention mechanism that
can protect MANETs from a range of attacks with a reasonable overhead on the network. The
contribution in this thesis in terms of intrusion detection and prevention mechanism for MANETs
is proposed in three main incremental phases: (1) Design & implementation of adaptive intrusion
detection & prevention (AIDP) against denial of services (DoS) attacks. It first shows the
unsuitability of tools based on static threshold such as control chart as DoS detector and then
proposes anomaly based intrusion detection system that uses chi-square test in combination with
control chart to detect, identify and isolate intruding nodes using variable threshold. (2) Extension
of AIDP into a generalized intrusion detection and prevention mechanism (CIDP). It employs a
combination of anomaly based and knowledge based intrusion detection that takes advantage of
both intrusion detection techniques to secure MANETs from wide variety of attacks, including
multiple different simultaneous attacks. (3) Indicating deficiencies of fixed intrusion response of
GIDP and then to overcome these deficiencies an adaptive intrusion response scheme is proposed
for GIDP. This adaptive intrusion response scheme selects the intrusion response action based on
severity of attack, degradation in network performance and impact of intrusion response action to
improve and maintain a desired level of network performance. All aspects of each phase of the
proposed protection mechanism are assessed and their effectiveness is demonstrated through
extensive simulations including case studies.
Keywords: Mobile ad hoc network security, intrusion detection & prevention, intrusion
response, secure routing and data services.
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Chapter 1
1 Introduction
The rapid development of devices such as laptops, notepads, PDAs, mobile phone
handsets, satellite navigation systems for vehicles, Bluetooth peripherals and other gadgets that
take advantage of wireless communication has encouraged & attracted research activities in
wireless networking technology in the last decade. As they become part of our everyday activity,
the importance of providing services such as connectivity, management and security for networks
consisting of these devices has increased dramatically. Mobile Ad Hoc networks (MANETs) [4]
have emerged as one of the next generation networking technologies. A temporary network can
dynamically form without the need of any existing infrastructure using mobile ad hoc networking
technology.
A mobile ad hoc network is a network of autonomous devices, which communicate
through wireless medium. A MANET has a distributed, multi-hop network architecture that does
not depend on any pre-existing network infrastructure for its deployment. The requirement to
deploy a MANET is at least two mobile nodes in communication range of each other. The
MANET environment differs significantly from fixed networks. In particular, the network
topology of MANETs is dynamic because the nodes in MANETs are free to join and leave the
network at any time, as they are free to move arbitrarily [5]. Another major characteristic of a
MANET node is the ability to route information for other nodes in order to provide a routing
service in the network in the absence of other routing devices.
Mobile ad hoc networks have the desired features of fast deployment and the ability to
communicate while on the move, which meets the requirement of next generation networking
technology. However, certain features such as a lack of centralized control, cooperative routing,
and limited computational ability of their nodes poses extra security challenges.
To obtain a desired level of security service in fixed wired networks, a network firewall
[6] is normally used to limit traffic between the network and the outside world to prevent attacks.
However, a firewall does not prevent attacks inside the network; hence, intrusion detection
systems and other security mechanisms based on cryptographic techniques are extensively used in
conjunction with firewalls in fixed networks. Due to the fact that firewall implementation in
MANETs are not operationally feasible because of their lack of centralized control, Intrusion
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Detection and Prevention (IDP) [7] systems become the front line of defence to protect mobile ad
hoc networks. Intrusion Detection is defined in [57] a~ a security system for computers and
networks for detecting inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activity or behavior. To find
evidence of security violation it employs various detection techniques and then it initiates an
intrusion response to alleviate the damage and prevent further attacks.
Although deployment of any security mechanism in mobile ad hoc networks is a
demanding task, intrusion detection and prevention has transpired as a promising approach to deal
with most of the security challenges with a reasonable overhead on MANETs as we shall show
through our proposed lOP mechanism.
1.1 Research Motivation
With the rapid proliferation of mobile devices and their extensive use in modem lifestyle,
the paradigm of networking has shifted from fixed networks to mobile wireless networking
technologies with limited or no infrastructure support. This paradigm shift was indicated in [8]
[9], where visionary researchers described the future integration of mobile networking
technologies with the Internet.
Mobile ad hoc networks have high significance in current pervasive networking due to
their desirable features such as fast deployment and no need for existing infrastructure. Because of
these features mobile ad hoc networks are best suited to provide networking facilities in case of
emergencies and natural disasters for example, in case of earthquake where there is no
infrastructure available a MANET can be formed to carried out rescue operations. However,
routing and data services in these networks are vulnerable to security threats because of the
following reasons.
• In the absence of routers, nodes in the network have to participate and
cooperatively achieve the routing and data service requirement.
• Because of the open architecture of the network where the nodes are free to join in
and leave any time, a rogue node can join the network to cause damage.
• Most commonly used ad hoc routing protocols such as Ad hoc On-demand
Distance Vector routing (AODV) [to] and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [11]
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are designed under the assumption that all nodes trust each other and there are no
malicious intruder nodes in the network. Therefore, the presence of any such nodes
imposes security challenges. Malicious nodes can cause severe disruption through
a wide variety of attacks including both routing and data forwarding attacks.
• Stringent resource constraints exist in MANETs; for example, most of the nodes in
MANETs rely on exhaustible battery resources and intruders can exploit this to
compromise routing and data forwarding service in the network.
• Highly dynamic topology of the network due to nodes' mobility makes it difficult
to detect the attacking node.
Therefore, the fundamental motivation of the research described in this thesis emerges from
realizing the need to secure mobile ad hoc networks from a wide variety of attacks. Attacks from
intruder or malicious nodes cause various degree of damage to the network depending on the type
of attack used. We note that a substantial research effort has already been made to secure
MANETs. We can find several examples in literature where various routing attacks are analyzed
and then proposals are made to detect these individual attacks. However, our view in this thesis
is that most of the work described previously in the literature has focused on detecting and
preventing a single attack; but very few have suggested a generalize approach that can protect
against a wide variety of attacks.
We consider that security is a major service for MANETs, where there is no central
administration or control to monitor and identify attacks or activities that compromise network
security. We also note the lack of research on mechanisms with the capability to detect and
prevent a range of possible attacks in MANETs. Therefore in our opinion, further research is
needed on mechanisms that can guard MANETs against a wide variety of attacks effectively.
This is especially true for reactive routing protocols since they are more widely used. It is also our
view that not only is detection of these attacks required, but also there is need to identify the
intruding nodes and develop strategies to mitigate the damages caused by these attacks and
ultimately preventing such attacks. In addition, it is imperative to consider operational feasibility
of any proposed security mechanism by recognising the constraint of MANETs such as their
limited processing ability and lack of centralized control.
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1.2 Research Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a novel lightweight generalized intrusion
detection & prevention mechanism that can protect MANETs from a wide variety of attacks and
ensure a desired level of security service in the network. Most of the intrusion detection systems
described in the literature emphasize the detection and identification processes and give less
importance to the ways to respond to the intrusion. We believe intrusion detection and prevention
systems that respond to intrusion rigidly are inefficient in some cases in MANETs. Therefore, it is
also part of our objective in this thesis to propose flexible and adaptive intrusion detection and
prevention system that along with detecting and identifying intrusion can investigate, analyze, and
develop strategies to respond to the intrusion efficiently. Because of the highly dynamic
environment of MANETs, it is also imperative for any security solution to adapt. Realizing this,
our approach has the ability to adapt in order to cope with MANETs dynamic environment in all
stages of intrusion detection and prevention.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
The contributions of this thesis focus on the development of a new intrusion detection and
prevention mechanism to protect mobile ad hoc networks. The proposed mechanism is a
combination of design and implementation efforts in order to contribute towards improving
security services in MANETs. The different aspects of this thesis contribution are as follows:
a. Adaptive Intrusion Detection and Prevention of Denial of Service attacks
An adaptive intrusion detection and prevention (AIDP) protocol is designed and
implemented. We illustrate its effectiveness by using it on top of the routing protocol to protect
against distributed denial of service attacks in MANETs. An anomaly based mechanism is
proposed that uses the combination of chi square goodness of fit test and control chart to first
detect and then identify an intruder. AIDP successfully detect, identify and isolate the intruding
node causing denial of service (DoS) attacks with an affordable processing overhead as shown in
simulation results (chapter 3).
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b. Generalized Intrusion Detection and Prevention
A generalized intrusion detection and prevention (GIDP) architecture is designed by
extending AIDP. It continuously monitors network characteristic parameters and derives
parameters that reflect network performance. This novel design employs a combination of
anomaly and knowledge based intrusion detection that takes advantage of both intrusion
detections techniques. Proposed approach operates in stages in first stage it detects intrusion in the
network, identifies the attack, identify intruding nodes and finally isolate the intruding nodes from
the network.
c. Protection from wide variety ofmultiple simultaneous attacks
GIDP takes advantage of knowledge-based ID technique through which it maintains the
signatures of known attacks that allows it to identify various attacks. A case study is conducted
where GIDP is simulated and tested with a number of scenarios with different attacks. The
contribution of this case study is the success of GIDP to protect MANETs from a variety of
attacks and with multiple simultaneous attacks with an affordable processing overhead on the
network (chapter 4).
d. Investigation of the impact of various attacks OD MANETs performance
The contribution of this investigation through the case study is the realization that different
attacks cause various degree of damage to the network. Some attacks are very severe and cause
overall network performance to degrade dramatically in a short span of time. On the other hand,
some attacks are mild and have lowest influence on the network performance. This investigation
has resulted in the idea of an adaptive intrusion response that takes account of the degree of
damage an attack causes on network.
e. Improved network perfonnance through adaptive intrusion response
We note from (d) that in some cases a fixed response of GlOP, i.e. isolating the intruding
node from the network, actually results in a net degradation of network performance. The
contribution in this part of the mechanism for the adaptive intrusion. response scheme for GIDP is
to design three levels of response; this has the ability to trade off the impact of attack and the
impact of certain intrusion response so as to optimise the network performance. Simulation results
of the case study shows that GIDP with adaptive intrusion response can cover the deficiencies of
GIDP with fixed response inmost cases (chapter 5).
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The proposed protection mechanism facilitates adaptability in all aspects of the thesis'
contributions but in two different contexts. In the first aspect of the contribution «a) above), in
AIDP the term adaptability refers the ability of protection mechanism to cope with the dynamics
of MANETs in the intrusion detection phase. In the last aspect of the contribution «e) above) the
adaptive intrusion response mentioned is specific for the intrusion response scheme for GIDP.
This is adaptive in terms of its selection of intrusion response action that is based on the detected
attack, the severity of attack and degradation in network performance
1.4 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 describes the background of the research areas investigated and describes the related
work performed in these research areas. It first presents the MANETs paradigm, their security
vulnerabilities that allow various attacks, description of attacks, and the existing proposals aiming
to protect against these attacks in MANETs. Then this chapter introduce the fundamentals of
intrusion detection and prevention including classification of intrusion detection systems, ID
techniques, highlighting the challenges faces by intrusion detection system IDS in MANETs. We
follow this with the review of existing IDS architectures and proposed IDS in MANETs from the
literature.
Chapter 3 first shows how denial of service attacks can be introduced in the network and
unsuitability of methods based on static thresholds to detect denial of service attacks in MANETs.
and then we presents adaptive intrusion detection and prevention algorithm that uses variable
thresholds including its model design , assumptions and detailed description of the algorithm.
Finally, the evaluation of AIDP through simulated scenarios shows our approach can successfully
detect, identify, and isolate the intruding nodes attempting to cause denial of service attacks.
Chapter 4 extends this work and presents a novel generalized intrusion detection and prevention
mechanism for securing MANETs. This chapter starts with illustrating how an intruder can launch
various attacks in MEANTs then emphasize the need and motivation for a general approach that
can guard against multiple attacks in MANETs. We then explain the architecture, design and
algorithm of our approach. Further, it includes evaluation of GIDP through the case study with
various attacks including multiple simultaneous attacks scenarios. Simulations results illustrating
23
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the effectiveness of our approach in protecting MANETs from a wide variety of attacks included
at the end.
Chapter 5 analyze the intrusion response mechanism for GIDP, with the aim of increasing the
effectiveness of overall intrusion detection and prevention mechanism. This chapter begins with
introduction of intrusion response and review some of the intrusion response mechanism in
literature from MANETs. Then we demonstrate the need for an adaptive intrusion response in
MANETs. We next present an adaptive mechanism, including details of response model, types of
punishment and selected set of punishment for GIDP intrusion response mechanism. Finally, the
proposed response mechanism evaluation through case study is included at the end.
Chapter 6 first provides thesis summary then overview the contribution we made in this thesis
including conclusions and finally highlights the open research issues and challenges for future
based on the current work in the area.
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Chapter 2
2 Background and Related Work
Technological advances in field of communications have occurred at an incredible pace in
the last few decades that has changed the way we live and communicate; in particular,
breakthroughs in the "wireless world" have revolutionized our lifestyle. Developments in
technology have not only brought change in personal lifestyle but also from a commercial
perspective companies are adopting to the advancement in wireless networking technology to
improve customer services. One of the major advances in the wireless networking technology is
the concept of ad hoc networking. Mobile ad hoc network has attracted the research community
since mid 1990s, due to the rapid growth of wireless devices and Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11). As part of
this, a significant amount of research in MANETs has looked at providing desirable level of
security services. This chapter first explains the paradigm of mobile ad hoc networking including
its characteristics, application and routing. We then consider security aspects, describing
vulnerabilities, classifying possible attacks and reviewing existing proposals that secure MANETs
from attacks. Finally, in the last section we present concepts of intrusion detection and prevention
(IDP) including, categorization of IDS, ID techniques, IDS challenges in MANETs, and review
existing IDS architectures and proposals from the literature.
2.1 MANETs Paradigm
2.1.1 Background& Standards
The evolution of Ad Hoc networks can be categorized into three generations. The first
one is considered to date from 1972 when it was called PRNET (Packet Radio Network) [12],
where CSMA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access) was used as the access mechanism. The second
generation of ad-hoc networks emerged in the 1980s, when enhanced ad-hoc network systems
were implemented as a part of the SURAN (Survivable Adaptive Radio Networks)[13] program.
This introduced a packet-switched network without a preexisting infrastructure for battlefield
environment. In the 1990s, with the emergence of wireless devices such as notebook the concept
of commercial ad-hoc networks arrived. At the same time, the concept of a collection of mobile
devices working together was proposed at several research conferences and the IEEE 802.11 sub
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committee adopted the term of "ad hoc networks". Since then the research community has
recognized this as a wireless ad hoc networking paradigm. In 1997 the IETF established the
Mobile Ad hoc Networking Working Group [14] and since then substantial effort hass beeen put
in by the research community for standardization on this emerging paradigm. The purpose of this
working group is to standardize the routing protocol by considering their suitable functionality in
MANETs environment. They developed two standard track routing protocol specifications as
reactive MANET protocols and proactive MANET protocols. One of the main considerations for
the standardization of routing protocols is their performance issues such as loop freedom, demand
based operations, distributed operation and proactive operations [15]. Taking into consideration
the configuration issues of MANETs, IETF recently formed another working group called Ad
Hoc Networks Autoconfiguration (autoconf) [16]. The main aim of this working group is to
describe the issues in addressing model for ad hoc networks that is how the nodes in ad hoc
network configure their address both locally and globally when they connect to other networks.
The autoconf working group has contributed in a form of internet draft [17], where they propose
and describe a model for configuring IP addresses in ad hoc networks. The research community
perspective on this multihop ad hoc networking technology has changed as the technology has
developed in the last two decades [18] [19]. In [18] they defined the term pure MANETs refering
to an ad hoc network with no infrastructure support as compared to one with limited infrastructure
support. The former is now considered as one of the desirable features for ad hoc networking.
In [20] IEEE 802.11a, the IEEE defined the standard for wireless local area network
(LAN) technology, which was published in 1999 and has been revised and amended several times
[21][22][23] for improvement. Enhancement to the existing medium access control and physical
layer specification was the main purpose of enhanced standard [24J in which it describes IEEE
802.11 architecture components. Basic Service Set (BSS) is a basic component for IEEE LAN
technology. An access point (AP) and all the stations associated with it called a BSS. The
coverage of the AP known as basic service area (BSA) and if a station is moved out of the BSA
then it cannot directly communicate with the other stations in the BSS. BSS can connect other
BSS if they have a common service set identifier (SSID) and this set of interconnected BSS are
called extended service set (ESS). Key feature of this ESS is that stations within the ESS can
communicate and may move from one BSS to another transparently to logical link control.
Independent basic service set (IBSS) is the component of IEEE 802.11 architecture as
shown in fig 2-1; it defines the standard for ad hoc mode of operations. In this mode, no access
point is required, stations communicate in a distributed manner, and the minimum requirement is
two stations within the radio range of each other. The station that initiate communication acts
initially as an access point and broadcast the properties of newly formed ad hoc network and the
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Figure 2-1: Ad Hoc architecture using IEEE 802.11 IBSS
station within the range connect to this station in a peer-to-peer manner to form ad hoc network.
With the rapid growth of wireless devices that support IEEE 802.11 technology ad hoc
networking modes is becoming increasing popular and widely applicable.
2.1.2 MANET Characteristics
MANETs are entirely different from fixed networks while quite similar to other wireless
networks such as wireless mesh networks or wireless sensor networks. Some of the key
characteristics [15] of MANETs are outlined below
Fast Deployment MANETs support pure ad hoc networking i.e. no pre existing infrastructure is
required which makes the deployment of these networks fast and easy. As described above, the
minimum requirement to deploy an ad hoc network is two nodes with a wireless interface within
the radio range of each other. This is the most desirable characteristic of MANETs that has made
it widely applicable especially in cases where network is needed and no infrastructure is available
such as in case of emergencies or for personal networking in remote areas.
Dynamic Topology Nodes in MANETs are free to move arbitrarily; thus the network topology
which is typically multi hop may change randomly and rapidly at unpredictable times. Due to
mobility of nodes, the total number of nodes present in the network keeps changing with time and
that makes it difficult to define or model the overall topology of the network.
Self-Organization Self-organization is a process during which the internal organization of a
system, is systematized without being managed by an outsider [58]. Nodes in MANETs are called
self-organized firstly because they should be self aware in a sense that they need the detailed
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knowledge of their components, status, capacity and all connections with other nodes and
secondly they need to configure themselves automatically.
Energy Constrained Operation Some or all the nodes in a MANET rely on batteries or other
exhaustible means for their energy, so to converse energy it is vital that the network protocols
make sure that these nodes do not perform unnecessary operations. Having limited processing
ability of nodes due to their energy constraint is not ideal in ad hoc networking where nodes acts
as routers and they have to route packets for others nodes in the network. Intruders normally
exploit the limited computational ability of nodes in MANETs and force them to process
unnecessary packets in order to drain their battery.
Limited Physical Security Mobile networks are more prone to threats related to physical
security for example, eavesdropping, interception, denial of serves and routing attacks as
compared to fixed -wired networks because their management usually not under central control.
A node moving in this hostile environment has a non-negligible probability of being
compromised, that is, an attack can be launched within a network at any time to compromise the
node.
Limited Bandwidth Mobile ad hoc network bandwidth is limited as compared to fixed networks
because wireless links have significantly lower capacity as compared to fixed networks. Because
of multiple access, fading, noise and interference the throughput of the wireless networks is often
less than the fixed networks.
Lack of Centralized Management MANETs use IEEE 802.11 IBSS technology where nodes
operate in a distributed manner without any centralized control by a network administrator. This
property leads to the issues of organizing and managing these networks. Lack of centralized
control make monitoring and detection of attacks challenging. This also hinders cryptographic
techniques used to maintain trust and provide other security service in the network. In general the
lack of centralized control in MAENTs can influence several operational aspects of the network.
2.1.3 MANETs Applications
MANETs are now deployed and used in wider fields such as business environment,
commercial or industrial use, crisis management, personal networking and military purpose etc.
This section outlines some of the main areas for mobile ad hoc networks applications.
On the Fly Collaborative Application In the business environment, where there is a need for
collaborative computing outside the office environment for example meeting to brief clients on a
given assignment. Some cases during the conference or seminar participants need a network to
communicate and share proceedings with other peers. In another scenario during fieldwork,
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engineers need the computer networking facilities to work in a team for a project. In all the above
situations considering the. need of minimal configuration and quick deployment of a temporary
network, a mobile ad hoc network is operationally and economically a feasible choice.
Crisis Management A mobile ad-hoc network is most suitable to provide crisis management
services applications, such as in disaster recovery, where the entire communication infrastructure
is destroyed and establishing a network for communication quickly is crucial. Using a mobile ad-
hoc networking technology, a network could be set up in hours instead of weeks. In emergencies
caused by natural disasters such as earthquake, fire and flood ad hoc networking technology
provides a quick and easy way to connect police, fire ambulance, medical staff and other
independent teams to perform rescue operations.
Commercial Applications There is a growing research interest for analyzing the applicability of
MANETs for commercial purposes. Researchers are investigating technicalities of possible
application scenarios of MANETs in commercial areas. For example, communication dispatch
systems for taxi in a town use to inform individual taxis about passenger pickups, route directions,
weather conditions etc. Although taxi networks has central point from where the communications
to individual taxis takes place, this communication dispatch system of taxis works in an ad hoc
manner. In [25] Huang et al. proposed an application scenario of mobile ad hoc network in the
form of a radio dispatch system for taxis. They investigated both technical and financial aspects to
check the feasibility of the proposed system. They concluded that a MANET based dispatch
system for taxis appears to be feasible in certain conditions and they indicate the risk associated
with this system.
Personal Area Networking A personal area network (PAN) is a communication network of
personal devices such as computers, personal digital assistant (PDAs), telephones and notepads. A
PAN can be a wired or wireless network for example PDAs connected through Bluetooth are an
example of wireless personal networking eliminating the need of wire using IEEE 802.15[27].
These devices can form an ad hoc network to communicate and achieve other networking
facilities using IEEE 802.11. In [28] authors conducted an interesting comparison of Bluetooth
based PAN with an IEEE 802.11 ad hoc system. They compared them by focusing on link layer
and networking functionalities of these PANs.
Battlefield Application The military has been using mobile ad hoc networks for their battlefield
application since late 1970s. It is the main area of application for mobile ad hoc networks.
Networking of wireless devices in battlefield is critical to ensure the timely flow of information
and command which in a way contributes to the success of the mission. Mobile ad hoc networks
may initially lack the scalability and reliability as compared to fixed infrastructure based
networks, but the ability to establish field communication instantaneously is one of the reasons
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why they are aggressively pursuing MANETs. A significant percentage of research in military
communications is devoted to the MANETs applicability and challenges in this hostile
environment. For example in [29] Burbank et al. provide an overview of key challenges of
MANETs in military battle field networking and highlight several deficiencies of MANET
technology in this application. In another example [30] Ossama study the concept and challenges
for the design and implementation of MANETs for mission critical networks.
2.1.4 MANET Routing
The routing protocols used in fixed-networks and internet are inadequate in ad hoc
networks because of the decentralized architecture, no pre-existing infrastructure and in particular
the dynamically changing topology ofMANETs. In [31] Obraczka et al. describe the routing
issues in ad hoc networks and argue that wireless ad hoc networks are well suited to multicast
communications; they also discuss possible approaches for multicast routing. Because of the
mobility of nodes in an ad hoc network, routing protocols face various difficulties. For example,
wired networks rely on symmetric links that are always fixed; on the other hand wireless networks
links are asymmetric simply because nodes are mobile and frequently change their location in the
network. Therefore, the topology of these networks is dynamic and routing tables of these
protocols must somehow be able to reflect changes in the topology of the network. Because of the
need of frequently updating the routing table and the need to deal with stale routes, routing
protocols for these networks should also consider the routing overhead and strategies to minimize
these overhead. Thus with the popularity of mobile ad hoc networks, the researcher has challenges
to handle and accommodate these dissimilar characteristic of ad hoc networks while designing the
routing protocols.
2.1.4.1 Classification of Routing Protocols
Network routing protocols can be classified based on several criteria. Most routing
protocols proposed for either fixed and wireless networks are dynamic routing protocols, that is,
they allow routing tables on the router to change and update as the possible routes change as
compared to the static where the routing table is set up in a static manner and does not allows the
changes. Since the emergence of MANETs, routing protocols is the most investigated area of
research, several routing protocols have already been proposed and evaluated against various
aspects such as scalability, security, performance, provision of quality of services (QoS) and
adaptability. In [32] Hong et al. presented a survey on routing protocols and then classified the
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routing protocol in three broad categories as shown in fig 2-2. In the flat network routing protocol
category, all nodes have an equal role in the network; on the other hand in hierarchical routing
protocols, the network is organized hierarchically, and nodes are assigned different roles. This
hierarchical organization of ad hoc network also known as clustering. The hierarchical routing
approach is useful when the network size is significantly large and when flat routing protocols
efficiency decrease because of the increase in the processing overhead. Cluster gateway switch
routing (CGSR) [33] and hierarchical state routing (HSR) [34] are examples of hierarchical
routing approach. HSR that follows link state routing, first divide network into logical levels and
then use clustering scheme recursively to maintain cluster of nodes which are at same level. The
main purpose is to reduce routing overhead in terms of routing table distribution, storage and
processing. An extension of HSR was proposed in [47] where they extended the hierarchical state
routing protocols for hierarchical, heterogeneous multilayer ad hoc wireless networks considering
the battlefield application. In last category the routing is assisted with Global Positioning System
(GPS) embedded on the nodes. Research has indicated that geographical location information
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Figure 2-2: Classification of Ad hoc routing protocols [32]
can improve the routing performance of MANETs however, there are concerns that location
provided by these devices may not be accurate and could lead to inappropriate routing.
Geographic addressing and routing [35], and location aided routing protocol [36] are examples of
geographic assisted routing.
The IETF MANET working group [14] has develop two standard tracks for routing
protocol specifications considering the wireless routing applications, reactive and proactive
routing protocols, as stated above.
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Proactive Routing
Proactive routing protocols, also known as table driven routing protocols, require each
node to maintain consistent up to date routing information of the networks in more than one
tables. It is essential that these protocols adopt changes in network topology through propagating
routing table updates periodically throughout the network to make routing information consistent
for the nodes in the network but these updates cause a significant routing overheads. A number of
routing protocols proposal are presented in the literature based on this proactive table driven
routing but they differ in two areas [37] a) the number of routing related tables used and b) the
method in which changes in network structure are broadcasted. Some examples of these protocols
are OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing) [38], DSDV (Destination Sequenced Distance Vector
Routing) [39] and WRP (The Wireless Routing Protocol) [40]. OLSR follows a classical link state
algorithm with some optimization such as it selects some nodes as multipoint relays which
broadcast messages during the route discovery process hence reduces the message overhead as
compare to traditional link state algorithm. Another optimization is that only selected multipoint
relay nodes generate link state information and only partial link state information is distributed in
the networks that results in reduce overall network overhead as compare to classical link state
routing. On the other hand, DSDV follows the distance-vector approach of classical Bellman-
Ford routing algorithm where distance represents the cost of reaching the destination and vector
represents the direction towards the destination. In addition, it maintains the sequence number
associated to the freshness of the route. In order to maintain routing table consistency the routing
table update are periodically distributed in the network in this protocol.
Reactive Routing
The term reactive routing is also known as source initiated on-demand routing. In contrast
with proactive the reactive on-demand routing creates a route only when the source node requires
a route towards destination. Most of the reactive routing protocol operations mainly consist of
route discovery and route maintenance procedures. They initiate the routing discovery process,
which completes when either a route is found or the entire network is examined. They maintain
established routes following a specific route maintenance procedure until either the route is no
longer desired or the destination becomes inaccessible. In [41] Fotino et al. perform an interesting
comparison of reactive (DSR) and proactive (OLSR) routing protocols through evaluating their
energy consumption during the routing process. They found that reactive routing protocols are
more efficient when the traffic load is low. However, at higher traffic rate proactive routing
protocols perform a bit better than reactive routing protocol. A similar study is performed in [42],
where they compared performances of OLSR, DSR and AODV using end to end data delay, jitter,
packet delivery ratio and routing load through simulating a case study. They concluded that
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reactive routing protocols AODV & DSR are efficient and more adapted for data services such as
file transfer as compare to proactive routing protocol.
We choose AODV routing protocol as an example to apply our proposed scheme simply
because currently AODV is the most commonly use routing protocols, but our approach can be
applied to other routing protocols. We now describe the operation of AODV in some detail.
2.1.4.2 Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing
Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing protocol (AODV) is a reactive routing protocol
that enables dynamic, self-starting, multi hop routing for MANETs. It is an on-demand routing i.e.
routes are obtained only when they are needed. Message types in AODV protocol are outlined
below:
Route Request Packet (RREQ)
Route Reply Packet (RREP)
Route Error Packet (RERR)
Hello Message
A brief description of the routing operation [43] of ADOV is as follows:
a) Generating Route Requests:
When a node needs a route to a destination and does not have one available then it
broadcast a RREQ packet containing RREQ IBroadcast id , source address, destination address ,
hop count and destination sequence number (which is the last sequence number known for the
destination node). Sequence number reflects the freshness of the route, a larger sequence number
means a fresher route. After broadcasting, a RREQ node waits for a specific time for RREP or
other control packet. If a RREP is not received within this time, then the node may try again.
b) Controlling Dissemination of Route Requests:
The node uses expanding ring search techniques for controlled flooding of RREQ in the
network. Specifically the node initially sends a RREQ with Time to Live (TIL) field set to one
then it waits for specific time, after this time expires then node may sends a RREQ again with
incremented TIL value. The node can repeat this process until either a RREP or RERR packet is
received or the TTL value reaches the NET Diameter (can be defined as the highest possible value
of TTL) after that the node can retry the same path discovery for a specific destination up to a
maximum RREQ retries.
c) Processing Route Requests
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When a node receives a RREQ it first checks the broadcast id and source address of the
packets. If it has received the same RREQ packet within a Path Discovery time, it then silently
discards the packet because the packet has already reached it along another path. If it has not
already received this RREQ, it then looks whether it has a fresh route (by comparing the packet's
destination sequence number with the one it already has) to a destination. If so, the node sends a
RREP to source node else it forward the RREQ with destination sequence number requested.
d) Maintaining Sequence No: In AODV each node maintains its destination sequence number
to ensure the loop-freedom property of all routes towards that node. Whenever a node receives
new information about sequence number from RREQ, RREP or RERR messages related to the
destination, the destination sequence number is updated to ensure the freshness of the route.
e) Route Reply Generation:
A route reply (RREP) is generated either by the destination node itself or by an
intermediate node. If the node who has initiated the RREP is the destination node then it places its
sequence number into the destination sequence number field and set the lifetime field of RREP
before sending a unicast RREP back to the source node. When an intermediate node generates a
RREP it first updates its own table and copies its own sequence number into destination sequence
number field and also places its distance in number of hops from the destination node before
generating a route reply.
f) Maintaining Local Connectivity:
Hello messages are use in AODV to offer and maintain local connectivity of mobile
nodes. A node checks after every Hello Interval whether it has heard from his neighbour; if not
then it sends a RREP packet with TIL =1. This represents a Hello Message and waits for a
specific time and if it does not receive a reply then the node assume that the link to the neighbour
is lost.
2.2 Security Concepts, Vulnerabilities & Attacks in MANETs
This section introduces basic security concepts, and describes vulnerability of wireless
routing protocols, attacks in MANETs and reviews existing work from literature that provide
protection against attacks. Security is an important & desired service for computer networks
irrespective of whether they are personal, public or organizational networks. The wide use of Wi-
Fi in public places, where various unknown devices connect through it, impose security
challenges. Normally providing connectivity through Wi-Fi hotspots is a prime importance and
security is given least precedence. Although these Wi-Fi hotspots employs Wi-Fi Protected
Access (WPA)[61], still a user with cruel intentions can harm & capture important information.
Therefore, we consider it is also important both for the service providers to take measures and
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also for the user to employ the security measures (protect important files, turn on personal
firewalls) form their sides as well for secure surfing in public networks. Most organizations have
now realized that it not only their tangible assets such as building, equipments, & offices that are
significant but also organizations' information assets have both a value and cost associated with
them. Now with most organizations doing business online they are forced to protect their
information & resources on the network from both outside and inside attackers. In [65] Karnik
and Passerini discuss the importance and issues of wireless network security from a business
prospective. They list the financial benefits of using wireless networks in corporate sector,
highlight security concern in implementation of these networks and draw attention to the factors
an organization should consider before implanting wireless networks. The concept of security
differs with the nature of the network but it is important to understand the basic concept of
network security. Realizing this Tadashi et al. [62] propose a network security model to provide
common conceptual understanding of network security by integrating network security issues.
Wireless networks are more prone to security threats than their wired networks although
wireless networks (wireless LAN, cellular, wireless ad hoc, sensor networks) technology have
became an indispensible part of our life however, security issues with these wireless networking
technology is the main obstacle to their widespread adoption. To tackle this obstacle we have seen
a significant amount of research to enhance security standards for wireless networks. For example
when it is realized that Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) [63] is a deprecated algorithm to secure
wireless networks because WEP was intended to provide confidentiality and does not cope well
with the extra security challenges in wireless networks. Then WPA [61] was proposed with the
intentions of overcoming the shortcomings of WEP. WPA standard operations can be specified in
two categories personal WPA and enterprise WPA; the former is used in small offices, homes &
performs authentication without any authentication server, and the latter was designed for
commercial use by authenticating through authentication server. WPA was an intermediate
solution of WEP insecurities therefore, IEEE 802.1li [64] came as an amended version of the
original IEEE 802.11 where it contains details of security clause and deals with all the problems
in WEP standard and proposes improvements in encryption, authentication and key management.
2.2.1 Basic Security Concepts
To understand security issues it is vital to know the attribute or basic concepts on which a
network security is judged. These attribute associated to security are the desired objectives of
Cryptographic mechanism. Cryptography can be defined in several ways, in [66] it is defined as
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Cryptography terminologies, key concepts, types are summarized in [67]. Following are the
attributes [66] or security services on which the security of the networks is evaluated.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality is also known as secrecy or privacy. Confidentiality is the process of
concealing information on the network, i.e. it ensures that information content cannot be revealed
by unauthorized entities that are normally known as internal or external attacker or intruders. It
can also be described as a security service that ensures only intended receivers could interpret the
information transmitted on the network. Confidentiality is very important security service in
MANETs considering wireless links in such networks are easily susceptible to eavesdropping. In
[68] a security protocol for reliable data delivery is proposed to improve the confidentiality
service in MANETs. They propose to split the encrypted message into separate shares and these
shares should be transmitted through independent multiple paths so making it difficult for the
attacker because now he has to eavesdrop all pieces of message and has to decrypt all of them
successfully to understand the message. In [69] Seng et.al propose secure routing mechanism
which provide data confidentiality using shared secret key.
Integrity
Integrity ensures that data packets are unaltered during transition from source to
destination i.e. unauthorized user could not manipulate data through insertion, substitution,
deletion or forging data. To maintain integrity, data is usually signed by the source and the
receiver verifies the digital signature to be assured of integrity of the data. Such mechanism will
incur extra overhead for nodes in MANETs with limited processing abilities and also because
nodes relay data for other nodes, so integrity cheeks needs to carried out at every hop. In [70]
Gavidia et.al realize the cost of guaranteeing data integrity mechanism for MANETs and
proposed a solution based on probabilistic integrity checks and traffic analysis. They prove that
probablistic verification is an effective method to restrict the amount of corrupted content and
their spread i.e. ensures data integrity in MANETs.
Authentication
Authentication is a process that allows node to verify the identity of the other nodes with
it is communicating. Two types of authentication are entity and data authentication [66]. Entity
authentication ensures that other communicating parties are who they claim to be and data
authentication is focused on providing a guarantee as to the origin of the data.
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Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation ensures that an entity in a dispute cannot falsely deny its action or reject
the validity of the contact. For example, during a transmission non repudiation service prevents
the sender from denying sending a message which he sent earlier, or a receiver cannot claim to
have received the message falsely.
Availability
Availability is another very important attribute, referring to ensuring that system
resources and services are available for use by authorized users of the system. It is imperative to
make sure all the network services remain available for its users given that an intruder can attempt
to deny services in the network through denial of service attacks, and that a network without
desired services is as bad as having no network. MANETs are especially vulnerable to different
types of denial of service attacks due to their inherent characteristics (section 2.1.2).
To achieve these security attributes or services in fixed networks several cryptographic
mechanism are proposed using trusted third party (TIP). TIP is an entity in the network trusted
by all users in the system for example Certificate Authority (CA) or Key Distribution Centres
(KDC). They are mainly used to provide key management services such as creating ,distributing,
updating and revoking keying material [71] for both symmetric (involve the use of single key) and
asymmetric key (involve the use of two keys) systems.
Security mechanisms developed using TIP are not directly implantable in MANETs
because they lack a trusted infrastructure and absence of centralized control. However, some
proposals based on modified approaches of key management for MANETs can be found in the
literature for example approaches in [72][73][74] suggest use of identity-based public key
management systems for MANETS. In [72] authors use identity based signcryption (combines the
functionality of digital signature and symmetric key encryption) and threshold secret sharing
(allows sharing of secret information among group of entities) to provide various security services
in MANETs. Recently the concept of threshold cryptography i.e. protecting secret information by
distributing it among a set of nodes or entities has proven to be an effective scheme for key
management in MANETs. For example in [75] authors propose a trust based threshold
cryptography key management scheme for MAENTs and their simulation results show the
advantages and suitability of the idea in MANETS.
2.2.2 Vulnerability of MANET Routing Protocols
Vulnerability, threat, and attacks are the terms used often in computer network security.
We begin this subsection with defining these terms [66]:
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Vulnerability: is any hardware firmware or software flaw that leaves a computer network or
information system open for potential exploitation.
Threat: All the intent or methods used to exploit a weakness in a system, operation, or facility
constitute threat.
Attack: is an attempt to bypass the security control of the system or computer network with
harmful intent.
MANETs are vulnerable in their functionality: intruders can compromise the network
operations by either attacking at physical, MAC or network layer. MANETs are susceptible to
eavesdropping, active interfering and frequency jamming attacks because of wireless links.
Frequency jamming [77] is a common physical layer attack on MANETs. Researchers have
looked at MAC layer misbehaviours [78] in MANETs in a presence of compromised or selfish
nodes. However, this thesis focuses on network layer vulnerabilities. Network layer especially
routing protocols for MANETs are more vulnerable in their routing operations because of the
following [76]:
• Use of cooperative routing algorithm: Because each node in MANETs has to act as a router
i.e. forward packets for other nodes, participate in route discovery and route maintenance
procedures. Nodes with harmful intention can cause severe disruption exploiting this property of
routing protocols.
• Rely on exhaustible batteries: most nodes in ad hoc network rely on exhaustible batteries;
hence, their processing capabilities are limited. Intruder can exploit this property by forcing a
node to process unnecessary packets in an attempt to exhaust their batteries within the rules of
routing protocols. Any service offered by the victim nodes can be denied through this intrusive
activity.
• Limited computational ability: nodes in such networks generally have limited computational
capabilities Le. low processing frequencies and smaller memory size which also adds to the
existing vulnerabilities.
• Easy theft of nodes: location of nodes in such networks is not permanent as they are allowed
to move arbitrarily which makes them vulnerable to being physically captured. From a routing
perspective, this means that a node can be compromised easily.
• Transient nature of services: because the topology of the network is dynamic as nodes move
frequently, therefore any specific service provided by nodes is transient, this adds to the
uncertainty in these networks. This makes it difficult to distinguish between acceptable or
malicious behaviour.
38
Chapter 2: Background and related work
• No clearly defined physical boundary: topology in these networks is defined by geographical
position of the nodes in the network which changes due to the mobility hence defining physical
boundary or entry points for nodes in the networks is difficult. Therefore, access control in these
networks is complex to deal with as compared to fixed networks.
Both reactive and proactive routing protocols are vulnerable because of the reasons
mention above; some of these reasons such as use of cooperative routing algorithms, transient
nature of services are due to the lack of infrastructure in MANETs. However, no need for pre-
existing infrastructure is the most desirable feature of MANETs that allows fast deployment of
such networks.
Reactive routing protocols such as AODV or DSR are especially vulnerable because
they are designed for use in networks where the nodes can all trust other nodes and assume there
is no malicious intruder node. In the light of the operations of AODV (explained in section 2.2.2),
specifically its route discovery process AODV, is highly vulnerable to denial of service attacks
(mentioned in section 2.1.3.2) from intruding nodes.
Wang, Lu and Bhargava [93] have done a vulnerability analysis of AODV in which they
observe that on demand route queries enable real time attacks. They have also analyzed the false
distance vector and false destination sequence attack on AODV. Injecting false routing
information in the network not only creates confusion in routing operations but can also result in
severe attacks as we explain in the next section.
2.2.3 Attacks in MANETs
Existing vulnerabilities in MANETs allows various types of attacks or intrusion possible
in MANETs from attacker or intruder. These attacker or intruders are traditionally divided in three
categories:
Masqueraders: are generally outsiders who access or enter the system using authorize user
identity or privileges with the intention of introducing attacks in the system. For example hackers
gain access as an authorized user to cause damage.
Misfeasor: is an insider or authorized user of the system, who misuses his privileges to achieve
certain goal that cause damage to the system. For example an authorized user trying to deny a
service in a network.
Clandestine: could be an insider or outsider, who gain access to the system or network and launch
attacks to achieve certain goals.
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2.2.3.1 Classification of Attacks
Intruder exploits the vulnerabilities in MANETs to launch a variety of attacks. Attacks in
MANETs can be classified into two main categories as shown in fig 2-3.
Passive
Location
Disclosure Routing
Figure 2-3: Classification of attacks in MANETs
Passive attacks:
Passive attacks are those where the attacker does not disturb the operation of the routing
protocol but attempts to seek some valuable information through traffic analysis. This in turn
could lead to disclosure of some critical information about the network or nodes such as
information about network topology, locations of nodes and important nodes in the network.
Some examples of passive attacks are as follows:
Eavesdropping
In MANETs because of the wireless links when a node sends a message in a wireless
medium every node equipped with transceiver can hear the message and if no encryption is used
then the attacker can get some useful information. The sender and receiver usually have no means
to know that this attack has taken place. Although it is not consider as severe attacks in most cases
but could retrieve vital information in some scenario therefore, researchers have focused on
minimizing eavesdropping for example in [79] authors have analyze the risk of eavesdropping
using the transmission range of nodes and node distribution in the network.
40
Chapter 2: Background and related work
Location Disclosure
Attackers can aim to listen to the traffic on wireless links to discover the location of
target nodes. For example in a battlefield scenario, a large amount of network traffic normally
flows to and from the headquarters. Observation of the traffic therefore allows an intruder to
discover the commanding nodes in the network.
Traffic analysis
In network traffic analysis an attacker or a group of attacker passively observe the traffic
and analyze the communication pattern, amount of data transmitted by nodes and the
characteristic of the transmission at various links of the network. This could result in obtaining
critical information such as important nodes in the network, identity of nodes and location of the
node. Even if the data in a message is protected through encryption traffic analysis can still be
performed to extract information.
Although passive attacks does not disturb the network functionality. However, in some
application scenarios of MANETs such as in military communication where important
information disclosure through traffic analysis or simply eavesdropping could prove costly.
Therefore several example of research efforts such as [79][80][81] can be found in the literature to
analyze and protect against these attacks.
Active attacks:
In active attacks intruders launch intrusive activities such as modifying, injecting, forging,
fabricating, dropping data or routing packets that can lead to various active attacks on the
network. Some of these attacks are cause by a single activity of an intruder and others can be
caused by a sequence of activities by colluding intruders. Active attacks as compared to passive
attacks disturb the operations of the network and can be so severe that can bring down the entire
network or degrades the network performance significantly for example in case of denial of
service attacks. Therefore, in this thesis we have focused on protecting MANETs against active
attacks in the network (chapter 3 onwards). Active attacks can further divided into routing or data
packet dropping attacks as shown in fig 2-3.
Malicious Packet Dropping
As a result of the route discovery process (section 2.1.3.2) in MANETs, the path between
source and destination is established. The source nodes starts sending the data packet to the next
node in the path then the intermediate node checks the next hop node towards the destination from
the established path and forward data packet to it , this process continue until the data packets
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reach the destination node. To achieve the desired functioning of MANETs it is obligatory that all
intermediate nodes forward the data packets for source nodes. However, a malicious node can
decide to drop these packets instead of forwarding it; thisis known as data packet dropping attack
or data forwarding misbehaviour. Some cases node cannot forward data packets for other nodes
because of excessive work overload or being selfish i.e. to save its battery for processing its own
operations.
Routing attacks
Both reactive and proactive routing protocols are vulnerable to routing attacks; reasons for
their existing vulnerabilities are explain in section 2.2.2. The on-demand MANET routing
protocols, such as AODV and DSR, allow intruders to launch a wider variety of attacks. In order
to illustrate these routing attacks we consider AODV (section 2.1.3.2) as an example in this thesis.
Using AOOV, we now give examples of how different intrusive activities can cause various
attacks in MANETs.
Sleep Deprivation:
Sleep deprivation (SO) [88] is a distributed denial of service attack in which an attacker
interacts with the node in a manner that appears to be legitimate, but the purpose of interaction is
to keep the victim node out of its power-conserving sleep mode. In later chapters of this thesis we
will consider an intruder that can cause SO of a node by exploiting the vulnerability of the route
discovery process of the protocol through malicious route request (RREQ) flooding in the
following ways:
Malicious RREQ Flooding 1: an intruder broadcasts a RREQ with a destination IP address, which
is within the network address range but does not exist. This will compel all nodes to forward this
RREQ because no one will have the route for this destination IP address.
Malicious RREQ Flooding 2: After broadcasting a RREQ an intruder does not wait for the ring
traversal time and continues resending the RREQ for the same destination with higher TTL
values.
This is a severe denial of service attack considering the energy constrained operations of
MANETs. We review previously proposed protection mechanism in next section and then
propose our approach to protect MANETs against this denial of service attacks in chapter 3 of this
thesis.
42
Chapter 2: Background and related work
Black Hole:
Intruders exploit the vulnerability in route discovery procedures of on-demand routing
protocol such as AODV and DSR where node requires a route towards destination. The node
sends a RREQ and an intruder advertises himself as having the fresh route in an attempt to
become part of most of the routes in the network. The intruder can then choose as an intermediate
node to drop packets instead of forwarding or processing them, causing a Black hole (BH) [89] in
the network. The way the intruder capture the routes may vary in different routing protocols to
initiate Black hole attack. For example, in AODV, the destination sequence number (dest_seq) is
used to represent the freshness of the route. A higher value of dest_seq means a fresher route. On
receiving a RREQ an intruder can advertise itself as having the fresher route by sending a Route
Reply (RREP) packet with a new dest_seq number larger than the current dest_seq number. In
this way, the intruder becomes part of the route to that destination. The intruder then drops all
packets to cause the BH attack in the network. The severity of the attack depends on the number
of routes in the network the intruder successfully becomes part of; we analyze severity of BH
attack and our approach to protect this attack in chapter 4 of this thesis.
Grey Hole:
A Grey Hole attack (GH) [90] is a special case of the BH attack, in which intruder first
capture the routes i.e. become part of the routes in the network similar to the BH attack and then
either only drops packets selectively, e.g. from specific nodes or drops packets probabilistically or
drops packets in some specific pattern.
Rushing attack:
In order to limit the control packet overhead an on-demand protocol only requires nodes to
forward the first RREQ that arrives for each route discovery. An attacker can exploit this property
by spreading RREQ packets quickly throughout the network to suppress any later legitimate
RREQ packets. For example in AODV, an intruder can forward the forged rushed RREQ, giving
them a higher source sequence (src_seq) number and minimum delay. This will suppress the later
legitimate RREQ and increase the probability that routes that include the intruder will be
discovered instead of other valid routes, causing a rushing attack (RU). In [91] Hu , Perrig and
Johnson introduce the rushing attack in on-demand routing protocols and then proposed a rushing
attack prevention through a set of generic mechanisms such as secure neighbour detection, secure
route delegation and randomized RREQ forwarding that together defend against the attack.
Sybil attack:
Each node in a MANET requires a unique address to participate in routing, and nodes are
identified through this address in the network. There is no central authority to verify these
identities in MANETs. An attacker can exploit this property and send control packets, for
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example RREQ or RREP, using different identities; this is known as a sybil attack (SY) [92]. This
is an impersonation attack where intruder could use either random identities or identity of other
existing node to create confusion in the routing process or establish bases for some other severe
attack in the network.
The motivation of intruders behind launching either packet dropping or routing attacks is to
achieve a certain goal such as to cause denial of services i.e. to grab the availability of certain
resources or services such as web, printing, routing to the intended users in the network. Intruder
can use the attacks explained in this section such as SD, BH, GH or dropping packets to cause
denial of services. Partitioning the network, creates routing loops, discover valuable information,
theft of resources are some other goals of intruders which encourage them to attack. This thesis
presents a generalized approach to protect against all these routing attacks and malicious packet
dropping attacks (which is a part of BH and GH attack) in chapter 3 onwards.
2.2.4 Proposed protection mechanisms against attacks in MANETs
We have introduced the attacks in MANETs in last section and now we review the
protection mechanism against active attacks in MANETs.
Significant research has already been made to study and protect against data packet
dropping attacks. For example in [82], the authors propose a protection scheme against data
packet dropping attack based on cooperative participation of nodes. This scheme requires every
node in the network to monitor the behaviour of its neighbours and if it detects packet dropping
then invoke a distributed approach to ascertain about the attack. After detecting a dropping packet
node then use trust collector function to gather trust values from the neighbour of the suspicious
node. If majority of the nodes has low trust value for the suspicious node then they inform all the
nodes about the attacker by raising the global alarm. Finally, they compare the performance of
this scheme against watchdog algorithm proposed in [83] and show the improvement in term of
low false alarm rates.
Some other approaches such as [84][85] based on Neighbour Watch System (NWS) are
proposed to detect malicious node that drop packets. Packet forwarding misbehaviour detection
based on the principle of flow conservation is proposed in [86] & [59], where nodes continuously
monitor their neighbour, maintain the list of nodes they heard and check the behaviour of the
nodes periodically. Misbehaving node are detected by comparing the estimated percentage of
packets dropped with a pre-established misbehaviour threshold. Then an adaptive version of [86],
packet forwarding misbehaviour detection and isolation using polices was proposed in [87] that
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adapts in two ways first they propose a method for the calculation of misbehaviour detection
threshold. Secondly, adaptability of the protection mechanism was achieved using policies that
consider changing network conditions and the management objectives.
In routing attacks we first review protection mechanism against SO attack. Ping and
Zhang [95] considered a route request (RREQ) flooding attack in MANETs. They proposed a
RREQ flooding prevention mechanism based on neighbour's supervision that maintains a priority
queue of the incoming RREQs. This mechanism reduces the priority of RREQs generated by a
specific node if a higher rate of incoming queries from that particular node is observed. However,
in some applications of MANETs there can be specific nodes that generate more traffic; for
example, in on-the-fly networks formed for a seminar, and yet Ping & Zhang's method will
remove requests from the queue above a certain incoming request rate in all cases. In [96] authors
describe ways through which attacker can drain the batteries (for example through repeated
request of services or forcing nodes to do energy hungry tasks) of wireless devices such as POAs
& notepads in a mobile computing environment. In an experiment they measure the battery life of
notepads and POAs under this attacks and concluded that this attack drains their batteries more
quickly and shortened the battery life drastically. Then they propose the power secure architecture
with the aim to defend against these attacks by guarantying a minimum battery life even when the
device is under attack. The architecture employs two features in a system energy signature
monitoring and multilayer authentication. In another example,Yu and Ray [94] have described
sleep deprivation attacks through two types of injecting traffic attack in ad hoc network as query
flooding and injecting data packets. They investigated query flooding and injecting data packets
attacks from attacker's point of view and theoretically analyzed the probability of cases where
attacker can successfully launch these attacks without being detected. Then assuming nodes can
authenticate each other through public key, they propose query flooding attack detection using
neighbour monitoring mechanism where each node on receiving route request will check
conditions such as legality of source-destination, request id and its time i.e. the request has
received previously and no node in the route already mark as bad node. However, they have not
realize the cases where the intruder cleverly bypasses these checks through malicious RREQ
flooding 1 & 2 defined in section 2.2.3.1. We present our approach to protect against this attack in
chapter 3 of this thesis.
To guard MANETs against Black hole attacks several mechanism have been proposed, for
example TOGBAD was proposed in [97]. It detects the attack using a topology graph, looking at
the number of neighbours a node claims to have and the actual number of neighbours according to
the graph. It was developed for the OLSR proactive routing protocol where the topology
information can be obtained, but would not be effective for reactive routing protocols, where
45
Chapter 2: Background and related work
acquiring complete topology information is not operationally feasible. Kurosawa and JamaJipour
[89] also propose a black hole detection mechanism, this time for AODV, where three feature
vectors are used to model normal states of the network and then a discrimination module is used
for identifying the abnormal state that represents the black hole attack. In [98] the authors propose
a black hole detection method for AODV in which on receiving a reply the receiver node initiates
the judgement process about the replier. Neighbours send their opinion about replier and the
decision is based on number (a fixed threshold) such as if a node receives many packets but does
not send certain number of packets then it is malicious. In our opinion considering the dynamic
environment of MANETs such mechanism based on fixed thresholds to detect black hole attack
suffers from high false alarm rate as they have no means to adapt the changes due to mobility of
nodes. In [99] Zhang et.al proposed black hole detection based on checking sequence number in
RREP packets. They consider a scenario where an intermediate node is an attacker and suggest
whenever a node sends a RREP back to source node it should also generate a request for sequence
number to destination node. Then destination node reply to request by sending a packet containing
its sequence number to the source node. The source node then compare the sequence number of
RREP by intermediate node (suspect) with the sequence number reply packet from destination
node to check the freshness of the route and consequently detect the attack if comparison fails.
However, the introduction of two new packets with every reply not only increase the routing
overhead but also they have to make sure that attacker does not either drop or modify these
sequence request & sequence reply messages.
Xiaopeng and Wei [100] propose a grey hole detection scheme for the DSR routing
protocol. This requires each node to produce evidence on forwarding packets using an aggregated
signature algorithm, and then a checkup algorithm detects whether packets are dropped or not;
finally a source node uses a diagnostic algorithm to trace the malicious node. Then they slightly
modify their proposal of [100] in [101] and use Distributed Certificate Authority (DCA) to update
key management information to facilitate the detection process that uses aggregate signature
algorithm. Another mechanism for grey hole detection for AODV is proposed in [90]. It requires
all nodes to maintain their neighbour's data forwarding information. After a certain time each
node checks its neighbour, with whom it has not communicated recently, and initiates the
detection procedure for that node. The initiator performs a local detection by checking the number
of RTS (request to send) & crs (clear to send) messages; if this is found to be suspicious then
itasks other neighbours of the suspected node to check and finally, makes decision about the
suspected node.
In [102] Perrig and Johnson analyzed how an attacker can launch a rushing attack (RU) in
DSR and proposed a rushing attack prevention mechanism for MANETs. They describe ways an
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intruder can use it to launch the attacks; for example an attacker rushed a RREQ with higher than
normal radio range using a higher power level or higher gain antenna to suppress later legitimate
RREQs. They propose secure neighbour detection through mutual authentication protocol that
ensures that other nodes is within the communication range using tight delay timing. To integrate
rushing prevention with routing protocols they make sure that before sending or forwarding a
RREQ node first perform secure neighbour detection exchange with previous hop node. In [103]
authors propose a Secure Message Transmission (SMT) Protocol that ensures secure end-to-end
data forwarding protocol. They suggested that SMT is mainly for protecting the data forwarding
operation while route discovery procedure that are vulnerable to routing attacks such as rushing
attack can be secured using Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [104] an internet draft earlier
proposed by the same authors in an attempt to mitigate the effects of misbehaving nodes in
routing operations. However, they did not experiment SRP against routing attacks to evaluate its
effectiveness. In [105] Rawat et.al, examined the possibility of rushing attack on SRP and
concluded that SRP can withstand the rushing attack.
Most of the existing proposal in literature and the ones reviewed in this section on securing
MANETs are attack-specific i.e. consider protection of MANETs from a specific kind of attack.
In contrast, this thesis proposes an intrusion detection and prevention mechanism (Chapters 3, 4 &
5) that can protect MANETs from a range of active attacks to ensure desired level of security
service in the network.
2.3 Intrusion Detection & Prevention (IDP)
To achieve the desired goals of security in organization networks protection mechanisms
are implemented in multiple layers to prevent an attacker from accessing and causing damage to
network. Intrusion detection and prevention (IDP) systems have been used as one of the layer of
security for hte last three decades. Research efforts in this area started with Anderson's [106]
paper in 1980 and since then a significant number of intrusion detection system prototypes and
proposals have been proposed. Sobirey [109] maintains an archive of 92 such proposal &
prototype. Authors in [107][108] presented a comprehensive taxonomy of intrusion detection
systems in fixed networks in 1999 and 2000 respectively. These taxonomies describe basic terms
and then classify IDS proposal according to their properties, but it only covers IDS developed by
2000. Although networking technology has evolved and networking paradigm has shifted from
fixed to wireless networks in last decade but intrusion detection and prevention is still consider as
one of the basic layer of defence. In fact, in infrastructure-less wireless networks such as
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MANETs where network firewall cannot be implemented, intrusion detection and prevention is
now considered as first layer of defence [108]. In this section, we first introduce the concepts and
background knowledge of intrusion detection (ID) including, intrusion detection technique & its
categorization. Secondly, we describe challenges face by intrusion detection systems in MANETs.
Finally, we review intrusion detection system architectures and proposals in MANETs and then
analyze existing intrusion response system.
2.3.1 Definitions, Classification & Techniques
I will first define some basic terms related to intrusion & intrusion detection systems.
Intrusion:
Intrusion is an act of intruding through an incorrect, inappropriate, anomalous activity or
behaviour
Intrusion Detection:
Intrusion detection systems attempt to detect inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activity in the
network or information systems from intruders.
Intrusion Detection System:
Intrusion Detection System IDS is defence systems that detects & try to prevent intrusive
activities in a network from attacker or adversaries.
Intrusion Response System:
Intrusion response mechanism is a component of IDS which is invoke after intrusion detection
process. Intrusion response system analyze the detected intrusion and select the desirable action
needed to be taken as a response in order to prevent or mitigate the harm cause by the detected
intrusion in the system.
Audit Data:
Audit data is a filtered set of data from the network regarding user activities, behaviour, or
network events logs or logs of certain parameters representing network characteristic, which helps
IDS in detecting and preventing intrusion in the system.
Intrusion detection & prevention acts as a second layer of security after a firewall in fixed
wired networks connected with the Internet. In fixed networks a firewall enforces network
security by controlling & filtering traffic in the network to improve the network performance
[111]. The role of the firewall is restricted only to allow or deny the traffic based on the defined
rules but it does not detect or prevent the attack launched from the allowed traffic. This allows
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intruders to bypass the firewall and launch various attacks in the network. Therefore, intrusion
detection systems are used to detect attacks that bypass firewall. IDS not only can detect attacks
but also produce useful information to respond to and prevent these attacks. The IETF working
group of Intrusion Detection Exchange Format (idwg) [112] earlier established and the main
purpose of the group was to define data format and exchange procedures for sharing information
related to intrusion detection and response systems.
The basic requirement of any IDS is the ability to monitor and collect audit data from the
network. There are two approaches normally use to capture audit data either at each host node or
at the gateway of the network. One way to classify IDS is based on audit data collection approach.
2.3.1.1 Classification of IDS
Intrusion detection involves monitoring the network that results in capturing of audit data
and then reasoning about the evidence in the audit data through one or more intrusion detection
techniques to find out whether the system is under any attack. Depending on audit data collection
techniques used in fixed networks, IDS can be categorized in two ways: Host based Intrusion
Detection System (HIDS) and Network based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS).
Host based Intrusion Detection Systems
Host based Intrusion Detection Systems mostly rely on an operating system (OS) audit
log of hosts or nodes to collect the audit data, analyze and then apply intrusion detection
techniques to detect intrusion in the network. Host based IDS are implemented extensively in
fixed networks to detect malicious activities. In terms of the efficiency of Host Based IDS in fixed
networks, the authors raise some issues. In [113] the authors argue that operating system audit
trails are insufficient to detect low level attacks in fixed network and propose a new audit
mechanism for auditing network level information. In [114] the authors emphasize using host
session information instead of operating system audit data for clear identification of abnormal
behaviour of users in fixed network. Trapping systems are also use to monitor intrusive events in
the network. An example of this is Honey Pot. Honey pot is a security or computing resource
whose value lies in being attacked. It is mostly setup on systems or network resources, which
attract intruder or hackers. This has two major goals:
i. To learn how intruders probe and attempt to gain access to the systems or
network.
ii. To gather forensic information required to aid in the apprehension or
prosecution of intruders.
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Honey pots are use by companies and researcher for capturing information related to attacker for
intrusion detection. For example, Lee and Hyeon [115] have used Honey pots as an active
intrusion confronting systems in fixed networks.
Host based intrusion detection approach is also proposed for MANETs. For example a
host based IDS for MANETs (HIDS) is proposed in [116], where IDS is installed on every node
in the network and each node performs intrusion detection on the audit data gather locally using
misuse based intrusion detection (section 2.3.1.2) and generate global alarm then initiate response
in case of intrusion in the network. Although HIDS are theoretically not affected by mobility of
nodes because IDS are installed in all nodes in the network, HIDS has some disadvantages in
MANETs. HIDS requires all nodes to perform intrusion detection that will drain their limited
batteries resources. If a node is compromised due to an attack then it will affect the HIDS of the
network because it requires every node to detect intrusion locally and then report.
Network based Intrusion Detection Systems
Network based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) normally run in network devices
such as gateways of a network or few selected capable nodes perform intrusion detection. They
capture and examine packets that pass the network interface and then apply any of the intrusion
detection techniques (explained in section 2.3.1.2) to detect attacks. For example in [117] Porras
and Valdes have proposed a techniques to monitor TCP/IP packet stream through network
gateways and analyze it to detect intrusion using signature-based and statistical approaches
(section 2.3.1.2).
NIDS as compare to HIDS has some advantages such as in NIDS few capable nodes
could be selected to execute IDS so that the NIDS is distributed in devices with appropriate
capabilities. NIDS unlike HIDS does not require every node to be protected in the network
because the monitoring is achieved through few selected devices. Ahmed et.al in [118] propose a
network based approach to intrusion detection by setting up a scenario with a single server which
execute IDS and all the traffic in the network passes through the server where it is monitor for
intrusion. Finally, they mention the features of propose NIDS such as no need to run IDS on each
node, free from trust problem and limited message spreading i.e. low overhead as compare to
HIDS in fixed networks.
HIDS and NIDS approaches of ID have their own advantages and limitations. In
MANETs, some implementation of intrusion detection systems in literature are inspire from NIDS
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and HIDS proposal in fixed network. For example, IDS proposals in MANETs that uses mobile
agent to monitor and collect audit data from agents running on majority of nodes inspired from
HIDS. Cluster based IDS proposals where IDS execute by selecting cluster heads or manager
node are instigate from NIDS. IDS proposals in MANETs are reviewed in section 2.3.2 in this
thesis.
2.3.1.2 Intrusion Detection Techniques
Based on the detection approach of Intrusion Detection Systems they can be split into two
main categorizes misuse detection also known as knowledge base intrusion detection (KBID) and
anomaly based intrusion detection (ABID), the latter being also known as behaviour-based
Intrusion detection. Additionally specification based intrusion detection mechanism have also
been proposed recently. We now define these intrusion detection techniques.
Knowledge based Intrusion Detection
Knowledge-based Intrusion detections systems maintain a knowledge base that contains
signatures or patterns of well-known attacks and looks for these patterns in attempts to detect
them. In other words, KBID systems have knowledge about specific attacks and looks for
attempts to exploit them. KBID triggers the alarm when such an attempt is detected and in case of
unknown attack updates a knowledge base. A diagram illustrating basic KBID process is shown in
fig2-4.
KBID
Apply Knowledge base
detection techniques
Knowledge Base
Signatures
,Patterns & Rules
Current
Audit Data
Add New
Rule
Figure 2-4: Illustration of Knowledge based Intrusion Detection process
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KBID rely on knowledge about attacks so anything not explicitly recognized as an attack based
on existing knowledge declare as non-intrusive or acceptable. KBID systems use various methods
for constructing and modelling the knowledge for intrusion detection, some of them are describe
below:
KBID system use expert systems [119][120] for intrusion detection. An expert system maintains
the knowledge of known attacks in a knowledge based in the form of set of rules. Captured audit
data from a monitoring network is translated into facts and then an inference engine use these
facts and set of rules in knowledge base to detect intrusion in the network.
State transition modelling also used for intrusion detection where the attack is represented as a
series of states transition and defined attack state. The state transition models that represent
attacks are normally maintain knowledge base and apply state transition model in real time to
indicate intrusion in the network.
Signature analysis also used by KBIDS. In this technique, the attacks are modelled through
sequence of events or patterns that are then compared with the generated audit trails to indicate
intrusion.
Some KBIDS have also applied rule based approach [122] to model the knowledge of known
attacks in the form of set of rules which is obtain through observation or attack scenarios. Then it
checks the audit data by applying rules of known attacks either using forward or backward
chaining technique in search of evidence of attack.
Main advantage of KBID systems is that they generally have very low false positive rate of
detection simply because they trigger alarm only when the exact match of known attack signature,
pattern, and sequence of event is match. Therefore, KBID systems are best suited in scenarios
where the network is highly vulnerable to certain known attacks. However, KBID systems have
some drawbacks such as they can only detect attacks whose signatures or patterns are in the
knowledge base. Gathering the required information of attacks and keep them up to date is
demanding.
Anomaly based Intrusion Detection
Anomaly based intrusion detection (ABID) systems flag observed activities that deviate
significantly from the normal profile as anomalous. ABID systems are also known as behaviour
based intrusion detection in which the model of normal behaviour of the network is extracted then
this model is compared with current behaviour of the network to detect intrusion in the network a
52
Chapter 2: Background and related work
diagram illustrating basic ABID process is shown in fig 2-5. Anomaly detection systems typically
consist of two phases of operation: training and testing.
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Figure 2-5: Illustration of Anomaly based Intrusion Detection process
Training is the process of modeling normal or expected behavior of the network or users.
The model also acts as a profile of users or network behavior. For any anomaly-based IDS to be
effective, it must have a consistent and stable profile that characterizes the behavior. A profile
consists of a information about the list of parameters which are specifically geared to the target
being monitored. Constructing an effective profile involves gathering information on behavior
and activity that is consider acceptable for the network.
Testing involves comparing the normal or expected behavior model derived during the
training phase with the current model of the network or users to detect intrusion. The detection
techniques usually involve statistical or mathematical approaches to flag significant deviation
between two models. For anomaly detection techniques to be effective, they must have
mechanisms that keep the false alarm rate low.
ABID systems extensively use statistical methods [123] [124] to estimate the deviation
from the expected and current behaviour to detect intrusion in the network. Statistical
probabilistic techniques including chi-square test, Hotelling's T2 test and decision tree are
employed by researchers for ABID system. Neural network algorithm [125] is also use to learn
and model the behaviour of the users in the network. Key advantages of ABID systems are that
they can detect attempt to exploit new unforeseen vulnerabilities because ABID unlike KBID
systems looks for deviation from normal expected behaviour. ABID system can also provide early
warning for potential intrusions in the network. However, ABID systems are more prone to
generate false alarm as compare to KBID systems.
Specificadon based Intrusion Detection
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Specification based intrusion detection systems describe correct operation of the protocol by
defining a set of constraints and monitor the execution of the protocol with respect to the defined
constraint to detect anomaly in the network. For example, in [126] authors propose a specification
based intrusion detection for AODV protocol. They use finite state machine to define the correct
operation of AODV in terms of RREQ-RREP flow, which also contain a suspicious state.
Monitoring nodes are selected to monitor the RREQ-RREP flow according to the defined
specification and indicate anomaly if suspicious state in the finites state machine is reached.
2.3.2 Intrusion Detection in MANETs
This subsection explains the challenges in intrusion detection in MANETs and then
reviews existing MANET -based intrusion detection proposals.
2.3.2.1 Challenges of IDS in MANETs
Intrusion detection systems developed for wired networks are not directly implementable in
wireless network environment, and therefore the research community in last few years has been
actively involved in securing MANETs and intrusion detection system proposals have received
particular attention. Intrusion detection in MANETs is more complex and challenging as
compared to fixed networks, because of the difficulty in fulfilling the requirement of IDS and
some inherent characteristic of MANETs instigate operational and implementations complexities.
Unlike fixed networks MANETs lacks concentration points where monitoring and audit data
collection can be performed. For example, in NIDS in fixed network traffic is monitor at gateways
while in infrastructure less network of MANETs a node can only observe nodes within its
maximum radio range and attacker outside this radio range can escape easily therefore, NIDS
proposal in fixed networks are not directly implementable. Researchers realizing this difficulty
proposed cooperative approaches of audit data collection and applying intrusion detection
techniques using network clustering.
MANETs introduced new set of protocols for routing, which are significantly different from
routing protocols in fixed networks. These protocols require nodes to cooperate and act as a
router. This has created opportunities for attackers to identify vulnerabilities and find new ways to
launch attacks (explained in section 2.2.3).
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Attacks in MANETs are different from in fixed networks and therefore most of detection methods
used in fixed networks are not directly applicable; hence alteration in existing and new methods
are tried by researchers for detecting intrusion in the network.
Due to nodes' mobility the topology of the network is dynamic and unpredictable and this makes
the entire process of intrusion detection complicated. First it makes it difficult to capture and
gather audit data then it is hard to accurately characterize the normal behaviour of the network and
finally the detection phase have to accommodate these dynamics of MANETs.
ID in MANETs is more demanding because some of the MANET's characteristics such as limited
computational ability of most of thenodes in MANETs limit the effectiveness of HIDS. Because
the territory of the network is not defined in MANETs, it is difficult to physically secure a node
from being compromised. Limited bandwidth of MANETs in contrast to wired networks makes it
challenging to transfer large amount of intrusion detection data therefore, IDS in MANETs have
to restrict the amount of data transfer required for intrusion detection.
To sum up, every phase of intrusion detection in MANETs presents additional challenges as
compare to fixed networks.
2.3.2.2 Proposed IDS in MANETs
We explained the extra challenges IDS have in MANETs environment earlier and now
to overcome these challenges and complexities researchers have presented a number of
cooperative architectures (i.e. nodes in the network are required to collaborate) for IDS in
MANETs. Most of these architectures are based on either peer-to-peer approach or hierarchical
approach. The key advantage of peer-to-peer ID architectures are that they are fully distributed
i.e. every node first performs ID individually and then performs collaborative ID by sharing
information such as observed audit data or intrusion detection alerts. For example, Zhang and Lee
argue that many intrusion detection techniques developed for wired networks are not directly
implementable in ad hoc networks and proposed an intrusion detection system architecture [127]
in which an IDS agent runs at each mobile node as shown in fig.2-6. It collects local data by
gathering real-time audit data from various sources and local detection through a local detection
engine. A local detection engine analyses the local data traces by data collection module for
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anomalies, whereas a cooperative detection and global response is trigger when an intrusion is
reported by a node. They use anomaly detection to detect abnormal updates to routing table.
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Figure 2-6: The IDS peer-to-peer architecture for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks [127]
In another example of peer-to-peer IDS architecture, a distributed intrusion detection
architecture based on a static database has been proposed in [129]. The architecture has two parts;
first, a mobile agent of intrusion detection system resides on each node in the network that is
responsible for detecting local intrusions based on local audit data and participating in cooperative
algorithms with other IDS agents to decide about intrusion in the network. The second part is a
secure stationary database that contains known misuse attacks signatures. However, the
assumption made in this paper that the stationary database is accessible to all nodes, which in the
decentralized architecture of MANET is difficult to achieve. Similarly in [130] Hijazi and Nasser
studied and analysed the mobile agent feasibility for intrusion detection in MANET and they
concluded that many mobile agents features are the exact requirement for MANET IDS. They
believe that mobile agents (autonomous executing programs) execute without affected by the
originating node status, have direct relevance to the challenges face in MANETs such as reducing
network load, conserving bandwidth, having robust and fault-tolerant behaviour. However, they
also mention that mobile agent have inherited security vulnerabilities that is one of the reason why
they still not used extensively for ID. Albers, Camp and Puttini in [131] proposed an Local
Intrusion Detection System architecture (LIDS) which uses Mm(Management information base)
agent, SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) agent and local intrusion detection agent
that works together to detect intrusion in the network.
Hierarchical IDS architectures organize nodes in a hierarchy and assigned different roles
to each node. Clustering techniques are extensively used to organize nodes in MANETs in a
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hierarchy as explained in section 2.1.3.3. Hierarchical approach of IDS in MANETs generally has
lower overhead as compared to peer-to-peer approaches because nodes communicate with a small
set of nodes such as cluster heads in hierarchical architecture.
/. /_---------
Mobile Ad Hoc
Nodes
Figure 2·7: The IDS dynamic hierarchical architecture for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks [128]
For example, Sterne, Carmen and Balupari in [128] have proposed a cooperative IDS
architecture which is organized as dynamic hierarchy shown in fig 2-7 where the nodes annotated
with I & 2 represent first and second level cluster respectively. In this hierarchical architecture,
data is acquired at leaf nodes through either promiscuous monitoring or direct reporting.
Promiscuous monitoring can be described as being where, if node X is within range of node Y, it
can overhear the communications to and from Y even if those communications do not directly
involve X. whereas in direct reporting, nodes report to other nodes the observed data through
special packets. After the data is acquired, it is then analysed as it flows upwards towards cluster
head nodes. The cluster head applies detection module to detect nodes that intentionally drop a
significant amount of data packets. They have also claim that routing attacks such as modification
of RREQ packets can be detected but it is not demonstrated in this paper because the main
purpose was propo ing an IDS architecture that can meet the challenges of IDS in MANETs. In
another example, Huang et.al [132] proposes a cooperative intrusion detection system for ad hoc
networks. They develop a cluster based IDS using cluster formation protocol to manage clusters
so that only cluster leader performs ID for each cluster. Some other example where hierarchical
architectures of IDS is used in MANETs are [133][134].
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Anomaly based Intrusion Detection Proposals
Anomaly detection approaches hold out more promise than knowledge-based
approaches, as they utilize learning techniques to enable adaptation to the environment. This is
essential for MANETs where the overall behaviour of the network changes with time because of
the nodes entering or leaving the network periodically. In addition, anomaly-based detection is
simpler in operation because it needs to first establish a normal expected behaviour and then
compare it with the current behaviour to detect intrusion as explained in section 2.3.1.2.
Researchers have proposed different anomaly based detection techniques based on different
training and testing approaches. Some of these approaches are discussed below:
In [135] Cretu et.al proposed an anomaly detection approach for MANETs in which it
models device behaviour which peers can then use to determine trustworthiness of other nodes.
They examine their approach through an anomalous payload detector, the training phase observes
payloads then aggregates from different node to build profile which are then compared by
forming a similarity matrix. However, exchanging models among all nodes in a MANET could
produce processing and communication overhead, and devices in the networks can have different
behaviour depending on the application of MANET.
Markov chain classifiers are also used as anomaly detection for example, Jiang and Wang
[136] proposed an anomaly detection algorithm based on Markov Chains for wireless ad Hoc
networks. The algorithm consists of two parts: construction of Markov chain table and classifier
to Markov. It first converts the audit data traces into sequence of symbols then it construct a
Markov chain table with state transitions. The second part consists of a classifier to Markov chain
that checks whether the current transition is in Markov property by using uniform distribution to
calculate trace value and set threshold to detect anomaly. Markov chain classifiers is also use in
fixed network by Jha, Tan and Maxion [137] who used a sequence of system calls corresponding
to processes as the traces of system activity, traces of process are taken in Linux environment
considering different set of events, then they have constructed test suites and classifiers to detect
anomalies. In [140] Sun et.al modified the Markov chain classifier for detecting routing disruption
attacks of falsified RREPs in AODV MANETs.
Statistical probabilistic techniques are extensively used for anomaly detection. For
example, research of using probabilistic technique for anomaly detection was conducted by Ye
et.a!. [123]. They conducted a comprehensive investigation of the frequency and ordering
property of audit data by using various probabilistic techniques including decision tree,
HoteIling's T2 test, chi square test and Markov chain for detecting intrusion into the information
system in fixed networks. To test the performance of these techniques they gathered one sample
of both normal and intrusive activities by monitoring and collecting computer audit data from a
Sun SPARC workstation with a Solaris operating system, which has a Basic Security Module
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(BSM) to record audit events. The second sample of normal and intrusive activities was taken
from MIT lab, which was produced from a US Air Force project. After testing, they concluded
that anomaly detection through a chi square test based on frequency property provide rather good
intrusion detection performance, and Markov model based on ordering property can provide
additional advantage for detecting intrusion in an Information System. After [123] Ye and Chen
have proposed [124] an anomaly detection based on only chi-Square for detecting Intrusion into
information systems in fixed networks. In this paper, they have used the same sample audit data
of normal events from MIT as in [123] and split that sample into two groups one used for training
a normal profile and the other used for testing. They consider some intrusion scenarios built audit
data of intrusive events and applied the chi square test. They concluded that results demonstrate a
promising performance of this technique for intrusion detection in terms of high detection and low
false alarm rate.
Knowledge based Intrusion Detection Proposals
Knowledge based approaches have an advantage of very low false alarm rate as compared
to anomaly based ID because they maintain knowledge based containing signature or pattern of
attacks and only look for attempt to these attacks. As mentioned earlier, knowledge based
intrusion detection systems use different techniques to model the knowledge about attacks into
signatures as mention in section 2.3.1.2. KBID system use state transition modelling, for example,
STAT [121] "state transition analysis" maintains the knowledge of known attacks in fixed
networks as a sequence of states. This approach use state transition analysis that models intrusion
as a series of state changes that transition from an initial secure state to a final compromised state
using a state transition diagram. In [138] the authors design an intrusion detection tool
AODVSTAT to detect packet dropping and spoofing attack in MANETs by using the concepts of
STAT [121].1n [138] signatures are represented by using an event model and the events are either
data or AODV routing packets exchange in the network. They assume that each node is equipped
with AODVSTAT sensor. This sensor performs state analysis of packet stream, which the node
has observed through either monitoring its neighbour or through update from its neighbour's
observation to detect signs of attacks.
Knowledge based intrusion detection approach using signature detection of known attacks
is implemented in fixed networks but to analyze its effectiveness in ad hoc networks a study is
conducted in [139]. In this study, the authors assume they know the signature of attack and the
node in the network can execute an intrusion detection process to investigate the ability of routing
protocols in ad hoc network to facilitate signature-based detection. They consider a very simple
scenario with an intruder node is part of the initial path of source and destination and estimate the
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probability of detecting this intruder with and without mobility of nodes in the network. They
concluded that reactive routing protocol is less effective than proactive in the considered scenario.
This thesis first use ABID using statistical approach to secure MANETs against denial of
service attacks in chapter 3 and then propose a combination of ABID (statistical approach) and
KBID (rule based approach) that takes advantage of both techniques to protect MANETs against
wide variety of attacks (chapter 4 &5).
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have first presented a detailed background of MANETs including its
characteristics, applications and routing. We have also given a simple description of AODV
protocol because we use AODV to implement our approach in this thesis as an example; however,
as we shall see, our approach is general and can be implemented with other routing protocols. We
have then introduced basic security concepts, and reviewed the existing vulnerabilities in
MANETs routing protocols which allows variety of attacks in MANETs. We followed this by
describing possible attacks in MANETs including packet dropping and routing attacks and
reviewed most of the existing mechanisms proposed to secure MANETs from these attacks.
Finally, we presented the IDP Paradigm. We defined common terms in IDP, categorization of IDS
in fixed networks and ID techniques. We followed this by indicating the challenges of IDS in
MANETs and then reviewed the IDS architectures and proposed IDS in MANETs from the
literature.
In next chapters (3, 4 & 5) we will present our Intrusion Detection & Prevention
mechanism for MANETs that takes advantage of both ABID and KBID intrusion detection
techniques. Unlike most of the existing non-ID and IDS proposal in literature (section 2.2.4 &
2.3.2), our approach can detect wide variety of attacks, identify intruding nodes and respond to
intrusion efficiently with an affordable overhead in the network.
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Chapter 3
3 Adaptive Intrusion Detection & Prevention
for DoS Attacks
We begin our work by considering denial of service (DoS) attacks. In this chapter, we
present an Adaptive Intrusion Detection and Prevention (Amp) mechanism that provides
protection against DoS attacks. Amp is an anomaly based intrusion detection system that uses a
combination of chi-square test [147] (explained in section 3.2) and control chart (a tool used in
statistical process control [148]). It first detects intrusion then identifies the intruding node in the
network and finally isolates the intruding nodes that are consistently detected exhibiting DoS
attacks in the network. We assess the performance of our proposed approach through simulation,
evaluating its successfulness using different network scenarios. We also analyze the performance
impact of Amp on the network through these simulations.
The scenario in this chapter focuses on protecting MANETs against Sleep Deprivation
attack through malicious route request flooding as defined in section 2.2.3. It is a severe DoS
attack that exploits the vulnerabilities of the route discovery procedure of the routing protocol to
force victim nodes to power consuming sleep mode. We have presented different ways of
launching this attack in section 2.2.3 and in this chapter we present our approach that provides
protection against these hostile attacks from intruding nodes. The work described in this chapter
was presented and published in international wireless communication and mobile computing
conference (IWCMC 09) [51].
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 illustrates the denial of service attack in
MANETs through malicious RREQ flooding. Section 3.2 presents our approach for adaptive
intrusion detection and prevention. This section starts with the model's assumptions, followed by
describing the core functionality of our approach, and then the algorithm and detailed design
description. Section 3.3 first assesses the suitability of control chart as a denial of service detector
then presents the simulations results of evaluation of our approach.
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3.1 Illustration of the Problem Addressed
This chapter focus on DoS attacks. In these attacks an intruder attempts to make resources
or services unavailable to their intended users. Sleep Deprivation (SD) is a distributed denial of
services attacks that is a severe threat for MANETs because they can be crashed due to their
limited battery power, or their network can easily become congested due to its relatively limited
bandwidth compared to fixed networks. We defined an SD attack in section 2.2.3.1, and we now
using AODV as an example to describe in detail the ways this attack can be introduced in the
network and to illustrate weaknesses in some previously proposed protection mechanism
addressed in section 2.2.4.
When a node needs a route towards a destination, it initiates a route discovery process by
broadcasting a RREQ with its current destination sequence number. If an intermediate node
receiving this RREQ knows the route then it unicasts a RREP to the source node otherwise it
rebroadcasts the RREQ packet. For controlling dissemination of RREQ, AODV uses an
expanding ring search technique, i.e. the source node first sends the RREQ with TTL field set to
TfL_ST ART value; then it should wait for the RING_TRAVERSAL_TIME, after this time
expires without receiving a RREP the node may sends a RREQ again with increased TTL value.
This process can be repeated until TTL value reaches TTL_THRESHOLD, where
TTL_THRESHOLD > TTL_START.
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Figure 3·1: Snapshot of the network without any attack
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Now consider fig 3-1, which shows a snapshot of the network where circles represents
nodes and the dotted lines shows the links between the nodes. Suppose node V6 is an intruder and
it launches a SD attack through malicious RREQ flooding as follows:
• V6 generates a RREQ with a destination IP address of node V25, that is
within the network address range but does not exist.
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Figure 3-2: Snapshot of the network after intruder generate malicious RREQ
Intruder V6 broadcasts this RREQ with a TIL value of one (assume TIL_START=1). Fig
3-2 show the network after this broadcast. Nodes V2 , Vi , Vs and V9 which are within the radio
range of V6 will receive the RREQ (solid arrow line shows the RREQ flow). They will check
their routing table entries for route to the destination node V25 for this RREQ.
• Because nodes V2 , Vi , Vs and V9 do not have the route for node V25 , they
will also broadcast the RREQ initiated by intruder.
• Nodes who will receive RREQs from V2 , V] , Vs and V9 will first check if
they have not process these requests then they will also broadcast this
malicious RREQ further.
• Since no nodes know the route for this destination node, this process will
continue.
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Figure 3-3: Snapshot of the network with malicious RREQ flooding
Fig 3-3 shows the state of the network under sleep deprivation attack. As can be seen
from the diagram after three broadcasts this network is flooded with malicious RREQs and
eventually the entire network will be flooded with these RREQs. Nodes processing these
unnecessary packets could possibly drain their batteries and hence will no longer be able to
provide services in the network.
As we discussed in section 2.2.4, in [95] the authors propose neighbour supervision, i.e.
the neighbours maintains a priority queue of incoming RREQs and reduce the probability of
processing RREQ from a nodes if a high number of incoming RREQs are received from this node.
If the number of RREQ received from a node exceeds the threshold they suggest neighbours of
that node should cut off the path.
Link
between"",,· ......
nodes
Properly ~V2.
bshavlng ~
Nodes
Path cut off ~
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"""~ ~~ ........... ~
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Figure 3-4: Prevention of malicious RREQ flooding [95]
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For example, in fig 3-4 if the number of RREQs received by the neighbours of node V6
exceeds threshold then each neighbour ignores V6 and cuts off the path. However, in some
applications of MANETs such as network formed for a seminar some nodes might reasonably
generate more data, for example if node V2 is chair of the seminar. Yet the method proposed in
[95] based on static threshold will cut off the path of node V2 as shown in fig 3-4. Mobility of the
nodes will further degrade the performance of this approach; for example if intruder V6 after a few
broadcasts moves and continues the attack from another location, it can easily by pass this
protection mechanism.
3.2 Adaptive Intrusion Detection & Prevention
3.2.1 Model Assumptions
Although both physical and link layer operations are vulnerable to attacks, protection of
attacks in these layer are not considered in this thesis. However, we believe with appropriate
matrix selection, the proposed mechanism in this thesis can also be applied effectively for link
layer.
At the network layer we only consider sleep deprivation through malicious RREQ
flooding in this chapter; other attacks described in section 2.2.3 are taken into account in chapter
4.
We note that an ABID system requires data from normal activities, i.e. audit data traces
and traffic patterns of normal events to build a training profile that is then used by the ABID
system to detect anomalies in the network. However, in contrast with fixed networks, data
resources such as [44] reflecting normal activities or events are not available for on-the-fly
MANETs applications. Therefore, we assume that the initial behaviour of the network formed on-
the-fly is free from anomalies.
To illustrate the implementation of AIDP we assume a clustered MANET organization.
We select the most capable node in terms of its processing abilities and lowest mobility ratio as
cluster head (CH) and the others nodes become cluster nodes (CN). The only CH is assumed to
perform the processing required by the AIDP algorithm.
We assume threshold based cryptography mechanism such as [72][75] can be used to
protect communication between CH and CNs. The details of this mechanism are outside the
scope of the work in this thesis, because we focus on a general intrusion detection mechanism that
guards MANETs against wide variety of network layer attacks.
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3.2.2 Overview of AIDP
This section briefly describes the basic functions of AIDP. A detailed explanation
including the algorithm is presented in next section. We use clustering hierarchy (that is the most
capable node is selected as cluster head and the other nodes becomes cluster nodes) only for AIDP
and clustering is not used for routing purpose. At the start of the simulation when a new node can
not finds a Cfl then it starts the cluster head election process by broadcasting a cluster head
election packet (eEP) . On receiving the eEP nodes calculate the capability function value using
equation 3-1 and inform other cluster nodes about it. Then the node Vi with bighest CF(v;) value is
elected as eH and other nodes become eNs. In equation 3-1 capability function estimate the
capability of each node based on three parameters processing power (PP(v;), memory capacity
(MEM(v;)) and mobility ratio (MR(v;)) and the weights wpO.5, W2 =0.5 are assigned considering
the importance of both parameters.
CF(V)= wIPP(v)+w2MEM(v)
I MR(v
j
)
(3-1)
AIDP uses an ABID technique that consists of two phases: training and testing (defined in
section 2.3.1.2). The time-based operation of AIDP is illustrated in fig 3-5.
Testing PhaseTraining Phase
CH:
MANET Monitors the network
Established for N time intervals(TI)
call Training Module
after each TI
CH:
Continuously monitors the network during each
Tl and calls Testing Module after each TI
Time
Figure 3·5: Time-based operation of AIDP
When the network is established, the eH gathers RREQ information from eNs in the
network after each time interval (TI) during both training & testing phase. For collecting RREQs
information the CH broadcast a request packet with TIL (time to live)=2 for the limited broadcast
to make ure thi broadca t does not cause congestion to the network while still reach all the eNs
in the network. To ensure this further the CH broadcast this request packet with a unique request
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ID and on receiving this request eNs first check ID of this request to avoid duplicate request
processing. Cfl has estimate of the number of eNs in the network because we assume only one
cluster head in the network and if after certain time significant number of response packets
containing RREQs information from eNs is not received then CH re send the request packet for
RREQs information to accommodate the request packet lost during first request reply operation.
The CH then applies the AIDP training module (explained below in section 3.2.3.1) for N time
intervals (TI). This training module results in an initial training profile (ITP). The ITP reflects the
normal expected behaviour of the nodes in the network. Once training is complete. the AIDP
testing module is invoked by the CH after each TI. This consists of several tasks. the first of
which detects intrusion in the network. If there is no intrusion then it updates the ITP. This update
is important in dynamic networks such as MANETs in order to adapt the variation in the network
behaviour as time progresses. If intrusion is detected in the network then the CH performs a
second task of the testing module: that is. it identifies the intruding nodes. To optimise the
probability of identifying intruders correctly with a low level of false positives. it maintains a test
sliding window (TSW). The TSW is a moving window of specific number of time intervals (TI);
for example with a TSW of size five TIs, AIDP only considers the latest five TIs for intrusion
detection & prevention as shown in fig 3-5. One of the main reasons of maintaining TSW is that
we notice that a single detection of any node as an intruder is not sufficient in MANETs as it
might leads to wrongly accusing and then punishing the properly behaving node. Therefore, we
introduce the concept of a TSW where d detections of the same node are required in p time
intervals (TI) to confirm the node as an intruder. The value of d is always less than or equal to p.
If this detection threshold is passed then the CH will Blacklist (BL) the node and isolate the node
by informing all CNs.
A further reason of maintaining the TSW is that our algorithm looks for detecting persistent
intrusion that can actually deny the services or cause sleep deprivation of the nodes in the
network. Therefore. AIDP does not react to the intrusion if the number of detection in a TSW is
less than d, in other words if a node introduce a very low volume of attack for a very short time or
repeat this activity later. Because AIDP estimates the attacks is not harmful and tolerable for the
network.
3.2.3 AIDP Algorithm
This section explains the AIDP training and testing module algorithms.
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3.2.3.1 Training Module
The main goal of the training module is to gather RREQ information and generate an
initial training profile reflecting the normal expected behaviour of the nodes in the network. Fig 3-
6 presents the pseudocode of the training module.
In fig 3-6 X~ ={Xb X2• X3 ..... XM} is a set of random variables representing the number of
RREQs received by all eNs in the ith TI. Where random variables Xl to XM subscripts represents
the category of the number of RREQs received in a TI and these subscripts are denoted through k
= I to M . Therefore, Xl is the random variable representing the lowest and XM represents the
highest category of the number of RREQs received by any eN in a TI. For example if the
maximum number of RREQs received by a eN from all the eNs in the network is 30 then M=30
and X~ will consists of 30 random variables. This includes both the RREQ packets generated by
the source nodes and those RREQ packets forwarded by intermediate nodes on behalf of source
nodes.
Training Module
For i= 1to N
.CH collects the number of RREQ received X! by CNfrom all other CNs.
. Calculate the probability distribution P{XV
End For
.calculate mean X~of P{XU for i=l to N
.store the results as ITP.
. Exit
Figure 3-6: Pseudocode of training module of AIDP.
The probability distribution of X: is calculated for the TI i, and this process is then repeated for
the N time intervals in the training phase. We then calculate the mean X ~ of the probability
distributions P( X;) for each of N intervals, which is then stored as an ITP containing the
expected values for that particular network observed for the total time of N.T! seconds.
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3.2.3.2 Testing Module
The AIDP Testing module consists of several tasks including intrusion detection, intruder
identification, Accusation Packet handling and intruding node isolation. Fig 3-7,3-8,3-9 show the
pseudocode of these tasks respectively.
In the first task (Fig 3-7), the CH first monitors the network for one TI i and calculates the
probability distribution of X; for k = 1 to M. After monitoring the network for one TI, the CH
uses the chi-square test to identify any intrusion. This test determines how well the observed
model fits with the expected. We use chi-square first because it has a low computational cost
because it is based on distance measure as compared to other tests such as Hotelling's T2.
Motivation of using chi-square test emerge through analyzing the related literature for example,
Testing Module:
a) Intrusion Detection
·CH sets TSW to P number of TI
.CH Monitor the network for TI
Do after each TI i
. CH collects number of RREQ received X ;from all other CNs in TI.
. Calculate the probability distribution P(Xi )
k
.Store this probability distribution in X! as Observed values.
· End do
·CHApplies the chi-square test by first calculating chi computed (X2)
.Hypothesis Testing
Ho:Observed distribution of X! fits the expected
Ha: Observed distribution oix; does not fit expected
.If (chI-computed (a.d.f) > P-value (a.d.f)) then
Reject Ha& perform Intruder-Identification
For all nodes VI In LND (List of Nodes Detected)
. If (VI detections in PIL> Detections_ To_ Accuse)
CH: Blacklist VI& Broadcast AccusationPacket(AP)
else: enter Vi in PIL
endif. else: Update Expected values X! (ITP)
.endif
.Exit
Figure 3-7: Pseudocode of testing module task a) Intrusion detection.
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Ye et al. [123] used a probabilistic technique for anomaly detection in fixed networks. They
investigated audit data by using various probabilistic techniques including decision tree,
Hotelling's T2 test, chi-square test and Markov chain for detecting intrusion into the information
system on fixed networks and concluded that chi-square test based on frequency property
provides good ID performance. Ye and Chen [124] also proposed an anomaly detector based on
the chi-square test for detecting intrusion in fixed networks. They concluded that the results
demonstrate promising performance in terms of high detection and low false alarm rate.
Equation 3-2 represents the general equation of the chi-square that evaluates Z2 value.
%2 is small if observations of the random variable are close to the expectation, and therefore the
null hypothesis (that there is no intrusion) is accepted; but the null hypothesis is rejected if chi-
computed calculated value is larger than a critical value, which depends on the given level of
significance (a) and degree of freedom.
2 ~ (Observed - Expected)2
Z=~ Expected (3-2)
Equation 3-3 is the specific form of the test applied to AIDP, in which X~ is the
observed and X; is the expected value of the kth variable from ITP for TI i. Chi-computed is
calculated through equation 3-3.
(3-3)
After calculating the chi-computed value, the CH performs hypothesis testing by setting the
null hypothesis Ho and alternative hypothesis Ha as shown in fig 3-7. The critical P-value is
calculated at given level of significance (a) and degree of freedom (d.f). To illustrate the operation
of the algorithm we have chosen the standard value of a=5% (i.e. a confidence interval of 95%).
The d.f is the number of classes of X; (i.e. the number of groups in which the frequency of
RREQ is divided) being tested which is M (maximum value of k) and in our case it is determined
by the testing module of AIDP for each TI at run time. If the calculated chi-computed value is
larger than the critical value then we reject the null hypothesis Ho, and assume intrusion in the TI.
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Testing Module
b) Intruder-Identification
.calculate RREQgenerated by Vi for i=l to n (n=number 0/ nodes)
.colculote standard deviation 0 0/ Vi
.set Contol Line (CL)
.set Upper Control Limit (UCL)& lower controllimit(LCL)
For Vi i= 1 to n
1/(RREQgenerated by V, » UCL
odd Vi to LNO
. endif
.endfor
.return (LNO)& Exit
Figure 3-8: Pseudocode of testing module task b) Intruder Identification.
We then perform the intruder-identification task (fig.3-8) to identify the individual
intruding node. This uses variable control chart. Control chart is one of the charts used in
statistical process control, which was originally developed at Bell Laboratories by Dr Walter
Shewhart and has received growing interest in research and health care community [45]. We use
control chart based on standard deviation a to identify the intruding node because control chart is
a simple statistical tool that can identify the out of control process with a very low computational
overhead. We calculate the a of the number of RREQs generated by all nodes, then set the control
line CL= a, upper control limit UCL=CL + 3u & lower control limit LCL= minimum [0 , CL - 3u
]. We choose 3u limits because we know that for a normal distribution 99.7% of the observation
lies within ± 30' limits and also from some initial simulations we learn that this limit of ± 3u
keeps the false identification rate to its minimum value. We consider node Vi to be a detected
intruder if it initiates more RREQs than the VCL, in which case we add node Vi to the potential
intruder list (PIL) maintained by CH. If any node VI is detected more than d times in a test sliding
window of p intervals (the threshold for accusation Detection_to_Accuse) then the CH blacklists
the node and informs all other CNs by sending an accusation packet (AP). CH sends accusation
packet using limited broadcast with a very low TTL value i.e TTL=2.
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Testing Module
c) Accusation Packet (AP) Handling
. each CN VI maintain its local BlacklistTable (BLT)
·if CN VI receive an APfar CN 10
.tf CN VI has node 10 in its BLT
Ignore AP
else
CN add node 10 to its BLT & rebroadcast AP
.endif
.endif
d) Isolating Intruding Node
.if node Vi receive packet from node 10
.tf node V, is in node VI BLT
Ignore packet & drop 01/ packet queued from Vj
Else: handle & process packet
.endif
.endif
Figure 3-9: Pseudocode of testing module task c) Accusation Handling & d) Isolating intruder.
When a eN receives an AP it first avoid processing a duplicate AP by checking the
broadcast id & source address of the packet. All eNs maintains a blacklist table (BL T) which
contains the entries of current black list nodes in the network. eN checks its BLT and if the
accused node is already blacklisted the eN will ignore & drop the AP to prevent unnecessary
network traffic. Otherwise, the eN will blacklist the accused node by entering the node in its BLT
and rebroadcasts the AP as shown in fig 3-9. Finally, to isolate the intruder from the network all
nodes will not only drop packets from a blacklisted node but also immediately ignore all packets
in their queue from the blacklisted nodes as shown in fig 3-9.
If on the other hand no intrusion is detected by the chi-square test (fig 3-9) then we update
the training profile using an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA). as given in
equation 3-4,
Where X I " and x' represents the expected and observed value for update period number q
/'):1 I (f.AtJl)
respectively. The value of q starts at one at the start of the simulation and is incremented for each
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TI when no intrusion in the MANET is detected. k represents the random variable from 1 to M
and p = _2 _ is the weighting factor. In EWMA the degree of weight decrease is expressed
(q -1)
through a constant smoothing factor p. The updated expected profile model reflects the current
behaviour of the network. This is essential for adaptive intrusion detection in MANET where
overall behaviour of the network can change with time. Though, a very smart attacker can reduce
the effectiveness of this update process by starting it very low volume of attack and increase it
over several time intervals but we still believe that this update is essential for adaptive intrusion
detection in MANET where overall behaviour of the network changes with time
3.3 Evaluation
3.3.1 Simulation Environment
Simulations have been widely used in academic research to provide the proof of concept
of the proposed research methodology, mainly to enable large-scale deployment of the network
and overcome the lack of experimental test-beds. Simulations are a powerful tool especially in
MANETs research for evaluating proposed network designs or protocol performance, but caution
needs to be taken in setting up a network simulation environment so that it reflects important
aspects of the real network. In [149] the authors analyze network simulation software packagess
which includes Global Mobile Information System Simulation Laboratory (GloMoSim) [46],
Network Simulator (NS-2) and OPNET simulator and then recommend some cautionary measure
must be taken into consideration in setting up simulation environment.
We use GloMoSim version 2.03 to build the simulation environment, taking account of the
recommendations of the authors in [149]. Table 3-1 shows the simulation parameters for all
scenarios. We assume that the data link and physical layer are reliable in their operations. The
underlying routing protocol is AODV, and MAC layer protocol is IEEE 802.11. The nodes are
initially placed at the start of simulation in a rectangular grid where each node is grid unit away
from its neighbour, therefore the total number of nodes in the network are square of an integer.
Then nodes can move using random waypoint mobility model (RWP). A node randomly selects a
waypoint (destination) from the defined physical terrain dimension in this mobility model then it
moves with the specific speed (uniformly chosen between minimum and maximum mobility
speed) in the direction of the destination. After reaching its destination, node stays there for a
specific duration (pause time) before it starts moving again. The mean speed of the nodes varies
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from 0 to 20 m/s and pause time varies from 10 to 60 seconds during the simulations. The terrain
dimension values in Table 3-1 ensure node density is constant between all three scenarios.
Wireless transmission range of each node is 50 metres and the capacity of link is 2 Mbps in all
three scenarios.
Table 3-1 Simulation Parameters
Number of nodes 25 49 64
Terrain dimensions 400*400 m 560*560 m 640*640m
Number of intruders lor 2
Node placement Grid with grid unit=lO metres
Time interval TI 100 seconds
Simulation time Training + Testing =500+2000=2500 seconds
Routing protocol AODV
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11
Mobility Random Way Point Model (RWP)
Pause time Varies from 10 to 60 seconds
Mean speed Varies from 0 to 20 m/s
3.3.2 Assessment of control chart as an intruder detector
We first assess the suitability of control chart alone, based on standard deviation of RREQs
generated by nodes to detect intrusion in terms of DoS attacks. We use simulation parameters of
table 3-1 and run set of experiments in which we only use control chart based on standard
deviation (1 of RREQs to detect sleep deprivation attack. We do not run the chi square test in
these simulations.
The general format and interpretation of the statistical control chart is shown in fig 3-10.
As we can see from the graph, any observation that lies outside the expected natural variation
(represented through upper & lower control limits) of measure of interest (i.e. in our case is
standard deviation of RREQs) is considered out of control. In these experiments, the CH monitors
the network during one TI and gathers the number of RREQs generated by all CNs during this TI.
Then CH applies control chart based on (1.For this CH first calculates the control line CL which is
equals to the (1of RREQs generated by all nodes i.e. (CL= (1), upper control limit VCL = CL + 3(1
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Figure 3·10: General format & interpretation of statistical control chart [45].
and LCL= minimum [0, CL-3a). These VCL and LCL represent the expected variation in the
standard deviation as shown in fig 3-10. The CH will detect as an intruder any node V; that
generates more RREQ than the UCL. This process is then repeated by the CH for each TI. We
perform 20 runs first with normal traffic (i.e. no intrusion in the network) and then a further 20
runs with one intruder picked randomly from the nodes. This intruder launches malicious RREQ
flooding attacks (explained in section 2.2.3) in order to cause DoS by sleep deprivation. We
perform this experiment with 25, 49 & 64 nodes scenarios.
Statistical Control Chart as
Intruder Detector
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Figure 3-11: Percentage of Detection of DoS attacks using statistical control chart.
49nodes 64nodes
The graphs in fig 3-11 shows the simulation results of using control chart as DoS detector
with 25, 49 & 64 nodes. Success rate here refers to the percentage of correctly identifying
intruding node and false alarm rate represents the percentage of detecting a node as an intruder
when there is no intrusion in the network. The result shows that the statistical control chart as
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intruder detector has an average successful identification rate of 70%, but also has a very high
average false alarm rate of 56.6%. This shows that this method has reasonable capability to detect
nodes that generate significantly large number of RREQs intentionally to cause harm in the
network, however, it will also identify and isolate the large percentage of properly behaving nodes
in network that is unacceptable. This is because of inference from statistical control chart is
simply based on the number of RREQs generated by individual nodes in a time interval and does
not consider the network as a whole. Control chart also does not have means to adapt to the
MANETs environment. We therefore conclude that control chart alone is not suitable as a
mechanism to detect intrusion, and we therefore run AIDP as a combination of chi square (for
intrusion detection) and control chart (for intruder identification).
3.3.3 Evaluation of AIDP
In this section, we present the results AIDP using a combination of chi square and control
chart. We experimented with all three scenarios (25, 49 & 64 nodes) using the simulation
parameters of Table 3-1.
By introducing the chi-square test in addition to statistical control chart the individual
identification rate rises to 86% and the false alarm rate drops from 56 % to 15% for a test in a
single TI on average. This significantly improves the detection rate.
We then consider a sliding window and consider detections across multiple TIs. Initially
we set the size of TI =30s during the training phase assessment of AIDP. We found statistical
inconsistencies in collected audit data in various Tis that leads to an undertrained training profile.
Therefore, we try training with increase size of TI and observe that the collected data is more
statistically consistent with increased size ofTI. Realizing this problem during training we suspect
same problem in testing and to avoid that we set the TI=IOO second for the evaluation of AIDP.
In simulations for AIDP the CH applies the training module (fig 3-6) for N=5 TI in order to
reduce the chances of an undertrained profile, and then applies the testing module (fig 3-7, 3-8 &
3-9) for 20 TI each of 100 seconds. We have introduced parameters d and p in section 3.2.2. We
initially run some simulations with different values of d and p to understand the suitable
combination of d and p values for the MANETs in terms of lowest probability of wrongly
accusing the properly behaving node while keeping the high detection rate. When we set 2
detection of the same node required in 4 time intervals (d=2 & p=4) we receive an average false
alarm rate of II % in 25 nodes network with high detection rate of 92%. To further understand the
76
Chapter 3: Adaptive intrusion detection & prevention for DoS attacks
intruder accusation we analyze the results of [87]. In [87] authors have analyzed the probability of
accusation of misbehaving node (packet forwarding misbehaviour) by considering a) the number
of times the behaviour of the suspected node is checked and b) the number of required detections
to accuse the node. They experiments with various combinations of a) and b) and analyzed the
accusation probability and selected to accuse a node if 3 detections of the same nodes are found
during 5 checks.
Considering our initial experiments with the combination of d and p values and the
analysis of results from [87], we choose to illustrate the results with size of TSW (P)=5 and
Detection_to_Accuse (d)=3 i.e. three detection of a nodes is required in five TIs to declare the
node intruder. To keep the low probability of wrongly accusing well-behaved nodes while still
maintaining the high probability of correct detections. We perform 20 runs with each scenario
(25, 49 & 64 nodes) with normal traffic using the simulation parameters of Table 3-1 and then
with intruders picked randomly from the nodes. These intruders launch malicious RREQ flooding
1 & 2 attacks in order to cause DoS by sleep deprivation. At each tested mean speed we perform
20 runs with no intruders and 20 runs with one intruder using malicious RREQ flooding I(MRF1)
and 20 runs with one intruder using malicious RREQ flooding 2 (MRF2).
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node mean speed (64 node network)
Fig. 3-12,3-13 & 3-14 depict the success rate (SR) and false alarm (FA) rate of AIDP
as a function of the nodes' mean speed in 25, 49 & 64 node networks respectively. By success
rate here we mean the rate of correctly indicating intrusion in the network and then identifying &
isolating the node which is causing the DoS. A false alarm (FA) means that a correctly behaving
node has been incorrectly identified and isolated. When there is no intrusion in the network the
false alarm rate is zero in all three scenarios. In general, graphs in fig 3-12, 3-13& 3-14 show
good performance of AIDP in terms of high success rate and very low false alarm rate against
DoS attacks through malicious RREQ flooding 1 & 2. The graph in fig 3-12 shows that mobility
has a least effects on the performance in a smaller network. However, in larger networks (fig 3-
14) the success rate drops slightly when nodes are moving with high mean speed. This is mainly
because of two reasons. First is due to the routing protocol (AODV) performance degrades in
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overhead. Therefore, some of the RREQ information send by CNs to CH is lost especially when
nodes are moving with higher mean speed which increase frequency of link failures, thus partially
reducing the accuracy of AIDP. Secondly we use only one CH in AIDP and in a network of 64
nodes with high nodes mean speed it affects the audit data collection process, therefore we have
implemented improve clustering scheme based on virtual clusters in chapter 5 of this thesis.
The gap between success and false positive rate is an important parameter to evaluate the
performance of any intrusion detection mechanism, especially anomaly based approaches, as they
are more prone to generate high false positive. It can be seen from the graphs that the gap between
success and false positive rate of our approach is wide and the minimum value of the difference
between success and false positive rate at certain mean speed of the nodes is 70% that shows the
effectiveness of our approach.
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The time taken by any protection mechanism to detect and prevent attack is another
essential parameter on which performance of the proposed approach can be judged. If the
protection mechani m is laborious then it will allow the intruders to cause considerable degree of
damage to the network by the time it is detected. Since we choose three detections in a TSW of
size of 5 TI to accu e a node, any accusation takes a minimum of 300 seconds. In situations
where intru ion detection and prevention time is critical the network administrartor can re set the
size of TI by reducing it and AIDP will adapt accordingly. In fig 3-15 show the effectiveness of
AIDP in terms of the mean time, it takes to successfully isolate the intruding node & prevent DoS
attack in all three scenarios. We see that in general intruders are isolated almost as soon as the
algorithm allows. During initial simulation we try other combination of number of detections and
79
Chapter 3: Adaptive intrusion detection &prevention for DoS attacks
size of TSW but realize from the results that this combination is more effective in terms of high
detection and low false alarm rate.
3.3.3.1 Effects on network performance
It is imperative that protection mechanism for MANETs does not incur substantial
overhead on the network. In this section, we analyze the performance impact of AIDP on the
network through monitoring control packets & data packets during simulations. Control packets
include routing packets i.e. RREQ + RREP + RERR and AIDP packets. AIDP packets consists of
request packet (packet sent from CH to CNs for audit data request), response packet (packet sent
from CNs to CH contains audit data information) and accusation packet (sent from CH to CNs to
inform about the intruder nodes in the network). We assume that the request packet consists of
request id, source id and time interval number and the total size of the packet is 10 bytes.
Response packet consists of source id, time interval number and RREQ_received information
from all other nodes, size of the packet depends on the number of nodes in the network for
example for 25 nodes its size is 56 bytes. Accusation packet consists of accusation id, source id,
number of nodes accused and accused node address. the size of accusation packet is 18 bytes. The
RREQ of course includes the number of packets transmitted by an intruding node. We estimate
the control packet overhead. by calculating the ratio of the number of control packets to the
number of data packets delivered to their destination during the simulations of all three scenarios
of 25.49& 64 node network. We use simulation parameters of table 3-1 first to perform 20 runs
when there i no intrusion in the network then 20 runs with DoS attack through malicious RREQ
flooding 1 &2 without any mechanism to defend against these attacks and finally, 20 runs with
DoS attack with our proposed protection mechanism.
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Figure 3-16: Control packet overhead vs node mean speed (m/s)
in 25 node network.
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Fig 3-16,3-17& 3-18 depicts the control packet overhead as functions of increasing
mean node peed in 25, 49 & 64 nodes network. Each graph displays the average control packet
overhead a a function of nodes mean speed when there is a) no DoS attack in the network b)
intrusion in the network (DoS attack) but no means of defending these attacks, and c) intrusion
(DoS attack) with AIDP in place to protect the network. As can be seen from the graphs AIDP
reduces the control packet overhead & conversely improves the network throughput when it is
u ed in a network under DoS attack. However, the control packet overhead is not as low as that of
a network when there is no intrusion because AIDP also require certain number of control packets
for intrusion detection and prevention in the network. In addition, AIDP takes certain amount of
time for detecting, identifying, and isolating intruder as shown in fig 3-15 which cause slight
degradation in network performance before intrusion is detected in the network hence the control
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packet overhead in graphs infig 3-16, 3-17& 3-18 is slightly higher as compared to when there is
no intrusion in the network.
Furthermore we have also analyzed from the graphs that the control packet overhead
which is the ratio of number of control packets per data packet delivered in the network is high in
a network with large number of nodes (fig 3-18) as compared to a network with smaller number
of nodes (fig 3-16). This is due to the increase number of routing packets in larger networks. For
instance route discovery procedure of AODV that uses expanding ring search technique
(explained in section 2.1.3.2) generate substantial number of RREQs in larger network as
compared to smaller network.
3.4 Summary
The on-demand nature of MANET routing protocols makes them susceptible to DoS
attacks, such as sleep deprivation. In this chapter, we have focused on protecting MANETs from
DoS attacks. We have first illustrated how intruders can cause DoS attacks through exploiting the
weakness in route discovery procedure of routing protocol in MANETs. We then test the
suitability of using only control chart to protect against these attacks and have demonstrated that
this method based on static threshold similar to the one proposed in [95] & [94] is not suitable in
MANETs. This is because it does not cope well with the dynamics of MANETs and has no means
to adapt to the changes in the network.
We then proposed an adaptive intrusion detection & prevention mechanism AIDP. It
employs ABID, which first use chi-square test to check the overall behaviour of the network and
indicate intrusion in the network. Although chi-square test is been widely used as an anomaly
detector in fixed networks, we have demonstrated that by making reasonable adjustment and
including adaptability this test can also detect intrusion in MANETs. AIDP then use control chart
to identify intruding nodes. Finally, our approach isolates the intruding nodes from the network.
Additionally, results shows that our approach decreases the control packet overhead and
consequently improve the performance of the network affected by nodes causing DoS attack in
the network.
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Chapter 4
4 Generalized
Prevention
Intrusion Detection &
In the previous chapter, we focused on protecting MANETs against DoS attacks. We
proposed AIDP, which used anomaly-based intrusion detection to protect MANETs against DoS
attacks. We demonstrated through simulation results that AIDP performs well in terms of high
success and low false alarm rate at an affordable processing overhead over the range of scenarios
tested.
In this chapter, we extend AIDP to a Generalised Intrusion Detection & Prevention
(GIDP) mechanism. We propose a combination of anomaly-based and knowledge-based ID that
takes advantage of both intrusion detection techniques. Unlike most of the research proposals in
securing MANETs in the literature, which detect and prevent a single specific kind of attack such
as sleep deprivation, black hole, grey hole or rushing attacks our approach presented in this
chapter can secure MANETs from a wide variety. GlOP not only guards MANETs against a
range of attacks but also has the capability to detect new attacks or intrusive activities that
degrade network performance; to the best of our knowledge, this is novel.
The work describe in this chapter was presented & published in IEEE international
conference on ultra modern telecommunication (ICUMT) [60] and an extended version of the
work has been accepted for publication in a special issue of Telecommunication System Journal
[26].
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 presents the addressed problem, including
illustration of various attacks and the motivation behind generalized intrusion detection &
prevention mechanism. Section 4.2 presents our approach generalized intrusion detection and
prevention. This section starts with a description of the GlOP architecture, followed by the core
functionality and finally it describes the GlOP algorithm including technical details. In sections
4.3 a case study is conducted to assess the applicability and performance of GIDP and this section
ends with the evaluation results of the case study.
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4.1 Addressed Problem
In the previous chapter we considered distributed DoS attack through malicious RREQ
flooding 1 & 2. In this chapter we broaden our previously developed algorithm by considering a
variety of attacks including both routing and malicious data packet dropping attacks such as black
hole (BH), grey hole (GH), Sleep Deprivation (SD) and Rushing. We have. defined all these
attacks in section 2.2.3.1. We have also illustrated sleep deprivation attack through malicious
RREQ flooding 1 & 2 in section 3.1, and now, using AODV as an example, we will describe the
ways other attacks can be introduced in the network.
Figure 4-1 shows a part of the network as an example without any intrusion. We know in
the route discovery procedure of AODV that a source node broadcasts a RREQ when a route is
required for a destination. On hearing the RREQ, intermediate nodes, which have the route
towards the destination, send a RREP back to the source node using the reverse path. If the source
node receives multiple RREP packets it will check the destination sequence number (Dest_Seq) of
each reply and selects the route with highest Dest_Seq i.e. the freshest route .
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Figure 4-1: Snapshot of the network without any attack
We now consider the network in fig 4-1 and illustrate how an intruder can launch black
and grey hole attacks. We suppose nodes V9 & V4 needs routes towards nodes VJ3 & V7 respectively.
Therefore, node V9 & V4 broadcast RREQs and the initial flow of RREQs is shown in fig 4-2.
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Figure 4-2: Snapshot of the network: after route discovery from node V9 & V4.
Illustration of black and grey hole attack:
Now assume node V6 is an intruder and wants to capture most of routes in the network to
cause either a black or grey hole attack through false RREP packets in the following way:
• On receiving RREQs from V9 & V4 for the destination nodes V]3 & V7 intruder
respectively, V6 checks the current destination sequence numbers for VJ3 & V7
• Intruder V6 prepares RREP packets for these RREQs with destination
sequence number higher than the current destination sequence number for
nodes VB & V7.
• V6 sends these false RREP to the source nodes V9 & V4 as shown in fig 4-3.
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Figure 4-3: Snapshot of the network: intruder sending false RREP to source node Vg & v4.
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After receiving the RREPs source nodes V9 & V4 will selects the route with V6, since the
RREP from him suggests that V6 has the fresher routes. Repeating this process intruder V6 can
successfully capture other routes in the network and force most of the network traffic flow
through him.
Now the intruder v6is in control of the network data traffic and can decide to cause either
black hole or grey hole attacks in the network. For instance, now source nodes V9 & V4 will send
data packets to their destination node which will reach node V6; and V6 instead of forwarding these
data packets towards their destination decides to drop all the data packets to cause black hole
attack in the network as shown in fig 4-4.
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Figure 4-4: Snapshot of the network: intruder V6 drops all data packets to create black hole.
Grey hole is a special case of black hole where the intruder, after becoming part of routes
in the network, either drops packets selectively or probabilistically in a specific pattern. For
instance in the above network scenario, if intruder V6 selects to drop packets for VJ3 and forward
other packets as hown in fig 4-5, this is an example of grey hole attack.
Illustration of rushing attack:
Now we illustrate rushing attack. Here, the intruder exploits the property of on-
demand routing protocol, which only allows nodes to forward the first RREQ that arrives for each
route di covery and discard the other RREQ receive later for the same route. An Intruder will
rushed the RREQ to suppress any later legitimate RREQs. We consider the network in fig 4-1 as
an example to illustrate the rushing attack. Suppose node V9 broadcasts a RREQ for node Vi3 and
node V12 know the freshest route to VJ3. Now on hearing the RREQ intruder V6 rushes the RREQ
to suppress the later legitimate RREQ in the following way:
86
Chapter 4: Generalized intrusion detection &prevention
@... ....@-.r ...·.....61· ......1\7\V10 ~-.r ..."" ......~. . ~
. V. drops packet .
selectively Grey
hole®~....~
rV-:l_ ~.~ ~
~ ..... ~ ~
FOrv7 @"
Intruder VI
RREP
Flow
Data ~
Packets
Network
Nodes
Figure 4-5: Snapshot of the network: intruder V6 drops packets selectively to create grey hole.
• Intruder V6 ignores the request forwarding delay (randomized delay used by
routing protocol to avoid collision of broadcast packets).
• Intruder V6 rushes (i.e. transmits without delay) the RREQ with higher source
sequence number towards node V12.
Then this rushed RREQ from intruder arrives first at node V12, therefore node V12 will discard
legitimate RREQs later as shown in fig 4-6. This will not only suppress the legitimate route
discovery but also increases the probability that routes that include the intruder will be discovered
rather than the other valid route. This then allows the intruder to launch other attacks.
~ Legitimate
~~~REQISdropatv12
T • ........@
e
<f!i'
Link between Network
Immediate Nodes Intruder
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Flow Flow RREQ
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Figure 4-6: Snapshot of the network with illustration of rushing attack.
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4.1.1 Motivation for GIDP
The main motivation behind a generalized intrusion detection mechanism is that the
research in securing MANETs has to date mostly focused on detecting and preventing specific
attacks. For example, TOGBAD was proposed in [97] to identify nodes that attempt to create
black hole attacks in MANETs that use the OLSR routing protocol. Research methods propose in
[89],[98] &[99] are other examples where authors has focus on detecting black hole attack.
Xiaopeng and Wei in [100] proposed a grey hole attack detection scheme for the DSR routing
protocol. Then they modify their proposal of [100] in [101]. Similarly, some researcher has focus
on protecting MAENTs against sleep deprivation attack for instance Ping and Zhang in [95].
Likewise significant research efforts have focused on protecting against malicious data
packet dropping attack in MANETs. For instance in [82] authors propose protection against data
packet dropping attack based on cooperative participation of nodes. Approaches based on
Neighbour Watch System are proposed in [84][85] to encounter data packet dropping. In another
example packet forwarding misbehaviour detection based on principle of conservation of flow is
proposed in [86] then an adaptive version of [86] was proposed in [87]. In [102] Perrig and
Johnson analyzed rushing attack (RU) in DSR and proposed a rushing attack prevention
mechanism for MANETs.
Though most researchers have concentrated on protecting MANETs against specific types
of attack, some have suggested a more general approach. For example, ARAN [48] is a hop-to-
hop authenticated routing mechanism that can protect MANETs against a number of attacks from
external malicious nodes. A similar approach, Ariadne [49] has been proposed for end-to-end
authentication based on shared key pairs. In [50] CRADS, a cross layer approach, is proposed that
uses a support vector machine (SVM) to detect routing attacks based on the proactive routing
protocol OLSR. SEAD was proposed in [52] as a secure routing protocol that uses a one-way hash
function to provide authentication for the proactive routing protocol DSDV.
We believe more effort is needed on mechanisms, which can guard MANETs against a
wide variety of attacks, and especially for reactive routing protocols since these are more widely
used.
4.2 GIDP
In this section, we present our generalized approach that is Generalized Intrusion
Detection & Prevention mechanism (GIDP). GIDP is an extension of our previously developed
algorithm AIDP (Chapter 3) therefore the model assumptions listed in section 3.2.1 also applies
for GIDP.
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4.2.1 GIDP Architecture & Core Functionality
GIDP is a hybrid intrusion detection and prevention approach that uses a combination of
anomaly-based and knowledge-based intrusion detection.
GIDP Simplified Architectire
=~N~:;~~t::~~9J
Testing
Figure 4-7: Simplified architecture ofGIDP.
The diagram in fig 4-7 shows the simplified architecture of GIDP. It can be seen from the
diagram that GIDP mainly consists of three modules: network monitoring & data collection,
training and testing. GIDP monitors the network and collects audit data specific for intrusion
detection throughout the network's lifespan. Once the network is established, training is
performed for N time intervals (TI) to obtain an initial training profile (ITP). The testing module
is then called after the training module has run, and this continuously tests the network for
intrusion detection and prevention after each further TI.
The detailed architecture of GIDP is represented by the diagram in figA-8 where the
block arrows shows the flow of control and data between data collection, training and testing
phase of the architecture and the line arrows within the testing phase mainly describes the data
flow between testing modules . During data collection, the cluster head (CH) gathers data in the
form of two matrices: the network characteristic matrix (NCM) and a derived matrix (OM). NCM
is a two dimensional matrix of (r x c) and the value of the number of rows (r) and number of
columns (c) depends on its parameters therefore its storage structure is dynamically assigned by
the GIDP. The network characteristic matrix contains data specific to the network routing
protocol; for example in the case study in this chapter, the network characteristic matrix consists
of seven AODV parameters:
NCM= { RREQ (route request), RREP (route reply),
RERR (route error), ITL (time to live) values,
RREQ src_seq, RREQ dest_seq, RREP dest_seq }
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GIDP Detailed Architecture
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Figure 4·8: Detailed architecture ofGIDP.
The derived matrix consists of parameters which reflect the network performance and can
all be derived from network characteristic matrix parameters. Network throughput is also included
as a parameter in this matrix. In the case study in this chapter, the derived matrix consists of four
parameters:
DM= { RPO (routing protocol overhead), PDR (data packet delivery ratio),
RPD (number of routing packets dropped), Throughput}
In this case study DM is a one dimensional matrix (array) of four elements RPO, PDR,
RPD and throughput. The routing packet overhead (RPO) in the derived matrix is calculated as a
ratio of number of routing packets sent as a fraction of the number of data packets delivered to
their destination nodes in the network. The packet delivery ratio (PDR) is the ratio of the number
of data packets received at the destination nodes to the number of data packet originated by source
nodes. The routing packets dropped (RPD) is the number of routing packets dropped during the
routing process including route discoveries and route maintenance procedures in the network. The
last parameter of the derived matrix, throughput, represents the average network throughput.
After collecting the network characteristic & derived matrices the cluster head (CH)
employs two phases: training and testing. Fig 4-9 shows the time-based operation of GIDP. When
the network is established, the CH continuously gathers network characteristic and derived matrix
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information and applies the GIDP training module for N time intervals (TI), resulting in initial
training profiles (ITPs) of the network characteristic and derived matrix. The ITPs reflects the
normal behaviour of the nodes in the network and the expected network performance.
In the testing phase the CH applies the testing module after each TI. The testing phase
consists of several tasks as shown in fig 4-8. Firstly, it detects intrusion in the network. If there is
no intrusion in the network then it updates the ITPs in order to adapt the variation in the network
behaviour as time progresses. If there is intrusion, in the second task the CH identifies the attack
or attacks using existing information in the knowledge base. In the case of known attacks, the CH
identifies intruding nodes using existing intruder identification rules specific to the known attack
in the knowledge base. To optimise the probability of identifying intruders correctly with a low
level of false positives, it maintains a test-sliding window (TSW) as shown in fig 4-9 which is a
repetition of fig 3-5 for ease of reference for the reader, in which d detections of a node are
required in p time intervals (TI). If this detection threshold is passed then the CH will blacklist the
node and isolate the node by informing all CNs.
If attack identification detects an attack that does not match the rules for known attacks
then the CH applies the attack inferences. Attack inference stores the rule trace of the current TI
as Detected Rule Trace and looks for its match in a TSW. If the match is found in a TSW then the
CH confirms the new attack by constructing & adding a rule for the new attack in the set of rules
stored in knowledge base.
Training Phase
CH:
Monitors the network
for N time intervals(TI)
call Training Module
after each TI
Testing Phase
CH:
Continuously monitors the network during each
TI and calls Testing Module after each TI
MANET
Established
Figure 4·9: Time based operation of GIDP.
4.2.2 Algorithm and Technical details
This section explains the algorithm and the functionality of each module of GIDP in
detail. First, we explain the training phase then the testing phase of GIDP that operates in three
stages: a) intrusion detection, b) attack identification and inferences and c) identification and
isolation of intruding nodes as shown in GIDP architecture fig 4-8. For stage a) GIDP employs
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ABID using chi-square goodness of fit test on network characteristic matrix. In stages b) and c),
KBID is applied on both matrices NCM & OM using a rule-based approach.
4.2.2.1 Training Phase
The network characteristic matrix consists of j parameters mentioned above, where
j=l to 7 in the case study in this chapter where we consider seven parameters in the NCM.
j X; ={XJ, X2, X3, ••• ,XM} is a set of random variables representing jth NCM parameter in the ith
time interval, where M is the maximum value of the random variables of NCM jth parameter in
ith TI. For example jX; withj=l and i=2 represents the number of RREQs received by all CNs
in second time interval, where XM is the random variable which represents the maximum number
of RREQ received in second TI. Similarly, the derived matrix is represented by j~i consists of j
parameters mentioned above, where j=l to 4 because we have consider four parameters in the
derived matrix in the case study.
In the training phase, the CH collects the information regarding network characteristic
and derived matrix parameters from CNs after each time interval. Then the probability
distribution of j X ~is calculated for the TI. The CH then calculates the OM parameters RPO (i.e.
the ratio of the number of routing packet to the number of data packets delivered), POR (i.e. the
ratio of the number of data packets received to data packet originated), RPD (i.e. the number of
routing packets dropped in establishing & maintaining routes in the network) & throughput for the
ith TI. This whole process is then repeated for the N time intervals in the training phase. We then
-I . .
calculate the mean of NCM j X i of P( j X; ) and the mean of derived matrix Xi' for N intervals,
and these are stored as an initial training profile (ITP) of NCM and OM that represents the
expected normal behaviour of the network in terms of its routing and performance characteristics
respectively. These initial training profiles contains the expected values for that particular network
observed for the total time of N.TI seconds.
4.2.2.2 Intrusion Detection Phase
This is the first stage of testing; this module only considers network characteristic matrix
parameters and uses anomaly based intrusion detection in which it applies the chi-square test to
identify any intrusion in the network.
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Intrusion Detection
Do after each TI i
. Collect NCM j X; from all other CNs in Tl, for I7"j
. Calculate the probability distribution P (X i )
J k
.Store The probability distribution P{ .Xi) as observed values
J k:
. End do
.For Vj perform hypothesis testing by first calculating
chi- computed (X2U] using Equation 4-1 )
Ho{j]: Observed distribution of NCM j X: fits the expected
Ho[j]: Observed distribution ofNCM j X~ does not fit expected
.If {chi-computed{j] (a.d.jU}) > P-value[jJ (a.d·f[j]))
Reject Ho{j}. endif.
.Endfor
.Combined Null Hypothesis Testing
Combine Ho: Observed distribution of NCM fits the expected
Combine Ha: Observed distribution of NCM does not fit expected
.tf (combined Hois rejected)
Perform Attack identification & inferences Fig.4-11
else: Update Expected values NCM ( i.e. ITP{NCM))
.Exit
Figure 4-10: Pseudocode of intrusion detection module.
This module continuously monitors the network. It first collects the network characteristic
matrix information, calculate the probability distribution of each parameter, and store it as
observed values. In each TI the CH performs hypothesis testing for each parameter j of NCM
j X; at calculated chi-computed values obtain from equation 4-1, where j is the parameter of NCM
and k(l to M) is the number of random variables in each parameter. The CH then performs
combined hypothesis testing of NCM as shown in Fig.4-lO. If the combined null hypothesis Ho is
93
Chapter 4: Generalized intrusion detection & prevention
rejected then it assumes intrusion in the TI and proceeds to the next stage i.e. attack identification
& inferences. Else, we update the initial training profile of NCM using an exponentially weighted
moving average (EWMA) using equation 4-2:
v)·ex(t AI)=P* »; .,,)+(1-P)*X(1 .AI)) (4-2)q,k, q,k, q,k,
Where . X (' It) and " X (I k") represent the expected and observed values of NCM, q . k, q , ,
parameter j for update period number (q) respectively. The value of q is incremented in the TI
when no intrusion in the MANET is detected. k represents the random variable from I to M in
each parameter of NCM and P=2/(q-l) is the weighting factor. As q increases the weighting for
older data points decreases exponentially giving more importance to the current observation. The
updated expected profile model reflects the current behaviour of the network. This is essential for
adaptive intrusion detection in MANETs where overall behaviour of the network changes with
time.
4.2.2.3 Attack Identification & Inferences Phase
In case of intrusion in intrusion detection phase, the CH proceeds to next stage and
employs the Attack Identification and Inferences module (Fig.4-Il) that uses a rule based
approach to identify the attack that is taking place in the network.
Interpreter applies Attack Inferences Fig.4-14
.endif
. Exit.
Attack identification and inferences
.Read set of rules Fig 4-13
.Set up the Interpreter for rule-based approach
.Interpreter applies forward-chaining on set 0/ rules
.If (Any Goal Condition of known attacks are fulfilled)
Apply rules for Intruder Identification & Iso/atlon Fig.4-1S
.endi/.
.If (Goal Condition==" POTENTIALUNKNOWNATTACK")
Figure 4·11: Pseudocode of attack identification & inference module.
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This module maintains a knowledge base that is used in all stages of testing phase as
shown in fig 4-8. As the CH performs, all the processing required by the GIDP it also store and
maintain the knowledge base centrally. A knowledge base can be briefly described as a special
kind of a database that mainly consists of facts, rules and inference engine. Figure 4-12 describe
the knowledge base of GIDP. GIDP knowledge base maintain facts about the initial training
profiles of network characteristic & derived matrix, facts about detection information and
accusation information. The second part of the knowledge base contains rules. Known attack
information is modeled as a set of rules in this section. In addition, this section also maintains
inference rules and store rules traces, which are use for attack identification and inferences. The
last part of the knowledge base is a simple program that works as an inference engine.
ITP of NCM & OM, Detection, Accusation &
Inference information
Set of rules that models the known attack,
Inference rules and rule traces for attack identification &
inferences
INFERENCE ENGINE
A simple program that employs forward chaining
system on the set of rules
Figure 4-12: Detail diagram ofGIDP knowledge base.
This module obtains a set of rules from the knowledge base, an example set which is used
during the case study in this chapter being presented in fig 4-13. We have constructed these rules
from our previous work [51] (our AIDP simulation results), analyzing various attacks & their
impact on network performance through simulations and analysis of existing literature of known
attacks, for example [89,90, 95 & 102]. In fig 4-13 chi-square Test (NCM[xj) predicate returns
true if the parameter x is anomalous in network characteristic matrix. Similarly, the predicate or
propo itional function Test (DM[y)) returns true if the test on parameter y of derived matrix fails.
This test uses a tooJ of Stati tical Process Control known as variable control chart based on
standard deviation a. In the Attack Identification & Inference module a rule based approach is
used in which an interpreter can either employ forward or backward chaining system. A forward
chaining system process the rules one by one by checking premises (condition in the rule) to reach
conclusions; it can also draw new conclusions. On the other hand backward chaining is goal
driven, that i it reaches the conclusion first and keeps looking for rules that would allow the
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conclusion. In GIDP, an interpreter applies forward chaining on the set of rules, at the end
looking for the Goal Condition fulfilled as described in figA-ll. In case of known attack
condition it call the intruder identification and isolation module to proceed to the next stage.
If Goal Condition with POTENTIALUNKNOWNAITACK is fulfilled during the attack
identification process then GIDP employs attack inference module fig 4-14. The interpreter keeps
track of rule trace during the attack identification process, saves this Rule Trace as detected Rule
Trace, and looks for the match of this Rule Trace in next time intervals. If a match is found in the
current test-sliding window (TSW) (size of TSW is five TIs) then it confirms the new attack
detection by constructing a new rule and appending the new rule in a Set of Rules stored in the
knowledge base (fig 4-14).
We use the same GloMoSim version 2.03 as it was for AIDP in chapter 3 for consistency.
GloMoSim provide the basic simulation environment and I develop program to implement GIDP.
In the implementation of attack identification and inference module of GIDP, I developed an
interpreter function (program) that applies forward chaining on the set of rules stored and
maintain in the GIDP knowledge base.
Set of Rules example
Rule.l :Ix (chi-squaretest(NCM[x)))-> (CheckDerivedMatrix=TRUE)
Rule.2 CheckDerivedMatrix A 3y (Test(DM[y)))-> (PotentiaIAttack=TRUE)
Rule.3 PotentialAttack ->(BestRule=TRUE)
Best Rules for some known attacks:
Rule.4 BestRules 1\ (chi-squaretest(NCM[RREQ))) 1\
Test(DM[RPO)) -» "SLEEPDEPRIVATION"
Rule.S BestRules A (chi-squaretest(NCM[RREPdest_seq))) A
(Test(DM(PDR)) V Lowest(PDR)) -> "BLACKHOLE"
Rule.6 BestRules A (chl-squaretest(NCM(RREPdest_seq))) A
(Test(DM(PDR)) -> "GREYHOLE"
Rule.7 BestRules 1\ (chl-squaretest(NCM[RREQsrc_seq))) 1\
(Test(DM(CPD)) -> "RUSHING"
Rule.S -( trlc (chi-square-test(NCM[x)))) A -( W( Test(DM[y)))) -->
"POTENTIALFALSEALARM"
Rule.9 (Rule.l A Rule.2 A -Bestnute} ->" POTENTIALUNKOWNATTACK"
Figure 4-13: Set of rules in GIDP knowledge base.
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Else If (Rule Trace :::;:= Detected Rule Trace)
New attack Rule Trace= Rule Trace
Construct a rule for New attack Rule Trace
Append New attack Rule Trace in set of rule trace
Set Detected Rule Trace =Empty . endif
Attack Inferences
. If (Detected Rule Trace is empty)
Store Detected Rule Trace= Rule Trace
.endif
Figure 4-14: Pseudocode of attack inference.
4.2.2.4 Intruder Identification & Isolation Phase
In case of any known attack detected in the TI, the interpreter applies the Intruder
Identification & Isolation module (fig 4-15) to identify and isolate the intruding nodes. This
module first identifies the intruding nodes by applying the known attack rules for intruder
identification. For example in case of black hole attack (fig 4-13 Rule 5) it analyzed the RREP
received from all the nodes in last TI and finds the node that has initiated the false RREP packet
with highest destination sequence number. The Response Mechanism (fig 4-15(b» then checks if
detection threshold d is reached for any node Vi in the list of nodes detected in the last p TIs. If
so, then it blacklists the node Vi and informs all other eNs by sending an accusation packet (AP).
When a eN receives an accusation packet it first checks the broadcast id & source address to
avoid processing a duplicate accusation packet. If the accused node is already blacklisted the eN
will ignore & drop the accusation packets to prevent unnecessary network traffic. Otherwise, the
eN will blacklist the accused node and rebroadcast the accusation packet. Finally, to isolate the
intruder from the network all nodes will not only drop the packets from a blacklisted node but also
immediately ignore all packets in their queue that are from the blacklisted nodes, as shown in fig
4-15(d).
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Intruder Ideotificatjon &Isolqtjon
a) Identifying intruding nodes
. Obtain known attack Rulesfor intruder Identification
. for all Goal conditions fulfilled:
Apply intruder identification rule for each detected known attack
add each detected node VI to List of Nodes Detected (LND)
. endfor
b) ResponseMechanism
For all nodes VI in LND
.If (VI detections in Potential Intruder List( PIL)> Detections_required_ To_Accuse (d) )
CH:Blacklist VI & Broadcast Accusation Packet (AP)
else: enter VI in PIL .endif
.Endfar
c) Accusation Packet (API Handling
. Each CN VI maintain its tocat stockttstroble (BLT)
.if CN VI receives an APfor CN '"
.If CN VI has node V, in its BLT then Ignore AP
else: CNadds node V, to its BLT& rebroadcast AP
.endif
.endif
d) Isolating Intruding Nodes
.if node VI receives packet from node "l
.If node V, is in node VI BLT
Ignore packet & drop all packets queued from V,
Else: handle & process packet .endif
.endif
Figure 4-15: Pseudocode of intruder identification & isolation module.
To estimate and get an idea of the running time & complexity of GIDP algorithms we
consider intrusion detection phase (Fig 4-10) as an example. We assume a single non-iterative
task takes I seconds to complete. Total number of times the testing module runs is n TIs. Now we
consider Fig 4-10 pseudocode of intrusion detection phase. which can be split into three tasks for
estimation of their time complexity.
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1) Collecting audit data of NCM parameters, calculating and storing the probability
distribution of NCM parameters.
Running time of this part can be estimated using further dividing into three tasks
a) Collect NCM data for j parameters so time complexity will be j * 1
b) Calculate probability distribution forj parameters each parameter
Consist of M random variables
c) Store probability distribution for j parameters
So the running time of task 1) is = jt +jMt+jMI
=it +2jMI
=j(t+2Mt)
2) Performing hypothesis testing for each parameter j of NCM
j*M*t
j*M*t
Running time of this part can be estimated using further dividing into two tasks
a) Calculating chi computed using equation 4-1 j*M*t
b) Setting null and alternative hypothesis 2*1
c) Comparison chi computed and p values
So running time estimation for task 2) = j (jMt+2t+ j t)
j* t
3) Performing combine hypothesis testing and updating expected values
a) Combine chi computed
b) Setting null & alternate hypothesis
c) Comparison
d) Updating expected values
j*t
2*1
t
j*M*t
So running time estimation is =jt+2t+1 +jMt
=jt+3t+jMt
Now combing task I), 2) and 3)
Running Time (complexity) = n {j(t+2Mt) + j (jMt+2t+ j t)+ jt+3t+jMt}
Which can be simplified to Running Time (complexity) = {4nj+3njM+n/M+n/ +3n} t
If we focus on the non-constant portion of the running time and ignore the constants then the
above expression in big-Oh will be O(n( j+jM+/M + / )) . This expression can be further
simplified if we consider that time taken by j<jM</ </M then we can ignorej, jM and/ and
the final expression for the running time complexity will be O(n(/M )).
To sum up it can be seen from the final expression that the running time complexity of the
intrusion detection phase of GIDP is a function of n ( number of times the testing modules runs),
j (number of parameters in NCM) and M( maximum number of random variables in probability
distribution ofj parameters). Time taken by GIDP will increase with the higher value of n, j &M.
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4.3 Case Study & Evaluation
In this section, we consider a case study with different attack scenarios including multiple
simultaneous attacks scenario. The attacks are generated through our own code during simulations
similar to the way we have il1ustrated these attacks in section 3.1 & 4.1. We also conduct an
analysis of GIDP overhead, to assess the applicability and performance of GIDP. We present the
simulation results of these scenarios and some key findings from the analysis of attacks. As
before, we use GloMoSim version 2.03 to build the simulation environment, using the simulation
parameters shown in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1 Simulation Parameters
25 & 50Number of Nodes
Terrain Dimension 500 * 500 metres & 707 * 707 metres
Node placement Uniform distribution
Simulation Traffic CBR (Constant Bit Rate)
Simulation time 2500 seconds
Routing protocol AODV
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11
Mobility Random Way Point Model (RWP)
Nodes mean speed Varies from 0 to 20 mls
In this case study GIDP is assessed using its configuration parameters shown in Table 4-
2. We consider seven parameters in network characteristic matrix to represent the routing
characteristics of the network and four parameters in derived matrix to reflect the network
performance. Confidence interval of chi square test is 95% in the intrusion detection phase and
we set the size of test sliding to five TIs in which this time two detections are required to declare
the node intruder. We change the number of detection d required to declare the node intruder
slightly from the last work where we only consider SD attack. The main reason is that we are now
considering different types of attacks therefore; the value of parameter d should be general and
enable effective IDP in all attack scenarios. Hence, after analyzing the initial simulation results of
these attacks we use the vales of d and p mention in table 4-2.
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Table 4-2 GIDP Configuration Parameters
Time interval TI 100 seconds
Training Period (N) 5 Time Intervals
Testing Period 20 Time Intervals
Number of Parameters NCM =7 &DM=4 parameters
Chi-square test (a) 5% (i.e. 95% confidence interval)
Test Sliding Window p = 5 Time Intervals
Detections-Required- d = 2 in a Test Sliding Window
to-Accuse (d)
Number of Intruders Varies from 1 to 4
4.3.1 Scenario 1
In the first scenario, we test GIDP with a denial of service attack (sleep deprivation)
using malicious RREQ flooding (MRF), as illustrated in Section 3.1. The intruders launch MRFI
or MRF2 attacks. At each tested mean speed and for each network size (either 25 or 50 nodes) we
performed 40 runs with no intrusion and 40 runs with intruders, using a mix of both MRFI and
MRF2.
The graph in fig 4-16 depicts the success rate (SR) and false alarm (FA) rate of
GIDP as a function of the nodes' mean speed in 25 & 50 node networks with SD attack. By
succe s rate (SR) here, we mean the rate of correctly detecting intrusion in the network,
Sleep Deprivation attack through MRF
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Figure 4-16: Success & false alarm rate of Sleep Deprivation attack (SD)
versus node's mean speed.
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Figure 4-17: Routing protocol overhead with Sleep Deprivation attack (SD)
versus node's mean speed.
identifying the attack type and then identifying & isolating the node, which is causing the attack.
A false alarm (FA) means that a correctly behaving node has been incorrectly identified and
isolated. The graph shows good performance of GIDP in terms of high success and low false
alarm rates against sleep deprivation attack.
The graph in fig 4-17 shows the routing protocol overhead in a 25 node network when
there is a) no attack in the network, b) a sleep deprivation attack with no protection in the network
and c) a sleep deprivation attack with our proposed mechanism GIDP in place. The routing
protocol overhead which is the ratio of number of routing per data packet delivered increase
dramatically in case of sleep deprivation attack as shown in the graph in fig 4-17. The graph also
shows that GIDP reduces the routing protocol overhead and increases network performance when
it i used in a network under sleep deprivation attack.
4.3.2 Scenario 2
In the econd cenario we test GIDP with a mix of black- and grey-hole attacks caused
by initiating a fal e RREP and then dropping packets as illustrated in section 4.1. In order to
launch these attacks, on receiving a RREQ an intruder generates a false RREP packet with
destination equence number (dest_seq) is estimated using equation (4-3) where f represent the
increment in destination equence number of RREP.
dest_seq= current dest_seq +f (4-3)
Through simulations, we observed that for an effective attack, the value of f in the forged RREP
should be at lea t 5 in a 25 node network to pretend that intruder has the freshest route, and higher
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for larger networks. This is because some properly behaving nodes might have routes fresher than
the intruding node for the destination node. We also note that the severity of the attacks depends
on the number of paths (routes) in the network that the intruder manages to capture. One false
RREP packet only allows an intruder to capture the route of one node in the network, because
RREP packets are unicast.
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Figure 4-18: Data packet delivery ratio with Black & Grey Hole attack
versus node's mean speed.
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A single simulation consists of 20 test TIs. We monitor the number of false RREP packets (e)
generated by an intruding node in a simulation and its impact on packet delivery ratio. Fig 4-18
shows that increasing the value of e, that is a higher number of false RREP packets in the
network, reduces the packet delivery ratio during the black & grey hole attack and therefore
increa es the severity of the attack.
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To launch black and grey hole attacks an intruder can vary the values of parameters e
(number of false RREP) and / (the increase in destination sequence number in false RREP
packet). After analyzing the effects of these parameter, we simulate the attacks using the values
of e and/in the ranges 8:s e <20 and 5:S/:S 30 respectively. The graph in fig 4-19 depicts the
success and false alarm rate of GIDP with black & grey hole attacks. The graph shows good
performance of GIDP in terms of high success and low false alarm rate in the scenario tested. The
performance of GIDP drops slightly when the nodes are moving with high speed because with
high mobility the frequency of link failure increases and route discovery takes a longer time.
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The graph in fig 4-20 shows the packet delivery ratio with no attack in the network, black
& grey hole attack with no protection and black & grey hole attacks with GIDP in place. It can be
seen from the graphs that average packet delivery ratio drops dramatically when these attacks are
taking place without any protection mechanism as compare to the packet delivery ratio when there
is no attack in the network. It shows that GIDP can successfully detect these attacks, and identify
& isolate the intruding node and by doing so GIDP also improves the network performance in
terms of packet delivery ratio.
4.3.3 Scenario 3
In this cenario, we test GIDP with the rushing attack through forged RREQ as illustrated
in section 4.l. We have explained that intruders trying to cause rushing attacks by sending a
forged RREQ with a higher src_seq and minimum delay to suppress the later legitimated RREQs.
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In this scenario, an intruder node picked randomly that launch rushing attack as illustrated in
section 4.1 and we perform 20 runs at each tested mean speed.
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Figure 4-21: Success & false alarm rate of rushing attacks
versus node's mean speed.
Figure 4-21 shows that GIDP can also protect against rushing attack with high success
and low false alarm rate. We also note that intruder trying to cause rushing attack by sending a
forged RREQ with higher source sequence and minimum delay increase the number of routing
packets (i.e. RREQ+RREP+RERR) dropped in the network. Figure 4-22 shows in case of rushing
attack the number of routing packet dropped during route discovery and route maintenance
procedures increase as compare to when there is no attack in the network. This is because the
rushing attack forces nodes to drop all later legitimate RREQs for the same route discovery after
rushed RREQ. The graph also shows that GIDP after detecting and isolating the intruder causing
rushing attack reduces the number of routing packets dropped.
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versus node's mean speed.
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4.3.4 Scenario 4
In this scenario, we assess GIDP with a combination of simultaneous attacks launched by
separate intruders in a simulation. We perform 20 runs with each combination of attacks. In each
combination of attack separate nodes picks to launch different attacks for example in case of black
hole and rushing attack two separate nodes launch these attacks simultaneously during a
simulation. Success rate here means that GIDP has detected, identified and isolated all the
intruders causing attacks. False alarm means GIDP has detected and isolated a properly behaving
node as an intruder.
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Figure 4-23: GIDP success and false alarm rate with combination of attacks.
Figure 4-23 depicts the success rate and false alarm rate of GIDP for each of the attack
combinations simulated. The graph shows the ability of GIDP to detect and isolate attacking
nodes, and demonstrates the generality of our proposed mechanism. It can also be seen that the
gap between success and false alarm rate is quite wide and the minimum value of the difference
between succe and false alarm rate is 65%, which shows that GIDP is also effective in a
multiple auack cenario with a variety of attacks including routing and data packet dropping
attack. During the simulation GIDP flagged a POTENTIALUNKNOWNAITACK on a few
occasions but they did not meet the criteria of GIDP attack inferences (i.e. d detections of same
rule trace in a TSW) (fig 4-14)) to mark them as a new attack.
4.3.5 Scenario 5
In thi final cenario, we analyze the overhead imposed on the MANET by GIDP. We
assess the network overhead, measured in number of packets (evaluated as number of packets
generated * number of hops the packet travels) generated by GIDP as a function of the nodes'
mean speed, and compare it with (a) the AODV, routing protocol overhead and (b) the network
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traffic produced by the Constant Bit Rate (CBR) connections. CBR traffic generated at the
application layer during the simulation results in User Data Datagram Protocol (UDP) traffic.
GIDP traffic consists of the network characteristic matrix packets sent periodically from CNs to
CH and the Accusation Packets generated by CH to inform CNs about the intruders in the
network. The AODV overhead consists of all the routing packets i.e. RREQ, RREP and RERR
packets generated in the network during the simulation. Although packets in these three types of
packets differ in size, the comparison still gives us a useful indication of the relative contributions
made to the total network traffic.
Traffic overhead 25 nodes (No attack)
45000 ~--~~---T--~--~--~~--~--~~
40000
35000
r '
-+-AODVTraffic -1
_GIDPTraffic
..... UDPTraffic
~ 30000
Q)
tl 25000
&. 20000
'+-
~ 15000
Q)E 10000
~ 5000
O~~=:=:=;~~~~~=r=~~==r=~
o 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Nodes mean speed (m/s)
Figure 4-24: Overhead generated by AODV, GIDP & UDP
traffic on the network with no attack.
To analyze the network overhead in terms of AODV, GIDP and UDP traffic we first
con ider a 25 node network with no attacking nodes and then a 25 node network with SD attack
as an example. We perform 10 runs with nodes' mean speed varying from 0 to 20 mls. Graphs in
Fig 4-24 & Fig 4-25 shows the contribution made to the total network traffic by the three
component i.e. AODV,GJDP & UDP as a function of the nodes' mean speed with no attack and
sleep deprivation attack re pectively. We note from the graphs that the AODV overhead rises and
the UDP traffic fall with increasing node mean speed, while the GIDP overhead is independent
of node peed. The GIDP traffic on average contributes to 2.6% of the total network traffic, a very
low sum.
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traffic on the network with Sleep Deprivation attack.
4.4 Summary & Conclusion
Many proposals have been made in the literature to secure MANETs from various attacks,
but most are attack-specific. In this chapter, we propose Generalized Intrusion detection and
Prevention mechanism that protect MANETs against wide variety of attacks.
We have first illustrated how intruder can cause various attacks in the network and then
present our approach. Unlike some mechanisms that provide protection through authenticated
routing, the Generalized Intrusion Detection & Prevention mechanism that we have proposed in
this chapter monitors both network layer characteristics and performance statistics through
network characteristic and derived matrix respectively. GIDP uses a combination of anomaly-
based and knowledge-based intrusion detection in different phases of the algorithm to protect
MANET again t a variety of attacks. To assess the applicability and performance of our
approach we have conducted the case study and simulation results of our case study show that our
approach can ecure MANETs from a range of attacks with an affordable processing overhead.
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Chapter 5
5 Adaptive Intrusion Response Mechanism
forGIDP
In the previous chapter we presented our generalized intrusion detection and prevention
mechanism GlOP that can protect MANETs against a range of attacks. GIDP presented in chapter
4 has fixed intrusion response mechanisms that isolate the intruding node in all cases. Now we
focus on the intrusion response mechanisms that are normally part of intrusion detection and
prevention system; we note that these have received less attention in the research community as
compared to intrusion detection systems.
In this chapter, we first indicate the need of flexible adaptive intrusion response mechanism
for intrusion detection and prevention systems in MANETs through investigating the impact on
MANETs' performance of a) various attacks in the network, and b) different type of intrusion
response action. Then we propose a flexible adaptive intrusion response mechanism for GIDP.
This intrusion response mechanism selects an intrusion response action based on the severity of
attack, the degradation in network performance and the expected impact of intrusion response
action to improve and maintain a desired level of network performance. After the intrusion
detection and attack & intruder identification phase of GIDP, the proposed intrusion response
mechanism adaptively selects the response action from the selected set of punishments.
This chapter is organized as follows: section 5.lintroduce intrusion response and reviews
some intrusion response mechanism from the literature. Section 5.2 presents the results of a study
of the impact of various attacks and the impact of intrusion response of GlOP on MANETs
performance. The results indicate the need for a flexible adaptive intrusion response mechanism.
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Section 5.3 presents the flexible and adaptive intrusion response mechanism for GIDP.
Finally, in section 5.4 a case study is conducted to assess a) the effectiveness of the proposed
intrusion response mechanism and b) the overall intrusion detection & prevention mechanism, and
this section end with the evaluation results of the case study. The work described in section 5.2
has been accepted for publication in [26].
5.1 Intrusion Response
Once an intrusion is detected by the intrusion detection system then it is desirable to take
action to thwart attacks or mitigate the damage caused by the attack; this action is referred to as
intrusion response. Although intrusion response is normally a part of the intrusion detection
systems, it receives less attention in the research community compared to the IDS. In [141]
Stakhanova et.al presented a taxonomy of intrusion response systems and indicated some essential
requirements for an ideal intrusion response system. They classify intrusion response systems
(IRSs) based on different characteristic such as activity of triggering response, by the degree of
automation in IRSs, their ability to adjust and response selection method. The first category
classifies IRS as either passive or active IRS.
The main goal of passive IRS is to provide information through activity logging or to
notify the authority, but it does not take action to mitigate the damage caused by the attack or
prevent it. For example, a distributed intrusion detection system [142] was proposed to solve the
user's network identification problem in fixed networks. It uses signature analysis at each host to
detect a signature that consists of event or sequence of events; if the signature is found then the
host collects audit trails and sends them to a centralized detector for analysis. Active IRS aim to
mitigate the damage cause by the attacker and attempt to locate & take actions against attacking
node to prevent the attack.
Based on the degree of automation IRSs can be classified as notification or manual
response system and automatic response system [141]. Most IRSs developed for fixed networks
are either notification or manual response system. They notify the network administrator by
providing information about the intrusion, and the administrator then selects an intrusion response
based on reported attack information. On the other hand, automated response systems respond to
intrusions instantly using an automated decision making process, which is more effective in terms
of minimizing the damage.
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Another way to classify IRSs is their response selection method. An IRS mostly uses
either static or dynamic mapping of response with detected intrusion. IRS that follow static
mapping maps a predefined response with an intrusion alert. They do not take into account the
status of the network or the effect this response will have on the network. On the other hand.
dynamic mapping systems associate an intrusion alert with multiple response actions and selects a
response action by considering some attack metrics such as severity of attacks or confidence in
the attack in real time. Hence. dynamic mapping of response actions allows IRS to adapt to the
changing environment and consequently allow effective intrusion response in dynamic networks
such as MANErs.
It is imperative for intrusion response systems to estimate the impact a certain intrusion
response will have on the network and then decide the appropriate response action. For example,
in [143] the authors have presented a network model through an algorithm to evaluate the impact
of intrusion response on the entities in fixed networks. They first define the requirement for the
response model such as ease of use, flexibility, and minimization of negative impact. Then to
evaluate the impact of intrusion response they find the degree of dependency of response action
on the network entities i.e. how much the response action can affect network entities directly or
indirectly through a capability function. The capability function return values between 0 and 1 and
represents how much the functions of network will be affected if certain intrusion responses are
taken.
5.1.1 Intrusion Response Systems in MANETs
Intrusion response systems are difficult to implement in MANETs as compared to a fixed
network because of no centralized control, such as a network administrator who can instigate an
intrusion response. Nodes can respond to intrusion in MANETs directly or through a cluster head
if the network is organized using clustering. For example, the authors in [144] proposed an
intrusion response with two modes, passive and active. Once the node detects an intruder in the
network it can either respond in passive or active mode. In passive mode. the node that raised the
alarm removes the intruding node from its Neighbour Table. marks it as bad node, and ignores all
the communication with the intruding node. Whilst in active response mode, the node notifies the
cluster head that initiates a voting process and if the result of voting is positive then cluster head
instruct all nodes to stop communicating with the intruding node.
Response systems also make use of a cost sensitive approach, that is they develop
strategies to evaluate the cost of certain response actions on the network and compare it against
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the damage cause by the attack in the network. For instance. a cost sensitive model for IRS in
fixed networks was proposed in [145]. where they compared the cost of deploying a response
against the cost of damage caused by an un-responded intrusion. A response action (isolating
intruder from the network) is selected where the damage cost of the intrusion is greater than the
response cost. Authors borrow this concept in [146] to provide a cost sensitive intrusion response
for MANETs. In MANETs it is difficult to calculate the intrusion response cost i.e. the negative
impact cause by the response on the network resources in general. In [146] they first estimate a
Topology Dependency Index (TDI) using the available routing information that reflects the
response cost. The topology dependency index indicates how much the routing service of nodes in
the network will be disrupted if the intruder is isolated from the network. Then they estimate the
Attack Damage Index (ADI) that indicates the damage caused by an attack. The Attack Damage
Index calculates the damage in terms of the number of nodes affected by the attack using the
routing information. Finally. they respond to intrusion by isolating the attacker if the ADI is
greater than TDI. This cost sensitive model is proposed for proactive routing protocol OLSR
where complete topology information of every node is available. However. this cost sensitive
approach is not suitable for reactive routing protocols such as AODV & DSR because they only
provide partial topology information of nodes in the network. for example in AODV every node
only knows its next hops towards source or destination of active routes. We propose a flexible
intrusion response mechanism for GIDP in this chapter that selects an appropriate response action
based on the severity of attack to improve the overall network performance.
5.2 Investigation
We analyze the simulation results of the case study of chapter 4. where we assess the
applicability of GIDP to various classes of attacks. We notice that in each scenario with a specific
attack a certain parameter of our derived matrix (OM) is affected most. For example in the first
scenario (sleep deprivation attack) the routing protocol overhead (RPO) of the network increased
significantly (fig 4-17). In second scenario (black & grey hole attacks) the data packet delivery
ratio (PDR) decreased considerably (fig 4-20). In third scenario with rushing attack we observe an
increase in the number of routing packets dropped (RPD) during the routing operation in the
network (fig 4-22). This indicates that each attack studied has somehow affected the network
performance. but does not give us a clear picture of how severe these individual attacks are for the
network. Therefore. in this section. we investigate the effects of various attacks and then the
impact of intrusion response (isolation) of GlOP proposed in chapter 4 on overall network
performance.
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5.2.1 Impact of attacks on network performance
To evaluate the impact of various attacks on the network performance we ensure that the
matrix we use illustrates changes and effects that are cause by specific attacks in MANETs. We
use all four parameters of our Derived Matrix, that is, throughput, data packet delivery ratio,
routing packet overhead & number of routing packets dropped. We model these parameters when
there is no attack taking place in the network and then model them with sleep deprivation (SO),
black hole (BH) & grey hole (GH), rushing (RU) and sybil (SY) attack to measure the network
performance degradation (NPD) using equation 5-1.
NPD = WI *AThroughput + w2 *APDR + W3 *ARPO + w4 *ARPD (5-1)
4
where Wi represents the weights with L WI = I .We analyze the importance of throughput, data
i-I
packet delivery ratio (PDR), routing packet overhead (RPO) & routing packets dropped (RPD) in
measuring the overall network performance through literature [102, 155, 158] and simulation
results of case study in chapter 4. We observe that throughput and data packet delivery ratio are
more significant than routing packet overhead and number of routing packet dropped in
measuring network performance degradation. Therefore, to illustrate the impact of attacks and the
impact of intrusion response in the investigation in this section we use the following weights in
equation 5-1 to estimate network performance degradation:
10 equation 5-1, il represents the percentage change, for example, AThroughput is the percentage
change in throughput with and without an attack in the network. 10 equation 5-1 negative values
of A'Ihroughput & LlPDR and positive values of LlRPO & LlRPD represents the degeradation in
network performance. In case of degeradatoin in all parameters, percentage changes in all four
parameters are added without considering the signs. In all other cases, it evaluates NPD by
adjusting the positive or negative signs of each parameter.
5.2.1.1 Impact of various attacks
In this study, we used the simulation parameters of Table 4-1, to keep the simulation
environment consistent. With the 25 node network we first perform simulations with no attack in
the network and model the derived matrix parameters. Keeping the same simulation environment,
we then perform 10 runs with a randomly picked node causing a black hole attack in the network
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and estimate the network performance degradation using equation 5-1 when no GIDP is in place.
We repeat the same process for sleep deprivation, rushing and sybil attack with a single attacker.
Then the entire process is repeated for all attacks with the 50 node network. The graph in Fig 5-1
shows the degradation in network performance in the cases of black hole, sleep deprivation,
rushing and sybil attacks without any protection mechanism in the network. The graph in fig 5-1
suggest that some attacks are more severe than others from the groups of attacks tested.
Specifically, the black hole attacker has the highest impact on network performance. An attacker
causing sleep deprivation attack also has a significant impact while rushing and sybil attacks have
the lowest influence on network performance.
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Figure 5-1: Impact of various attacks on the network performance.
5.2.1.2 Impact of combination of attacks
In next set of experiments, we evaluate the impact of combinations' of attacks with more
than one intruder. We experiment with various combinations of simultaneous attacks (illustrated
in section 3.1 & section 4.1) launched by separate intruders. The graph in fig 5-2 shows that the
overall performance of the network degrades further when more than one intruder is present in the
network. We observe that all combinations of attacks with black hole attacks have caused more
damage to the network than any other combinations. We also notice that when we analyze each
attack independently, the rushing and sybil attack has the least effect on network performance as
shown in fig 5-1. But when rushing and sybil attacks are used with a combination of other severe
attacks such as black hole and sleep deprivation attack it has caused a significant impact on
network performance as shown in fig 5-2.
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Impact of combination of attacks on network performance
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Figure 5·2: Impact of combination of simultaneous attacks on the network performance.
5.2.2 Impact of intrusion response on network performance
When an intrusion is detected and the intruder is identified in GIDP then anintrusion
response is called by the CH. In response to the intrusion, the GIDP response mechanism
presented in chapter 4 isolates the intruding nodes from the network. To get an estimate of the
impact of GIDP intrusion response action (isolation) on network performance, we now randomly
isolate a properly behaving node in the network when there is no attack and no protection
mechanism such as GIDP in place and evaluate the network performance degradation using
equation 5-1.
We first set up a 25 node network using the simulation parameters of Table 4-1 with
no attack and no protection mechanism such as GIDP in place. Nodes in the network are set to
move according to the random waypoint model with a mean speed of 5 mls. We perform 10 runs
and in each run, we randomly choose a node, isolate it from the network, and observe the network
performance degradation because of isolation. We then repeat the same process with the 50 node
network.
The graph in fig 5-3 and fig 5-4 depict the impact of isolating properly behaving nodes
picked randomly during the simulation on the overall network performance of the 25 and 50 node
networks respectively. Tt can be seen from both graphs that the impact of isolating a node on
network performance differs in each case. In general, these graphs illustrate that some nodes in
the network are more critical than other nodes. This is mainly due to their location in the network
topology, but few nodes have a major role as routing nodes in the network, primarily because the
nodes are moving and therefore the critical routing nodes change with time. Isolating the more
important routing nodes, for example node 5, 6 & 20 in fig 5-3, affects more routes in a network
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than other nodes and re-routing causes significant routing disruption, which degrades network
performance considerably.
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Figure 5-3: Impact of node isolation on the network performance in 2S nodes network.
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Figure 5-4: Impact of node isolation on the network performance in 50 nodes network.
We next compare the results of the impact of attacks (fig 5-1) and the impact of isolating
nodes (fig 5-3 & fig 5-4) on network performance. We note that in some cases when attacks are
less severe for example rushing or sybil attacks, (fig 5-1) and nodes are more critical for instance
nodes 5 or 6, fig 5-3, the intrusion response of completely isolating these nodes actually results in
a net degradation of network performance. Specifically, in these cases it is actually better not to
punish an attacking node by isolating it. In other words, an intrusion response should be more
flexible and should be able to tradeoff between the impact of the attack and the impact of isolating
the attacker from the network.
To sum up, the results of this investigation shows that in some cases isolating the attacker
can cause more harm than good to the network, hence an adaptive flexible intrusion response
mechanism is required.
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5.3 Flexible adaptive intrusion response mechanism for GIDP
The results of the last section reveal the downside of a fixed intrusion response in the
context of intrusion detection & prevention in MANETs. To overcome this weakness and improve
the protection mechanism in this section, we present a flexible adaptive intrusion response for
GIDP, which is an integral part of the intrusion detection & prevention mechanism proposed in
this thesis.
Some proposed methods of intrusion response in MANETs were reviewed in section
5.1.1 for instance cost sensitive intrusion response [145] is proposed where it compares the cost of
intrusion response with damage caused by the attack and isolates if the latter has a higher value
than the former. They estimate the cost of intrusion response (isolating) using topology
dependency information of nodes in the network that can be obtain in proactive routing protocols
however, in reactive routing protocols such as AODY and DSR nodes only know the next hop
towards the destination so estimation of topology dependency of a nodes in the network is
difficult.
We adapt the work of [145] as follows. We propose an adaptive intrusion response
mechanism for GIDP that first estimates the following parameters:
• Confidence on attack
• Severity of attacks
• Network performance degradation
Confidence on attack is evaluated after the intrusion detection phase of GIDP, and once
an attack is identified its severity is then approximated using the existing information of attacks
from GIDP and through calculating the network performance degradation. Then we have a
defined set of intrusion response actions, and use a decision table to model the intrusion response
selection criteria based on confidence on detected attack and network performance degradation
caused by this attack.
Before we present the adaptive intrusion response mechanism, we first describe the slight
improvement in this chapter in terms of scalability. To improve scalability of GIDP and to get an
estimate of overhead our proposed scheme imposed on the network, we borrow the clustering
approach used in [55] and implement it for GIDP with slight modification. We now briefly
explain how we have used this clustering approach for GIDP. In this approach all network nodes
operate in one of the three roles manager node (MN), cluster heads (CH) and cluster nodes (CNs).
The manager node represents a network administrator or high-level network entity, this role is
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assigned statically and it encapsulates the functionality of cluster head. Cluster heads in this
clustering approach are elected and the election process selects the most capable nodes in the
network in terms of their processing power, memory and mobility ratio as CHs. The clustering
approach presented in [55] also makes use of the virtual cluster principal proposed in [56].
Initially in the virtual cluster principle, the entire network area is divided into equal regions called
virtual clusters (VC) and in each VC a CH is selected by first calculating the capability of each
node in VC using equation 5-2.
CF(~)
w.PP(v) +w2MEM (v) + w3PVCC(v)
MR(v)
(5-2) [55]
CF(Vi) is a capability function that estimates the capability of each node based on four parameters:
processing power (PP(Vi», memory capacity (MEM(Vi)), proximity to the virtual cluster centre
(PVCC(v;)) and mobility ratio (MR(Vi). Each variable of equation 5-2 is divided by its maximum
value to normalized it to a value range between (0, I) and the weights WI> W2 & W3 are assigned
considering the significance of each variable. We use the same values of w}=0.3, W2 =0.3& w3=OA
as it is used in [55].MR(Vi) here refers to the average frequency of the node Vi changing its virtual
cluster and a lower value of MR means the higher chances of the node Vi being selected as CH
(equation 5-2). This approach assumes all nodes are aware of their current location, for example
equipped with GPS (Global Positioning System) or other system such as Galileo. Therefore, when
a CH change virtual cluster it informs all the nodes in its old VC about the change through a
changeover packet. When new node enter the VC and can not finds a CH in the VC then it starts
the cluster head election process by broadcasting a cluster head election packet (CEP) in the VC.
On receiving the CEP nodes calculate the capability function value using equation 5-2 and inform
other cluster nodes about it. Then the node Viwith highest CF(v;) value is elected as CH and other
nodes become CNs.
Now with the modified clustering approach data collection procedure of GIDP described
in section 4.2.1 has changed slightly. As stated earlier MN is statically assigned and all the CHs
know the predefined location of the MNs. When the MN changes its location, it updates CHs
accordingly. In the data collection phase of GlOP, CHs after each time interval gather the network
characteristic matrix & derived matrix from CNs in each virtual cluster and report these matrices
to the MN. The MN after col1ecting these matrices applies a modified testing phase, in which the
fixed intrusion response presented in chapter 4 is replaced by the adaptive intrusion response
mechanism in this chapter.
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5.3.1 Response model architecture
The diagram in fig 4-8 in chapter 4 represents the detailed architecture of GIDP. We now
present adaptive response model architecture, algorithm, and detailed description of intrusion
response process.
In GIDP after collecting network characteristic and derived matrix, information the MN
employs two phases training and testing. Training phase results in an initial training profile (ITP).
Then MN applies the testing module, which consists of several tasks (fig 4-8). In the first task it
detects intrusion in the network using chi-square test, if there is no intrusion in the network then it
updates the ITP through exponentially weighted moving average to adapt the changing network
behaviour. If there is intrusion, in the next task the MN identifies the attack or attacks in the
network using existing knowledge of attacks. In case of a known attack, the MN identifies the
intruding nodes using intruder identification rule specific to the known attack. Finally, the MN
respond to the intrusion. Training, intrusion detection, attack identification and intruder
identification phase of GIDP testing are unaltered. The modified architecture of intrusion response
of GIDP is represented by diagram in fig 5-5.
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Figure 5-5: Adaptive intrusion response internal architecture of GlOP.
After intruder detection, attack identification, and intruder identification, the intrusion
response mechanism is run by the manager node, which mainly performs three tasks as, can be
seen from the diagram in fig 5-5. In the first task MN calculates its confidence in the detected
attack using the detection information and then to determine the severity of attack the MN
evaluates the network performance degradation since the attack was launched using the derived
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matrix information. The proposed response mechanism requires the network administrator to
model the response decision process in the form of a decision table [54]. This defines the criteria
for selection of intrusion response action taking into account the appropriateness of intrusion
response action in the current context by considering the level of confidence on detected intrusion
and network performance degradation level since the attack began. Finally, the MN selects the
intrusion response action according to the decision table for the detected intrusion and takes the
necessary actions required to implement the intrusion response action which we will explain later
in section 5.3.2.
5.3.1.1 Intrusion response actions
Most of the intrusion detection system in the literature responds to the intrusion in a
predetermined fixed manner without considering the negative impact of the response or the side
effects of the response action on the network. In an effort to enhance the effectiveness of intrusion
response and reduce its adverse effects on the network, we first consider possible intrusion
response action (punishment for intruding node) in MANETs. Then after analyzing the
appropriateness of each intrusion response action, we select a set of intrusion response action for
proposed intrusion response mechanism of GIDP.
To list the possible intrusion response actions or punishments for intruding nodes in
MANETs we consider the data forwarding and routing services and suggest punishments to stop
the attack by the intruding node, mitigate the damage cause by the attack and prevent further
attacks from the intruder. An example list of possible punishments based on the various
operations a node in the network performs on data and routing packets is as follows:
1) Isolation
In this response action all nodes in the network punishes the intruding node by
completely isolating it from the network immediately, that is, simply treat the intruder as non-
existent. To employ this intrusion response action nodes impose the following restriction in
terms of data forwarding and routing service:
• Nodes in the network do not forward any data packets originating from or destined to
the intruding node.
• No nodes in the network route any packets through the intruder.
• Nodes ignore all routing and data packets from the intruding node.
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2) Probabilistic isolation
In this response action nodes do not isolate the intruder completely, but instead they
apply some restriction in terms of forwarding data. To employ this intrusion response nodes
perform the following actions:
• Nodes only forward some of the data packets based on certain probability level.
• Nodes do not route any packets through the intruder.
3) Route around attacker
In this intrusion response action nodes route data packets around the intruding node to
stop further attacks from the intruding node while still allowing the intruder to forward data
packets for other nodes. To employ this intrusion response nodes perform the following
actions:
• Allow intruder to forward data packets for other nodes in the network for existing
routes. Nodes process these data packets so that they will reach their destinations.
• Do not include intruder in new routes discoveries i.e. route the packets around the
intruding node.
• Ignore all routing packets generated and forwarded by intruder (i.e. to prevent further
attacks).
4) Service denial
In this response, action nodes deny services provided to or offered by the intruder
while using the intruder as an intermediate router. For employing this intrusion response
nodes perform following task:
• Nodes do not forward any data packets originating from or destined to the intruding
node
• Deny any further services the intruder provides to other nodes in the network for
example providing internet access.
• Allow routing packets through intruder nodes i.e. still use the intruder as an
intermediate router in the network.
5) No punishment
In some cases when the attack is not severe, that is, the performance of the network is not
significantly affected, it is possible that employing a strong intrusion response such as complete
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isolation might have adverse effects on the network. In these cases, the response mechanism
ignores the attack.
6) Relocation
Another intrusion response action is relocating a node closer to the intruder node before
isolating the intruder. This approach requires the availability of network topology information
that assists in finding critical nodes in the network, and requires the network to be able to
command its nodes to move as required. For example, if isolating the intruder causes network
partitions due to its location in the network then to maintain the network connectivity a different
nodes can be relocated closer to the intruder node first. then the intruder can be isolated from the
network.
We analyze the appropriateness of each response action in this list of possible intrusion
response actions (punishments) in terms of their side effects or any adverse impact they might
have on network performance through the results of investigation study in section 5.2. In addition,
we further analyze the appropriateness of these response actions in terms of their practical
effectiveness in combating attack, mitigating damage cause by attack and stopping further attacks
from the intruding node. We then propose three intrusion response actions for GIDP based on
confidence on detected attacks and the impact of attack on network performance. This selected set
of intrusion response actions are as follows:
a) Isolation
We propose GIDP response mechanism should employ this response action when the
confidence on detected attack is high, the attack is severe, and the network performance has
degraded considerably since the attack was launched. By isolating the intruder, nodes in the
network will treat the intruder as non-existent. Although it will cause re routing overhead it still
improves the overall network performance significantly.
b) Route around attacker
When the confidence on detected attack is reasonably high and the network
performance degradation is noticeable then response mechanism of GIDP will employ route
around attacker. In this intrusion response, nodes allow the intruder to keep on forwarding data
packets for other nodes in the network but will not include the intruder in new routes and ignore
all routing packets generated or forwarded by intruder. The main reason for selecting this
response action is to stop further attacks from the intruder while still maintaining the data
forwarding service.
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c) No Punishment
When the confidence on attack is not high, the attack is not severe and network performance
degradation is tolerable then GIDP response mechanism will simply ignore the attack. The main
reason for not selecting either isolation or route around attacker response in this case is to avoid
possible adverse effect on network performance.
5.3.2 Algorithm & Technical details
This section explains the algorithm and the functionality of each process involved in
GIDP adaptive flexible intrusion response mechanism in detail. GIDP intrusion response
mechanism is invoked after intrusion detection, attack identification and intruder identification
phase as shown in fig 4-8. The algorithm and technical details of these phases are presented in
section 4.2.2 and are unchanged therefore, we only present the algorithm & description of
adaptive flexible intrusion response mechanism of GlOP in this section.
MN following the intrusion detection, attack identification, and intruder identification
employ intrusion response mechanism for all detected nodes in the current test sliding window
using the algorithm in fig 5-6. MN first estimates the confidence on attack detected based on the
detection and accusation information using equation 5-3.
ConfidenceOnAttack = WI *C.l + W2 *DetectionProbability (5-3)
In equation 5-3, Wi represents the weight of the formula where the sum of these weights
equals one. C.l represents the confidence interval of chi-square test during the intrusion detection
phase of GlOP. Detection Probability in equation 5-3 refers to the probability of detecting
intruding node during the current test sliding window of GIDP for example if the intruder is
detected three times in the test sliding window of size five then the Detection Probability is 60%.
Considering the importance of detection probability and confidence interval of chi-square test in
terms of estimating the confidence on detected attack we set WI = 0.3 and w2=D.7. Equation 5-3
returns the value between 0 and I that indicates the confidence on detected attack by intrusion
detection and attack identification phases of GlOP.
In the next stage of adaptive intrusion response mechanism, MN evaluates network
performance degradation as shown in fig 5-6. To calculate this, the intrusion response mechanism
obtains derived matrix information from the knowledge base which contains the derived matrix
parameter values (i.e. throughput, packet delivery ratio, routing protocol overhead & routing
packet dropped) when there was no attack in the network and the values of derived matrix
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Intrusion Response Mechanism
Response Mechanism
For all Detected nodes Vi in a Test Sliding Window
· Calculate confidence on attack (COA) value using equation 5-3
· Evaluate Network performance degradation (NPD) value using equation 5-1
· Define the COA levels & Assign level to calculated COA value
· Define the NPD levels & Assign level to evaluated NPD value
· MN obtain Decision Table
· MN search DTwith COA & NPD level to seek Intrusion Response Action (IRA)
· If (IRA== ISOLATION)
MN: Blacklist Vi & Broadcast Accusation Packet (AP) with IRA=ISOLATION
else .If (IRA== ROUTE_AROUND_ATIACKER)
MN: Temporarily Blacklist Vi & Broadcast AP with IRA=ROUTE_AROUND
else MN Set IRA to no punishment
endif.
endif .
.EndFor
Figure 5-6: Pseudocode of adaptive flexible intrusion response mechanism of GIDP.
parameter since the attack was detected. MN then use equation 5-1 to calculate the network
performance degradation (NPD), where A represents the percentage change in the parameter
between the average value of the current test sliding window and the average value of the
parameter when there was no attack in the network.
Once eOA and NPD values are calculated, which are between 0 and 1, then MN assigns
confidence levels of eOA and NPD. We have defined four levels, that is, confidence on attack
and network performance degraded level could be either low, medium, high or very high .. Then
the response mechanism obtain decision table from the knowledge base constructed by network
administrator to implement the intrusion response selection criteria. Modelling of intrusion
response selection through a decision table allows the network administrator to configure and
modify the intrusion response selection process for different network environment and GIDP
adapt accordingly.
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Decision Table for an Adaptable Intrusion response
COAlevel Medium High VeryHighVeryHigh High Low Low High MediumMediumMedium Low HighVeryHighVery HighLow
NPDlevel VeryHighVeryHighVeryHigh Medium High VeryHighHighMedium High Medium Low Medium Low Low High Low
ISOlATION X
ROUTE AROUND
AlTACKER
X X X X x
X X X X
NO PUNISHMENT x X X x X
Figure 5·7: Decision table of adaptive flexible intrusion response mechanism of GIDP.
The decision table is a method that formally describes the conditions along with their
possible combinations and maps these combinations of condition entries with certain actions, for
example, fig 5-7 shows the decision table used by GIDP intrusion response mechanism in the case
study in this chapter. In the decision table first two rows represents the conditions (Le. COA and
NPD levels) and the last three rows represent the actions (i.e. isolation, route around intruder and
no punishment). So response mechanism search the decision table with calculated COA and NPD
levels to select the intrusion response action (IRA). If the selected intrusion response is isolation
or route around attacker then MN inform all nodes about the IRA by broadcasting accusation
packet and in case of no punishment MN ignore the attack as shown in fig 5-6 in order to avoid
the possible adverse affect on network performance.
When a CN receive an accusation packet it first checks the broadcast id and source
address of the packet to avoid processing duplicate accusation packet. If the accused node "J is
\
already blacklisted either permanently or temporarily then the eN will ignore & drop the
accusation packet to prevent unnecessary network traffic (fig 5-8 ). Otherwise, the eN will check
the intrusion response action in AP that need to taken for the node "J. In case of isolation, eN will
first add intruder "J in its blacklist table then to isolate the intruder from the network all nodes will
not only drop all packets from blacklisted node but also immediately ignore all packets in the
queue that are from the blacklisted nodes as shown in fig 5-9 (a). If the intrusion response action
is route around attacker then eN will first add intruder Vj in its temporary blacklist table. To
implement this intrusion response all nodes will ignore and drop routing packets i.e. RREQ,
RREP, & RERR packets generated or forwarded by the intruder node "J to prevent further attacks
from the intruder. All nodes exclude intruder Vj in their new route discoveries that is they select
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Accusation Packet CAP)Handling
. Each eN Vi maintain its local BlacklistTable (BlT) & Temporary Blacklist (TBlT)
.if eN Vi receives an AP for eN Vj
.If eN Vi has node Vj in its Bl T or TBl T then Ignore AP
else: . eN Vi checks IRA in AP
.If (lRA== ISOLATION)
. eN adds node Vj to its Bl T & rebroadcast AP
. eN Isolate Intruding Node Vj (Fig 5-9(a»
else
. eN adds node Vj to its TBl T & rebroadcast AP
. eN Route around intruder Vj (Fig 5-9(b»
.endif
.endif
.endif
Figure 5-8: Pseducode of accusation packet handling for intrusion response mechanism.
Intrusion ResponseActions
a) Isolating Intryding Nodes
.if node Vi receives packet from node Vj
.If node Vj is in node Vi BLT
Ignore all packet & drop all packets queued from Vj
Else: handle & process packet
.endif
.endif
b) Route Around Intruding Nodes
.If node Vj Is in node Vi TBLT
.lf node Vi receives routing packet from node Vj
.Ignore & drop RREQ.RREP & RERR packets from Vj
endif .
.if node Vi receives data packet from node Vj destined for node Vk
. Node Vi forward data packets towards node Vk
endif
.Node Vj removes route entries include node Vj from its route table
Eise: handle & process packet .endif
.endif
Figure 5-9: Pseducode of implementing intrusion response actions.
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routes that does not include ") in the path. However, nodes will still forward the data packets
received from") for existing routes towards their destination nodes (fig 5-9(b» to maintain the
desired level of data forwarding service. Allowing a data-forwarding service from "i reduces the
possibility of adverse affects on network performance for a time until the nodes find new routes
around "). This response action is also effective in case node "i is a critical node in terms of its
location in the network topology, when isolating node "i could have signficant side effects on
network performance.
5.4 Case Study & Evaluation
We now present a case study to assess the enhanced GIDP with adaptive flexible
intrusion response mechanism. We first inspect GIDP intrusion response action appropriateness in
various attack scenarios and we assess the scalability of GIDP that is its performance as a
protection mechanism in larger networks. Then we study the impact of GIDP adaptive flexible
intrusion response mechanism on the network performance. We do so by estimating the a)
effectiveness of GIDP with no intrusion response, b) effectiveness of GIDP with fixed intrusion
response and c) effectiveness of GIDP with adaptive flexible response. In addition, we also
examine the impact of different types of intrusion response on average network throughput and
packet delivery ratio under different attack scenarios. We further analyze the overhead imposed
on MANETs by GIDP. Finally, we assess the impact of a) no intrusion response mechanism b)
fixed intrusion response and c) flexible adaptive intrusion response mechanism, on the overhead
of routing protocol (ADDV) and our proposed protection scheme (GIDP). We present the
simulation results of comprehensive set of experiments on each of these scenarios. For
consistency, we continue to use GloMoSim version 2.03 to build the simulation environment
using the simulation parameters shown in Table 5-1.
Table 5·1 Simulation Parameters
Number of Nodes 25 50 100 150 200
500 * 500 metres 707*707 1000*1000 1225*1225 1415*1415Terrain Dimension
Node placement Uniform distribution
Simulation Trame CBR (Constant Bit Rate)
Simulation time 2000 seconds
Routing protocol ADDV
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11
MobUity Random Way Point Model (RWP)
Nodes mean speed Varies from 0 to 20 mls
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In this case study GIDP is assessed using its configuration parameters shown in Table 5-
2. We keep the network characteristic and derived matrix parameters similar to the one in last case
study for consistency. Confidence interval of chi square test is 95% in the intrusion detection
phase and we set the size of test sliding to five TIs. Additional GIDP configuration parameters
related to intrusion response mechanism are added in table 5-2 such as selected intrusion response
action, parameters on which confidence on detected attacks and network performance degradation
is based, and levels of COA & NPD. Table 5-2 shows the values of GIDP configuration
parameters used for this case study however, the network administrator by tweaking these
parameters enables GlOP to adapt to the network with slightly different protection requirements.
For example in order to adapt to a network where intrusion detection and prevention time is
critical, network administrator can adjust some of GlOP configuration parameters such as time
interval and size of test sliding window.
Table 5·2 GIDP Configuration Parameters
Time interval TI 100 seconds
Training Period (N) 5 Time Intervals
Testing Period 15 Time Intervals
Number of Parameters NCM =7 & DM=4 parameters
Chi-square test (Cl) 5% (i.e. 95% confidence interval)
Test Sliding Window 5 Time Intervals
Number of Intruders Varies from 1 to 4
Intrusion Response Complete Isolation, Route Around Attacker &
Actions No Punishments
Confidence on attack Function of: Confidence Interval of Chi-
square test & Detection Probability
Network Performance Function of: Network Throughput, PDR, RPO
Degradadon &RPD
COA & NPD levels Four levels: Low, Medium, High &Very High
5.4.1 GIDP intrusion response action appropriateness in various attacks
In this section, we test the proposed GlOP intrusion response mechanism with different
attacks scenarios to analyze the appropriateness of intrusion response action in a network with
different attacks. This time we also assess the scalability feature of GlOP by including
experiments with 100, 150 & 200 nodes networks.
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5.4.1.1 Black hole attack
In this scenario, we test enhanced GIDP with adaptive flexible intrusion response
mechanism where one intruding node picked randomly during the simulation launches a black
hole attack by first capturing the routes in the network by sending forged RREP and then
dropping all data packets as illustrated in section 4.1. The GIDP response mechanism calculates
the confidence on detected attack (COA) and then it converts the calculate value of COA into
percentage and map it with the COA level mention in table 5-2 using the following range of
confidence on attack define in table 5-3.
T bl 53M fCOA I COAla e - appmg range 0 va ue to eve
COAlevel Range of COA value (%)
Low 0< COA value (%)::; 25
Medium 25 < COA value (%) ::;50
High 50 < COA value (%) s 70
Very High COA value (%» 70
We perform 20 runs with black hole attack for each network size that is 25, 50, 100, 150
& 200 nodes. We use the simulation parameters of table 5-1, GIDP configuration parameters of
table 5-2, mapping range of confidence on attack shown in table 5-3, and GIDP response
mechanism use the decision table shown in fig 5-7 that defines the intrusion response action
selection criteria.
GlOPselected response action
in BH attacks .Isolation
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GI_so
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Medium: 10<NPD(%)<=20
High : 20<NPD(%)<=30
25 nodes 50 nodes 100 nodes 150 nodes 200 nodes
Figure 5-10: G lOP intrusion response action selected with black hole attack
in 25, 50,100,150, & 200 nodes network.
Graph is fig 5-10 shows the percentage each of intrusion response action (i.e. isolating
intruder, route around attacker or no punishment) selected during the set of experiments in 25, 50,
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lOO, 150 & 200 node networks. The GIDP intrusion response mechanism in this experiment used
the network performance degradation level settings shown in the graph. The graph shows that in
the case of black hole attack the GIDP intrusion response mechanism has isolated the intruding
node in most cases. It can be seen that in larger networks (i.e. more than 100 nodes in the
network) GIDP has responded to intrusion by routing around the intruder node 26.6% and has
opted to ignore the attack 23% of the times. GIDP has chosen to isolate intruder 90% of times on
average in smaller networks (25 & 50 nodes) but this percentage drops to 53% in larger network
with the current configuration of intrusion response mechanism.
To inspect this dissimilarity of intrusion response selection of GIDP intrusion response
mechanism in smaller and larger networks, we repeat the same set of experiments by first
adjusting the network performance degradation level settings and then slightly modifying the way
intruder launches a black hole attack in larger network. To launch a black hole attack intruder first
sends a forged RREP with incremented destination sequence number (indicating freshness of
route). This increment is / which is calculated using equation 4-3 and explained in section 4.3.2.
In the last experiment, we use / with range 5~ / ~ 30 for all network size and now for repeated
experiment we use/with range l5~/~ 40 in larger networks (100,150 & 200 nodes), because a
larger value of/allows an intruder to capture more routes by falsely claiming to nodes that it has
fresher routes.
GlOP selected response action in BH
attack (repeated Scenario)
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Figure 5·11: GIDP intrusion response action selected with black hole attack
(repeated scenario) in 25, 50,100,150, & 200 nodes network.
Graph in fig 5-11 shows the result of repeated scenario with modified network
performance degradation level settings and alteration in range of / (increment in destination
sequence number of forged RREP) from 5~ / ~ 30 to l5~ / ~ 40. The modified network
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performance degradation level settings are given in the graph (fig 5-11). The graph shows that
GIDP intrusion response action selection in smaller and larger networks is more consistent with
the adjustment in the two parameters. GIDP has now responded to black hole attack by isolating
the intruder most of the time in larger network as well. We infer from the two graphs that an
intruder has to adjust the way it launches the BR attack in MANETs to cause same amount of
damage in larger networks as in smaller networks, and that consequently protection mechanisms
have to adopt in order to improve their performance in larger network (scalability).
5.4.1.2 Sleep Deprivation attack
In this scenario, we test GIDP proposed intrusion response mechanism with sleep
deprivation attack where one intruding node picked randomly during the simulation launches a
sleep deprivation attack as described in section 3.1. We perform 20 runs with sleep deprivation
attack for each network size (25, 50, 100, 150 & 200 nodes). We use the simulation parameters of
table 5-1, GIDP configuration parameters of table 5-2, mapping range of confidence on attack
shown in table 5-3, GIDP response mechanism use the decision table shown in fig 5-7, and now
following the last scenario we use the modified network performance degradation level settings.
GlOPselected response action in
SOattacks
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Figure 5-12: GlOP intrusion response action selected with sleep deprivation attack
in 25, 50,100,150, & 200 nodes network.
The graph in fig 5-12 shows that GIDP has responded to sleep deprivation attack by
isolating intruding node 78% of the time on average during the experiments on 25, 50, 100, 150 &
200 nodes network. In general it shows the appropriateness of the action taken by GIDP intrusion
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response mechanism because we know from the literature, and from the results of section 3.3.3.1
and the investigation results of section 5.2 that sleep deprivation is a severe denial of service
attack and causes considerable damage to the network most of the times. It can also be seen from
the graph that the GIDP intrusion response mechanism scales well for larger networks.
5.4.1.3 Rushing attack
In this scenario, we assess GIDP intrusion response mechanism with rushing attack
through forged RREQ as illustrated in section 4.1. We suspect rushing is a mild attack and this
has indicated by investigation results of section 5.2.1.1 where we have inspected the impact of
various attacks on MANETs performance. We perform 20 runs with rushing attack for each
network size 25, 50, 100, 150 & 200 nodes. For consistency, we use the simulation parameters,
GIDP configuration parameters, GIDP response action selection criteria same as in the last
scenario.
25 nodes SOnodes 100 nodes 150 nodes 200 nodes
Figure 5-13: GIDP intrusion response action selected with rushing attack
in 25, 50,100,150, & 200 nodes network.
Graph in fig 5-13 shows that in response to intrusion in terms of rushing attack GIDP
intrusion re ponse mechanism has selected not to punish the intruding nodes most of the times
during the experiments in 25, 50, 100, 150 & 200 nodes networks. This is because the impact of
rushing attack on network performance majority of time is low and we have learned from the
investigation in section 5.2 that taking strict action such as isolating intruder node when the attack
is less severe can actually results in a net degradation of network performance. The main reason
for this net degradation in network performance is that isolating a node that might be an important
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node can affect a number of routes in the network and re routing cause disruption and degradation
in network performance. Considering this GIDP response of not punishing the intruder node in
these cases shows the flexibility and effectiveness of our protection mechanism. However, it can
be seen from the graph in fig 5-13 that in some cases where the rushing attack degrades the
network performance GIDP has responded by either isolating or routing around the intruder node.
5.4.1.4 Grey hole attack
In this scenario, we test GIDP proposed intrusion response mechanism with grey hole
attack where one intruding node pick randomly during the simulation launches the attack as
illustrated in section 4.1. We keep the simulation and GIDP configuration parameters same as in
last scenario for consistency.
100
90
80
NPO level settings
Low : 0<NPO(%)<=4
:4<NPO(%)<=10
:lO<N
GlOP selected response action
in GH attack
o
25 nodes 50 nodes 100 nodes 150 nodes 200 nodes
Figure 5-14: GIDP intrusion response action selected with grey hole attack
in 25, 50,100,150, & 200 nodes network.
Graph in fig 5-14 shows that GIDP has countered grey hole attack by routing the packets
around the intruding nodes in most cases. In this intrusion response nodes in the network ignore
routing packets from the intruder and route packets around the intruder while still allowing
intruder to forward data packets for other nodes in the network. This intrusion response action is
taken when the confidence on attack is reasonably high and the network performance degradation
is noticeable but not substantial. The main reason of selecting this intrusion response action in this
scenario is to stop further attacks from the intruder node while preventing any adverse effects of
isolating intruder node completely on network performance. GIDP suspects that isolating the
intruder node completely in this scenario will cause rerouting overhead for the network therefore
selecting to route around the intruding nodes is an appropriate choice in this case. However, GIDP
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in some cases has chosen to isolate the intruding node completely as can be seen from the graph
when the grey hole attack cause considerable degradation in network performance.
5.4.2 Analyzing the impact of adaptive flexible intrusion response
mechanism
In this section, we assess the impact of intrusion response mechanisms on network
performance. In first stage, we estimate the effectiveness of intrusion response mechanism in
terms of degradation in network performance when either a) no intrusion response, b) fixed
intrusion response or c) adaptive flexible intrusion response mechanism is employed. Then we
analyze the impact of GIDP intrusion response action in case of various attacks on average
throughput and packet delivery ratio of the network. Finally, we analyze the impact of GIDP
response action on AODV and GIDP overhead in various attack scenarios.
5.4.2.1 Impact of intrusion response action effectiveness
In this scenario, we analyze the effectiveness of intrusion response mechanism as a
function of network performance degradation. We keep the simulation and GIDP configuration
parameters same for consistency. In experiments in this scenario, we consider 25 and 50 node
networks with various attacks with individual nodes and the combination of simultaneous attacks
with separate nodes. We perform 30 runs with each attack in a 25 node network; these are divided
as 10 runs when GIDP does not respond to intrusion, 10 runs when GIDP responds with fixed
response mechanism that isolates intruder in all cases and 10 runs when GIDP employs the
adaptive flexible intrusion response mechanism. We then repeat the entire procedure with 50
nodes network.
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Figure 5-15: Intrusion response action effectiveness versus network performance
degradation with various attacks in 25 nodes network.
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Figure 5-16: Intrusion response action effectiveness versus network performance
degradation with various attacks in 50 nodes network.
Graphs in fig 5-15 and fig 5-16 shows the goodness of intrusion response mechanism in
terms of network performance degradation in 25 and 50 nodes network respectively. It shows the
network performance degradation in various attack situations when there is no response to
intrusion by GIDP, GIDP respond to intrusion by isolating intruder, and GIDP using the adaptive
flexible intrusion response mechanism. It can be seen from the graphs that average network
performance degradation is minimum when GIDP is used with adaptive flexible intrusion
response mechanism proposed in this chapter. Although GIDP with adaptive flexible intrusion
response minimizes the damage on network performance in all attacks, we observe that in case of
mild attacks such as rushing or some situation of grey hole attack, adaptive response to intrusion
significantly improve the overall network performance.
5.4.2.2 Impact of intrusion response on throughput & PDR
In this section, we first analyze the impact of intrusion response actions on average
network throughput in case of various attacks in 25 and 50 nodes network. Average network
throughput here is calculated through estimating the total number of data packets successfully
delivered to the destinations. Then it converts the total number of packets into number of bits by
considering the packet size and the total simulation time.We perform 30 runs (10 runs with no
intrusion response, 10 runs with fixed response, and 10 runs with adaptive intrusion response)
with each attack and note the average network throughput in bits per second.
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Figure 5-17: Impact of intrusion response action on network throughput
with various attacks in 25 nodes network
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Figure 5-18: Impact of intrusion response action on network throughput
with various attacks in 50 nodes network
Graphs in fig 5-17 & 5-18 shows that average network throughput is least when intrusion
is not responded and it is maximum when GIDP employs adaptive flexible intrusion response
mechanism in all attacks. We also note from the graphs that in case of severe attacks such as black
hole and sleep deprivation the fixed intrusion response of isolating intruder maintain a reasonable
level of throughput. However, isolating intruder node in all cases in not efficient in cases of mild
attacks such as rushing and some instances of grey hole attack. Adaptive flexible intrusion
response mechanism overcomes this deficiency of fixed intrusion response and maintains desired
level of network throughout in all attack scenarios.
In the next set of experiments, we analyze the improvement that adaptive intrusion
response mechanism can bring about in terms of network throughput and packet delivery ratio
when the network is under attack. We first consider 25 and 50 nodes network and monitor the
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average throughput and PDR for the time when there is no attack during a simulation, during
attack and when GIDP responds to intrusion.
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Figure 5-19: Average network throughput before & during SD attack and after
GIDP intrusion response in 25 & 50 nodes network
The graph in fig 5-19 shows the average network throughput in normal circumstances
then it indicates the decrease when the network is under sleep deprivation attack and finally the
improvement in throughput after GIDP intrusion response action is taken in 25 and 50 node
networks. Similarly, fig 5-20 represents the same situation in the case of a black hole attack but
this time it shows the effect on data packet delivery ratio. It can be seen from the graph that the
data packet delivery ratio drops significantly in the case of a black hole attack but the GIDP
intrusion response action improves the PDR appreciably.
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Figure 5-20: Packet delivery ratio before & during BH attack and after
GIDP intrusion response in 25 & 50 nodes network
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5.4.2.3 Impact of intrusion response action on AODV & GIDP overhead
In this final scenario, we analyze the overhead of routing protocol AODV and our
protection mechanism GIDP imposed on the MANETs. We asses these overheads measured in
number of packets, which are evaluated as number of packets generated multiplied by the number
of hops the packet travels. In this experiment, we consider a 25 node network and analyzed
AODV and GIDP overhead by performing 30 runs (10 runs eachwith no response to intrusion,
fixed intrusion response and adaptive intrusion response) with rushing, black hole, and sleep
deprivation attacks.
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Figure 5-21: Impact of intrusion response on AODV overhead in case of
BU, RV & SD attacks 25 nodes network
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Graph in fig 5-21 shows the impact of intrusion response action on AODV overhead
when a) there is no response to intrusion, b) fixed response and c) adaptive intrusion response in
case of black hole, sleep deprivation, and rushing attack. The AODV overhead consists of all
control packets i.e. RREQ, RREP and RERR packets generated in the network during the
simulation. The graph shows that as a result of employing the proposed intrusion response
mechanism the AODV overhead decreases by 6.8% & 6.4% in case of sleep deprivation &
rushing attack respectively. Similarly, fig 5-22 shows the impact of intrusion response action on
GIDP traffic overhead including the overhead of clustering approach use which consists of the
network characteristic packets reported periodically from eNs to Clis & MN, cluster
configuration packets and the accusation packet generated by MN & Clfs to inform eNs about the
required intrusion response action. It can be seen from the graph that GIDP overhead is minimum
when there is no response to intrusion simply because there will be no accusation packets in the
network. GIDP overhead is similar when either fixed or adaptive intrusion response is used
however, using adaptive intrusion response in case of rushing attack minimizes the GIDP
overhead.
Analyzing the two graphs in fig 5-21 and 5-22 we can see that on average the AODV
traffic is approximately 8 times of GIDP traffic. If we consider the all the network traffic Le.
AODV, GIDP and UDP then GIDP traffic including clustering packets on average contributes
less than 5% of the total network traffic, a very low sum.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have first carried out an investigation to analyze the severity of various
attacks & the impact of GlOP fixed intrusion response mechanism on network performance. The
results of this investigation highlight the drawback of the fixed intrusion response of GIDP and
indicate the need of adaptive flexible intrusion response for GIDP to enhance the overall
performance of the intrusion detection and prevention mechanism propose in this thesis.
We then present the adaptive flexible intrusion response mechanism for GIDP. It proposes
three types of intrusion response actions: complete isolation, routing around intruding node and
no punishment from a list of possible intrusion responses mainly to stop intrusion, mitigate the
damage cause by the attack and prevent further attacks from the intruding nodes. GlOP now
selects the intrusion response action based on the confidence on detected attack, severity of attack
and the degradation in network performance. Decision tables that the network administrator
constructs & manages represent the intrusion response action selection criteria. Network
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administrator can slightly modify decision table to take on different security requirements of the
network and GIDP will adopt accordingly.
Finally, we assess the enhanced GIDP adaptive flexible intrusion response mechanism
through a case study for a proof of concept. The first part of the case study results reveals that
each GIDP response actions are appropriate in specific attack scenarios for instance in case of
severe attacks such as black hole and sleep deprivation GIDP has selected to completely isolate
the intruding node 81 and 78 percent of the times respectively. On the other hand in case of mild
attack such as rushing, GIDP in the majority of times selects not to punish the intruding node
because the impact of attack is low on network and taking severe action (isolation) could result in
net degradation in network performance. Results have also shown that GIDP can scale well in
larger network. The second part of the case study analyzes the impact of proposed intrusion
response actions on network performance and results show that GIDP with adaptive flexible
intrusion response mechanism is more efficient as compare to both fixed intrusion response and
no response in all attack scenarios, specifically in case of mild attacks such as rushing. We further
notice that average network throughput and packet delivery ratio improves after intrusion is
responded by GIDP and the proposed intrusion detection prevention mechanism incurs overhead
on the network which is less than 5% of the overall network routing traffic.
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Future work
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6.1 Summary
Data and routing services in MANETs are highly vulnerable to variety of attacks.
Although previous research effort has been made to secure MANETs, most of the work in the
literature has focused on protecting MANETs from specific kind of attacks. Therefore, the
motivation of this thesis emerges from realizing the need to secure MANETs from a wide variety
of attacks. The objective of this thesis is to propose a novel generalized intrusion detection &
prevention mechanism that can protect MANETs from a range of attacks. The new mechanism
ensures that the network is protected against various attacks with a reasonable overhead on the
network.
We develop and present our protection mechanism in three incremental phases in this
thesis. In first phase, adaptive intrusion detection and prevention method is design to secure
MANETs from denial of service attacks using anomaly based intrusion detection method that uses
variable threshold. In the second phase, we extend this protection method to a generalized
intrusion detection & prevention mechanism that can secure MANETs from a range of attacks
using the combination of anomaly based and knowledge based intrusion detection techniques.
Then we carried out an investigation study of the impact of various attacks and the impact of
intrusion response of GIDP on MANETs performance. The results of this study indicated the
drawbacks of using fixed intrusion response mechanism. Finally, to overcome the deficiencies of
fixed intrusion response, in the last phase of contribution in this thesis we design and implement
an adaptive flexible intrusion response scheme for GlOP.
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6.2 Thesis Contribution Overview
The contribution of this thesis has focused on design and implementation of generalized
intrusion detection & prevention mechanism for mobile ad hoc networks. The new protection
mechanism ensures that it secures MANETs from various attacks with a very low overhead on the
network. The contribution in this thesis is presented in three main incremental phases. which we
now overview.
1.Design & implementation of adaptive intrusion detection & prevention against DoS attacks
In first phase of the contribution in this thesis, we consider sleep deprivation attack through
malicious RREQ flooding as an example and first test the suitability of using only control
chart as a DoS attack detector. We demonstrated that this method based on static threshold
similar to the one proposed in [94][95] is not suitable in MANETs and consequently proposed
an adaptive intrusion detection and prevention mechanism. It employs anomaly based
intrusion detection that first use chi square test to indicate intrusion in the network by
checking its overall behaviour. To cope with the dynamics of MANETs, adaptation was
facilitated with the introduction of training profile updating process using exponentially
weighted moving average. The proposed method then used control chart to identify the
intruding node and finally, the proposed mechanism isolates the intruding nodes. This
integration of chi square with control chart has shown its effectiveness as a denial of service
detector in MANETs and formed the basis of a more capable protection mechanism.
2. Development of AIDP into a generalized intrusion detection & prevention
Realizing the need to secure MANETs from a range of attacks we broadened our approach
and proposed generalized intrusion detection & prevention mechanism GlOP by extending
AIOP. This proposed mechanism monitors most of the network layer characteristics and
network performance statistics such as average throughput, packet delivery ratio, routing
packet overhead and number of routing packet dropped during route discovery and
maintenance. Then GlOP used the combination of anomaly based and knowledge based
intrusion detection to secure MANETs from a wide variety of attacks. GIDP first indicate
intrusion in the network, then detect the attack intruder has launched, identify intruding nodes
and finally isolate them from the network. Accuracy in intrusion detection, attack
identification, & intruder identification stages is achieved by monitoring the network over a
period of time. To avoid penalizing properly behaving nodes as an intruder due to single
detection, GlOP maintains a test sliding window and looks for a certain number of detections
in the current test sliding window. This enables GlOP to penalize only those nodes that are
persistently intruding in the network.
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To assess the applicability and performance of GIDP we conducted a case study with various
attack scenarios including a scenario with multiple simultaneous attacks and showed that
GIDP can secure MANETs from a range of attacks, including multiple different simultaneous
attacks, with an affordable processing overhead on the network.
3. Adaptive intrusion response scheme proposed/or GIDP
In the last phase of the contribution in this thesis, we first carried out an investigation to
analyze the impact on MANETs' performance of a) various attacks in the networks and b)
different type of intrusion response actions. The result of this investigation indicated the
deficiencies of a fixed intrusion response of isolating intruding nodes in all cases and revealed
the need for a more flexible and adaptive intrusion response mechanism. Consequently, our
final contribution was to propose a flexible adaptive intrusion response scheme with three
types of intrusion response actions. This new intrusion response scheme selects intrusion
response action based on severity of attack, degradation in network performance and impact
of intrusion response action to improve and maintain a desired level of network performance.
A case study was conducted to first evaluate the intrusion response action appropriateness in
various attack scenarios. The benefits from an adaptive flexible intrusion response scheme for
GIDP were analyzed by first comparing GIDP with a) no intrusion response b) fixed intrusion
response and c) flexible intrusion response. Then the impact of adaptive intrusion response
scheme of GIDP on network throughput and packet delivery ratio is analyzed. Results of the
case study assisted in validating the proposed protection mechanism.
The proposed protection mechanism is adaptive in all three incremental phases, but
adaptive in different contexts. In the first and second phase of the contribution in this thesis, the
term adaptability refers to the ability of protection mechanism to cope with the dynamics of
MANETs in intrusion detection phase while the term adaptive intrusion response mention in third
contribution is specific for intrusion response scheme for GIDP. The proposed intrusion response
scheme is adaptive in terms of its selection of intrusion response action that is based on
confidence on detected attack, severity of attack and degradation in network performance.
The integration of these three main contributions of the thesis results in a concluding
intrusion detection and prevention mechanism for MANETs. This new proposed protection
mechanism is highly suitable and effective in securing mobile ad hoc networks from a range of
attacks. Naturally, a number of open issues remain to be addressed and some of them are
indicated in future work describe in section 6.3.
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6.3 Future work
The work presented in this thesis has achieved the research objective set initially in
section 1.2. However completeness of this work can not be claimed and some possibilities for
enhancement in the proposed work in future exist. We now briefly describe the possible direction
of future work.
• Basic security services described in section 2.2.1 such as authentication of nodes, data
integrity, data confidentiality, and non-reputation are important to prevent misuse of the
intrusion detection and prevention mechanism proposed in this thesis. Provision of these
security services will be important for deploying our proposed mechanism in real
environment. However, provision of these basic security services in mobile ad hoc
network itself is a multifaceted research problem; therefore, we think it is a possible
future research direction for the enhancement of the work proposed in this thesis .
• Unlike most of the existing attack-specific proposals in the literature the intrusion
detection and prevention mechanism proposed in this thesis is general i.e. it can protect
mobile ad hoc network from a wide variety of known attacks. However, intruders often
find new ways to attack and cause damage to the network. Therefore, we consider that
enabling the protection mechanism to learn from experience and use the existing
knowledge of attacks to infer and detect new intrusive activities (attacks) is an
interesting area of future research .
• Network security policies are enforced by high-level network managing entity.
Development and deployment of these policies are vital in network with dynamic
environment such as MANETs. We consider that developing and enforcing security
policies for our proposed protection mechanism is a possible future research direction
that could enable the mechanism to adapt in the networks with different security
requirements.
In mobile ad hoc network environment detecting and preventing attacks from colluding nodes and
dealing with liar nodes is a complex task. We consider that developing strategies to tackle
colluding attackers & liar nodes and its integration with proposed mechanism is another possible
future research direction.
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